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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the role of Thai non-government 
organizations (NGOs) and their use of a people participation approach in the process of 
economic and social development in Thailand. The thesis also provides a theoretical 
context for the NGOs in tackling the problems of underdevelopment.
In order to meet these aims, I define "development" in terms of the achievement 
not only of economic growth but also of the human values of dignity and freedom, and 
show that the distribution of the benefits of growth is a critical factor in development. I 
argue, therefore, that the state has an obligation to ensure development for all its 
citizens, in particular the common people (e.g. landless peasants and wage workers). I 
consider the role of the Thai state in the context of development planning from the early 
works of Phraya Suriyanuwat and Luang Pradit Manutham, through the period of 
economic nationalism to the more recent process, supported by the UN and World Bank 
in particular, of preparing Five Year Development Plans. Under this latter process, I 
argue, the state has pursued security objectives and supported private (and foreign) 
enterprises as the dominant actors in the development process despite the supposed 
acceptance of the World Bank and the IMF strategies of "Basic Needs (BNs)" or "Re­
distribution with Growth (RwG)".
I continue the investigation with an overview of development theories which are 
generally categorized into two schools of thought, modernization and neo-Marxist 
(including the dependency paradigm), and from this investigation it emerges that neither 
the modernization theory nor dependency paradigm is adequate to clearly explain the 
causes of underdevelopment or to provide the path to development. It is also noted that 
the debates of both schools of thought are in some respects reflected in the Thai 
development context and that the role of the state is an important focus particularly since 
Thai politics has been punctuated with military rule, coups and counter-coups. I 
conclude that there is a need for the democratic involvement of the people generally and 
for people participation in development in particular.
In discussing the concepts and methodologies used by NGOs in the 
development process, I argue that there is a major role for NGOs in development and 
support my claim with three selected case studies. These demonstrate that NGOs can 
play a catalytic role in the development process and can mediate between the people and 
the government in situations of exploitation and conflict. The case studies demonstrate
IV
too that the NGO's role as a "bridge of hope" between the common people and the 
government can promote true development without threat to the security, integrity or 
economic wellbeing of the parties involved.
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Introduction
The concepts of "basic minimum needs", "people's participation" and "self- 
reliant development" are widely accepted among development planners as fundamental 
to economic and social development.1 In practice, however, these concepts have not 
been well implemented as often indicated in academic research, in newspapers and in 
government reports. Moreover, these concepts are inseparable from the concept of 
"basic human rights" and can not be fully implemented unless the recognition of 
people's rights and self-expression are ratified politically, legally and culturally. To 
implement these concepts to benefit the common people requires the strengthening of 
people's consciousness and of their organization within the representative democratic 
system. Such organization will be a basis for carrying out "democratic planning, 
technical operation, and the creation of value change" in the development process.2 The 
strengthening of these people's organizations is part of a long-term goal of "building the 
nation from the bottom up" in Thailand at the present time, when the less-advantaged 
still have little bargaining power and need a lot of effort from various sources to help 
improve their organizations.
Amidst the scepticism and debate about people's organizations and movements, 
the aim of this thesis is to argue that the Thai non-government organizations (NGOs) 
can play a significant role as catalysts to help ensure that the four key concepts 
mentioned above are reflected in the economic and social development process in 
Thailand. In support of this approach, the NGOs, which represent a conscious middle- 
class movement, have shown that the four concepts are already embedded in "local 
wisdom" and community culture.3 Moreover, the NGOs, in trying to bring those 
concepts to bear in targeted areas and at the same time providing two-way 
communication between government officials and people, can be a counterbalancing 
power with the government politically and legally so that the people's rights to 
development can be fully recognized.
For example National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), The Sixth National 
Economic and Social Development Plan 0987-1991). Bangkok: NESDB, Office of the Prime 
Minister, 1987, pp. 367, 368.
D. Goulet, The Crucial Choice: A New Concept in the Theory of Development, New York: 
Atheneum, 1981, p. ix.
Chatthip Nartsupha, "Naeokhit Watthanatham Chumchon" [The Concept of Cultural 
Communityl, in Chakrit Chumwatthana and Ukrit Patthamanan, Saithan haeng khwamkhit 
[The Stream of Thought], [in Thai], Bangkok: The Committee for Conducting Academic 
Activities to Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of Khun Warunyupha Sanidwongse Na Ayudhaya, 
B.E. 2532 (1989), pp. 47-72.
2To achieve the aim of the study, this thesis provides an overall picture of the 
NGO movement since World War II emphasizing the role of the Thai NGOs in the 
development process; their historical background, underpining concepts and 
methodologies; some case studies to show their achievements and limitations in tackling 
the problems of peasants and workers; as well as some discussions indicating that they 
are an active social force, among others, in pursuing national development. Weaving 
together numerous aspects of the Thai NGO movement from the early 1970s to the 
present, I reveal the important role that they can play, and which must be played if 
Thailand is to develop for the benefit of all its citizens, with the hope that this thesis 
may be somehow useful for the NGO audience and government parties in their future 
policy-making processes.
The emphasis in the thesis on the human dimensions of development is 
particularly important because of the failure of development to date. The evidence 
shows that development policies in Thailand have encouraged private enterprise, 
assuming this would create prosperity and development, while reducing the role of the 
state to that of a supporter of private enterprise development. This has led to a high rate 
of economic growth, modem cities and extensive transportation and communications 
systems on the one hand, it has also produced deep economic, social and political 
problems in terms of disparity of income distribution, exploitation, youth problems, 
crime, urbanization, the deprivation of human rights, and increasing numbers of 
political prisoners on the other hand. To a large extent these economic, social and 
political problems have resulted from the role played by the state and its emphasis, 
under the US and World Bank influence, on security and growth rather than the welfare 
of its citizens. Since the beginning of the 1980s, however, the Thai government has 
depolarized domestic politics and moderated its development policies in a way which 
now enables concerned parties, including the NGOs, to help represent the problems of 
the common people. The government has also adopted development concepts such as 
"basic minimum needs", "people's participation" and "self-reliant development" and 
recognized a role for non-govemment agencies generally in achieving these objectives.
This thesis was written by combining my personal experience and empirical 
observation with academic research. As a participant and observer in Thai socio­
political movements, I was involved in the Student Rural Construction Group from 
1972 to 1974, worked as a teacher in the Northeast and the South of Thailand from 
1975 to 1980, and undertook research on Thai politics in consultation with a number of 
Asian Studies scholars. Before coming to study in Australia, I worked with the Union 
for Civil Liberty (UCL), a human rights organization, from 1985 to 1986. This 
background has provided me with a close understanding of socio-political aspects of
3Thai society and the root causes of the problems of the majority poor (peasants and 
workers), and has guided my selection of data, and approaches used in this thesis. To 
study in Australia during the period of intense international depoliticization of issues of 
common concern and the lessening of tensions between East and West has also given 
me a wider theoretical perspective and helped me to become aware of wider views about 
the future direction of Third World development.
In writing this thesis, I basically use an historical approach in that events are 
presented in sequence and historical rigour is applied to piecing together the overall 
picture .4 However, the topic of this thesis could not be satisfactorily treated without 
reference to the works of scholars from other disciplines such as anthropology, 
sociology, political science and economics. While arguing for the development of 
human beings as the first priority in a national development plan, this thesis intends to 
argue that development ought to be concerned with the improvement of the standard of 
living of the majority poor and direct its attention to "basic minimum needs", "people's 
participation", "basic human rights" and "self-reliant development". These four basic 
concepts are threaded through the thesis and used to examine development theories and 
the general theoretical debates, the Thai national development policies and the NGO 
movements, and to evaluate the role of NGOs in the development process. However, 
this study does not intend to provide a model of development to be replicated, but 
rather leaves the means to be flexible and open to choice as the particular circumstance 
of each target area warrants.
I have been resident in Australia throughout the writing of the thesis and did not 
returned to Thailand during this period for fieldwork or other purposes. This, to a 
certain extent, has determined the emphasis of the thesis and the type of information 
used. I have focused therefore on the conceptual development of debates rather than 
relying on actual participatory research. The data collection both in Thai and English 
was made through primary sources such as reports of meetings and seminars, annual 
reports, newspaper clippings, articles from various periodicals; through secondary 
sources such as research monographs, books and theses, and papers available in 
Australia in the Australian National Library, the Chifley and Menzies libraries at the 
Australian National University (ANU), and the libraries at the Australian International 
Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) and the Australian Council for Overseas Aid 
(ACFOA). Some articles and information have been sent from Thai NGO friends and 
both supervisors have kindly introduced me to some books and articles not otherwise 
available. Through my work on the thesis, I have found that my initial hypothesis has
4 E.H. Carr, What is History?. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1985.
4been reinforced -  that is, even though the NGOs are small and problematic, they have 
contributed significantly to development, directing their attention to the majority poor as 
the first priority and threading the four key development concepts into their work. They 
are now a part of the people's historical movements both internationally and 
domestically.
Finally, when translating from Thai into English, I have used the Library of 
Congress System, with some simplifications for typographical ease, for example the 
difference between " lo "  and "00" is not indicated, "ae" is given as "ae" and the 
macron to indicate long vowel length is not used. In addition, Thai Proper names are 
spelt according to the system of the Library of Congress, except where authors have 
been published in a variant form. For example, Pratip Sonthisuwan, who spelt his 
name as "Prateep Sondysuwan", has been quoted using the latter spelling. For the 
names of places in Thailand, I have depended on transliterations used in Thai official 
documents.
CHAPTER 1
Development Theories and Thai Development Context
It matters little how much information we possess about development if we have not grasped 
its inner meaning.
Denis Goulet, The Cruel Choice*
The advantage of economic growth is not that wealth increases happiness but that it increases 
the range of human choice.
W.A. Lewis^
Two decades of experience with international economic co-operation have convinced many 
leaders in the developing countries that basic changes in their economies and social systems are 
more important than quantitative increases in external resource transfers. ... It is now clear 
that popular participation in the production process and a better distribution of domestic 
income are preconditions of the kind of broadly based growth that developing countries need.
Overseas Development Council Communique^
Before carrying out, in the next three chapters, a specific analysis of Thai 
development and the emergence of the role of Thai non-government organizations 
(NGOs), it is important to provide a general overview of several development issues. 
They are: first, the definition of development; second, a summary of development 
theories4 used to analyse and explain development in Third World countries; third, 
some features of the debates on theories of development; and fourth, the application of 
development theories and debates in the Thai development context.
Definition of " developm ent”
The term "development" is controversial. It is widely used to distinguish 
between groups of countries which are thought of as "developed" and others which are 
variously known as "developing", "underdeveloped" or "less-developed" countries. 
The two groups are also referred to as North (developed) and South (underdeveloped)
Quoted from M.P. Todaro, Economics for a Developing World. London: Longman, 2nd. ed., 
1982, p. 87.
Quoted from ibid., p 105.
Overseas Development Council (ODC), "Communique on Development Issues: Self Reliance 
and International Reform", World Development. Vol. 2, No. 6, June 1974, p. 54.
4 By a theory, I mean an organized, goal-directed philosophical framework used to analyse 
dispersed evidence and activities.
6countries. Yet there is no general agreement as to what constitutes development. When 
some people talk about development, they have in mind an improvement in the economy 
as measured by indicators such as Gross National Product (GNP) and per capita 
incomes. Others think of non-monetary social variables such as life expectancy, literacy 
rates and the existence of health and education services; or in other words, they look to 
factors reflecting the quality of life as a measure of development. The choice of 
development methods and an assessment of their success or otherwise depends to a 
large degree therefore on the choice of definition of the term development itself. In this 
section, I will summarize various approaches to defining development ranging from 
those depending on classical monetary measures, to those adopting non-monetary 
measures which emphasize different priorities in achieving development.
In the first approach, development is defined in purely economic terms using 
economic growth as the measure. As Todaro explains, in the 1950s and 1960s 
development was generally seen in terms of "the capacity of a national economy, whose 
initial economic condition has been more or less static for a long time, to generate and 
sustain an annual increase of its gross national product at rates of perhaps 5-7 % or 
more" [italics as in the original].5 The concept of development was thus generally seen 
in terms of economic development in which benefits from the growth in the gross 
national product would "trickle down" to the majority poor in the form of jobs and other 
economic opportunities, and create the necessary conditions for distributing the 
economic and social benefits of growth.
However, the experiences from the 1950s and 1960s revealed that although a 
large number of developing countries did achieve satisfactory growth rates in line with 
UN targets, there was evidence too of increasingly inequitable income distribution and 
rising unemployment, and the living condition of most people, particularly the poor,
5 The "Development Decade" was designated by resolution of the United Nations General 
Assembly in which most member states are developing countries. Various development 
assistance activities have been created within the UN system such as the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and World 
Health Organization (WHO). The General Assembly also makes resolutions on international 
development strategies. See G.M. Meier, Emerging From Poverty: The Economics That 
Really Matters. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 42-43.
The 1960s represented the "First Development Decade" and "development" was conceived 
largely in terms of the attainment of a six per cent annual target growth rate of GNP. An 
alternative indicator which purported to combine economic and social performance was "per 
capita income" which was calculated by dividing GNP by the total population. While per 
capita income appeared to take into account the ability of the nation to expand its output at a 
rate faster than the growth rate of its population, it was, in fact, "biased" because it took "no 
account of income distribution and the ownership of the assets" which were "employed to 
generate part of that income" [italic as in the original] [M.P. Todaro, Economic Development 
in the Third World. London: Longman, 3rd. ed., 1985, pp. 83, 590].
7remained unchanged or even worsened. By the end of the first UN Development 
Decade, it was widely accepted that the focus on economic development strategies 
emphasized rapid urban industrialization at the expense of agriculture and rural 
development, and the dependence on "trickle down" was not working.6
Much of the criticism of development at this time was that it failed either to meet 
human needs or to assist man's attempt to realize his potential by creating a just and 
equitable society which suits and benefits his interests. In highlighting the human 
aspects of development, critics often emphasized alternative social and political factors 
(such as ignorance, disease, political unrest) which should be developed or improved in 
line with economic growth.7 Many of the leading proponents of these views were 
outspoken critics of official international development strategies based on growth and 
modernization.8 The narrow definition of "development" which had supported the
6 Ibid., p. 84. See too A. Blaser who shows also that GNP is "a poor indicator of rights 
fulfilment" because a high GNP might result from "rights deprivation associated with 
overdevelopment in the high-GNP unit and underdevelopment, poverty, or dependency in 
others". GNP also excludes important factors which might "advance rights to employment and 
well-being" [A. Blaser, "Assessing Human Rights: The NGO Contribution", in V.P. Nanda, 
J.R. Scarritt, and G.W. Shepherd, Jr., Global Human Rights: Public Policies. Comparative 
Measures, and NGO Strategies. Colorado: Westview Press, 1981, p. 275].
Indicators are needed so that the outcomes of development can be tested against stated 
objectives. There are however a whole range of indicators used in relation to development 
theory depending often on the perspective of the users. For instance, economic indicators 
include in addition to GNP and per capita income (to which we have already referred), such 
things as, household expenditure, consumption of goods and services, and percentage of 
unemployment. Common social indicators are levels of health, life expectancy and mortality 
rates, education and literacy rates, and may include statistics on strikes, demonstrations and even 
court cases. Typical political indicators are the number of political prisoners, degree of civil 
rights and liberty, extent of freedom for the press, as well as changes of governments by coup 
d'dtat
Not only is it necessary to choose the indicators, it is also important to be aware of the quality 
or validity of the data available in different situations. The collection of data may depend on 
social conditions within a particular country, for example, whether or not the freedom of the 
press and of people's opinion are restricted. In the case of a closed society, a reliable assessment 
with hard data may arise from analyses by country experts such as lawyers, sociologists and 
historians. Also some data and information may be relevant to one place and time but 
irrelevant to the another place and time. The complexity of socio-economic and political factors 
creates some difficulties for an examiner to make the right judgement in every event [Blaser, 
op. cit. pp. 273-278, 281-282], See also D. Seers, "What Are We Trying to Measure?", 
Journal of Development Studies. Vol. 8, No. 3, April 1972, pp. 21-36.
8 For example G. Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, London: 
Penguin Press, 1968; L.B. Pearson, Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on 
International Development. London: Pall Mall Press, 1970. For comment on Myrdal’s work 
see C. Collingwood, "Reviews: Reflection on Myrdal and Underdevelopment", Journal of 
Contemporary Asia. Vol. 1, No. 3, 1970, pp. 92-99.
8economic growth approach therefore needed to be redefined.^ An example of the move 
to adopt a wider definition of development can be seen in White's definition of 
development as:
"... a process of social change which 1) increases the total benefits available; 2) distributes new 
benefits in some inverse rates to the distribution of benefits already acquired; 3) offers some 
assurance of being a process that can be sustained over time".
Of particular importance in formulating a new approach to the problems of 
development was the role of the International Labour Organization (ILO) which in 1969 
launched the World Employment Programme, proposing the new "basic needs" and 
"people participation" approaches which were later recognized by the United Nations 
and the World Bank as fundamental concepts in economic and social development.* 11 
The basic needs concept included "certain minimum requirements of a family for private 
consumption: adequate food, shelter and clothing ..." and "... essential services 
provided by and for the community at large, such as safe drinking water, sanitation,
9 Todaro, Economic Development, p. 84. Todaro notes that as a result of this need, development 
during the 1970s "... came to be redefined in terms of the reduction or elimination of poverty, 
inequality, and unemployment within the context of a growing economy".
111 J. White, The Politics of Foreign Aid. London: The Bodley Head, 1974, p. 30. White regards 
development not only in the term of "economic growth" but also "a process of social change" 
which distributes the growth to participants. However, White does not specify which groups 
would benefit from the development. Todaro also redefined the term development by saying 
that "[DJevelopment must, therefore, be conceived as a multidimentional process involving 
major changes in social structures, popular attitudes and national institutions, as well as the 
acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality and the eradication of absolute 
poverty" (italic as in original). His redefinition of development was the same in both the 1977 
and 1985 editions of his book. He maintained a three dimensional view of change: social 
structures, popular attitudes and national institutions, and regarded development as a "process" 
of change to reduce "inequality" and eradicate "absolute poverty" [Todaro, Economic 
Development, p. 85]. See also, Todaro, Economics for a Developing World, pp. 406-407. 
From a sociological point of view there was reconsideration of development as a process in 
terms of "interaction" between societies and "action" to bridge the gaps. See A.M.M. 
Hoogvelt, The Sociology of Developing Societies. London: The Macmillan Press, 2nd. ed., 
1978.
11 For further information see the United Nations, Popular Participation in Decision-Making for 
Development. Geneva: UN Sale Publication No. E. 75. IV. 10, 1975. The World Bank 
supports the concepts in terms of "Redistribution with Growth" (RwG) and "Basic Needs 
strategy" (BNs) in the Report to the Board of Governors Annual Meeting, 1973, Nairobi. See 
also R.S. McNamara, The McNamara Years at the World Bank: Major Policy Addresses of R.S. 
McNamara 1968-1981. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981, Ch. 12.
The concept of people's participation was introduced into the development process as follows: 
first, to study and identify the people's needs; second, to formulate and decide on the 
development programmes to overcome the needs; third, to implement those programmes; 
fourth, to monitor and review the progress and effects of the programmes; and fifth, to decide 
what future measures are needed [International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and Consumers' 
Association of Penang (CAP), "Conclusions and Recommendations of the Seminar on Human 
Rights and Development in the Rural Areas of Southeast Asia", Rural Development and 
Human Rights in Southeast Asia. Report of a Seminar, Penang: CAP, 1981, p. 22].
9public transport, and health and education facilities".12 However, when implemented in 
development plans, the basic needs proposal goes somewhat further than its initial 
intention.13 In particular, the basic needs approach proposed by the ILO added further 
to the debate surrounding the definition of development by focusing on the participation 
of the people and including the concept of human rights in the development process:
[A] basic needs oriented policy implies the participation of the people in making the decisions 
which affect them .... The satisfaction of an absolute level of basic needs as so defined should 
be placed within a broader framework —  namely the fulfilment of basic human rights, which 
are not only ends in themselves but also contribute to the attainment of other goals. ^
The "basic needs", "people participation", and "basic human rights" concepts 
are powerful but controversial. They are powerful because they impose human values 
on what were narrow economic development objectives so that development will be 
measured by its ability to bring to all people the human ability to provide for their basic 
necessities for life sustenance; the human dignity to be a person and not a tool to be 
used by others for their own ends; and the human freedom to have choice.15 These 
concepts thus put people and their needs at the centre of development. However, they 
become controversial concepts because, in different regions or countries, it is argued 
that there are different standards, differences in social objectives and varying problems 
that arise in ranking basic needs, in evaluating the role of the people and even in the 
perception of what are basic human rights. Scholars, however, tend to minimize such 
controversial problems by arguing that when the three concepts are accepted as part of 
national development goals, planners should, with due regard to historical sequences 
and social evolution, create appropriate models suitable for a particular society in order 
to achieve the goals.16
We may conclude in brief that when the three concepts: "basic needs", "people 
participation" and "basic human rights" are incorporated into the country's development 
approach, we may re-assess the ways in which we currently categorize human societies. 
Such descriptions as "First World", "Third World", "developed" and "developing" are 
categories which "represent only a single [facet of a] complex of human activities: the 
level of national income, the material standards of life, and the consumption of
12 International Labour Organization (ILO), Employment. Growth and Basic Needs: A One-World 
Problem. Geneva: ILO, 1976, p. 32.
13 P. Sireeten and S J. Burki, "Basic Needs: Some Issues", World Development, Vol. 6, No. 3, 
1978, pp. 411-421.
^  International Labour Organization (ILO), op. cit.. p. 32.
15 Todaro, Economic Development, pp. 85-87.
16 Sireeten and Burki. op. cit.. pp. 413-421.
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industrial products".17 That is, a definition of development which includes not only 
economic values but also the human values of dignity and freedom for humanity, makes 
it possible to see that people of whatever "world" or category "... are people with 
significant histories, people who have made major contributions to the development of 
human societies, people who might possibly have something to contribute to the future 
growth of the world".18
Summary of development theories: the explanation of Third World 
development
Before discussing the essence of development theories, some general points 
relating to the use of theories should be mentioned. First, theories and practice in 
development may be seen from two perspectives. On the one hand we have the 
theoretical side where theories are debated and developed by academics and used by 
policy makers in governments and international institutions who turn theories into more 
practical proposals for action. On the other hand there are the practitioners, 
administrators, development workers and the people who, whatever their understanding 
of theory, will be guided by ideas and beliefs drawn from theories and are, to some 
extent, the ultimate translators of theory into practice. Referring to this distinction 
between theory and practice, Poulantzas says that "[T]he distance between theory and 
the real always persists despite the effort to fill it".19
Second, a theoretical framework is sometimes inadequately developed for 
dealing with particular target groups and it is often necessary for the users of theory to 
have some familiarity with a particular society and the problem to be addressed, or to 
depend on country experts.20
Third, the use of a theoretical framework is often not a value-free process and 
the objectivity of outcome cannot be ensured irrespective of the user. Bias may occur in 
the use of theory simply because the user is so familiar with the problems studied, or 
with co-workers in the same field, that an objective outcome of study and work cannot
17 C. Wilson, "Thai and Western Approaches to the Study of Thai History: Interaction and 
Growth", in E.B. Ayal (ed.), The Study of Thailand: Analysis of Knowledge. Approaches and 
Prospects in Anthropology. Art History. Economics. History and Political Science. Ohio: 
Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies, 1978, pp. 174-175.
18 EM-, PP- 174-175.
19 N. Poulantzas, State. Power. Socialism, transl. P. Camiller, London: Lowe & Brydone Printers 
Ltd, 1978, p. 23.
20 Blaser, op. cit.. p. 266.
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be guaranteed.21 Moreover, bias may also occur because the user chooses the theory 
for a specific personal or political purpose.
Fourth, there are difficulties in selecting development indicators because the 
choice of indicators and the way they are measured will probably reflect the actual 
theory under scrutiny (the theory demands certain indicators). Nevertheless for the 
purpose of examining the adequacy of theory, we can assert that any theory of 
development will be closely concerned with the questions such as who gets what, 
when, where, how and at whose expense; or in other words, the question of 
development for whom. Furthermore, reliable measures must be consistent and clear 
without shifts in meaning and assignment for different issues.22
Fifth, theories themselves should be subject to debate, particularly among those 
who work in development, as well as among academics. It is necessary, too, for basic 
disagreements to be taken into account so that a wide range of groups (academics, NGO 
workers, common people) will be able to help provide separate, up-to-date and relevant 
views on development issues and contribute to the reassessment and formulation of new 
theory.23
The following section aims to review problems in the use of development 
theories. Although most people recognize the symptoms of underdevelopment and are 
in agreement in their intention to "cure the disease", there are many disagreements as to 
the causes of underdevelopment. The breadth of this disagreement can be seen in two 
polarized schools of thought which, following Higgott, we can loosely term the "Neo- 
Marxist school and the Modernization or Diffusionist school".24 These two schools of 
thought have different ideologies or sets of philosophical tenets. For example, the neo- 
Marxists claim that the modernization ideology is used for serving the dominant class
Even though some government officials may have a good understanding of people's problems 
they are tied not only by rules and regulations, but also official perspectives (or "middle-class" 
perspectives) which may be the real basis of theoretical analysis and possible solutions. In 
order to avoid bias, Amnesty International (AI), for instance, does not allow staff members to 
work in their own country and thus avoids potential accusations that the results of their studies 
are not objective.
D. Goldsworthy,"Analysing Theories of Development", paper presented at a seminar organized 
by the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, May 1977, p. 9; and Blaser, 
cit.. p. 277.
Blaser, op. cit.. pp. 266-270.
R. Higgott, "Competing Theoretical Perspectives on Development and Underdevelopment: A 
Recent Intellectual History", Politics. Vol. XIII, No. 1, May 1978, p. 26.
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whereas they argue that their own ideology takes the side of the underprivileged.25 
However, the differences which exist within and between those theories are still 
debated.
Generally speaking, the period commencing from the end of World War II until 
the present time can be divided into three broad periods which can be identified in terms 
of the impact of theory on development. In the 1950s and 1960s, the first stage of 
development theory was dominated by the modernization theory. The second stage 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s, was characterized by two separate approaches: 
there was a period of re-assessment of modernization, which switched the analysis of 
underdevelopment from an emphasis on Western-oriented transformation to a political- 
order model; at the same time there was the emergence of the dependency paradigm 
(generally categorized within neo-Marxist theory) which criticized both the 
modernization theory and orthodox Marxism (e.g. Lenin's theory of imperialism). In 
the third period from the mid-1970s, there has been much theoretical debate and 
reassessment of earlier theoretical approaches, involving strong criticism of the 
modernization and dependency schools of thought, but without the formulation of any 
new theoretical approaches that have gained widespread support.26
For simplicity, I will organize the following theoretical discussion and its 
relation to development practice in terms firstly of modernization, then in terms of 
Marxism and dependency, and finally in terms of the general issues which have 
emerged in theoretical debates since the late seventies. The discussion of modernization 
and dependency will correspond broadly to their periods of influence as outlined in the 
previous paragraph.
Modernization theory
During the 1950s and 1960s, the theory of development was dominated by the 
modernization theory which provided a planning framework for underdeveloped 
countries to develop following a Western pattern. Modernization theory, which had its 
roots in the Western view of political and social change according to the theory of
R. Sandbrook, "The 'Crisis' in Political Development Theory", The Journal of Development 
Studies. Vol. 12, No. 2, January 1976, p. 168.
R. Higgott et al.. "Theories of Development and Underdevelopment: Implications for the Study 
of Southeast Asia", in R. Higgott and R. Robison (eds.), Southeast Asia: Essays in the 
Political Economy of Structural Change. London: Routlege & Kegan Paul, 1985, p. 16.
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evolution and a structural-functional model of society,27 held the simple view that the 
causes of underdevelopment lay in the backwardness of pre-capitalist societies. In 
order to eradicate underdevelopment and to bridge the gap between underdeveloped 
societies and the developed West it was considered necessary only to give the correct 
stimuli, whereby the pre-capitalist societies, which contained both traditional and 
modern elements, would be transformed into industrial societies with modern 
institutions as had developed in the West. The chosen stimuli to development included 
foreign capital, investment and technology which were considered necessary for a rapid 
increase in the rate of economic growth in the developing countries; foreign aid (which 
freed up domestic capital) was another key factor in this approach, providing a major 
influx of capital to facilitate building an industrial base as had been so successful in 
post-war Europe under the Marshall Plan;28 and the transfer of (Western) political and 
cultural values to the underdeveloped areas to support capitalist expansion.29
Modernization theory, applied in most developing countries under the guidelines 
of the first UN development decade, was characterized by an emphasis on economic 
growth, social differentiation and the evolution of political organizations.30 
Economically, the growth in GNP was to be achieved by the formation of industrial 
systems run by (foreign) private enterprises based on modem technology and by the 
specialization of economic roles and activities (e.g. production, consumption, marketing 
and labour) following an Anglo-American model of the free-market economy. 
Economic plans and activities were centralized under the control of national 
development institutions. Socially, development was also considered to be achieved by
The theory of evolution was derived from Darwin's definition of biological evolution of human 
species "in terms of random variation and natural selection" which was accepted by scientists in 
the nineteenth century. Social scientists, later, borrowed from Darwin's theory to explain 
human history in evolutionary terms. See W P. Wertheim, Evolution and Revolution: The 
Rising Waves of Emancipation. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1974, p. 17; and A.A. Mazrui, 
"From Social Darwinism to Current Theories of Modernization", World Politics. Vol. 21, No.
I, October 1968, pp. 69-83.
The structural-functional model emphasizes social forces within (rather than outside) a society 
and places high development value on well-organized institutions. Thus the achievement of 
economic growth is seen to rely on the efficiency of political units which facilitate the 
acceleration and diffusion of growth to eradicate problems of underdevelopment. See Higgott, 
"Competing Theoretical Perspectives", p. 28.
J. K. Galbraith, The Nature of Mass Poverty. New York: Penguin Books, 1979, Ch. 2. 
Galbraith was involved in early U.S. Government deliberations on development as well as 
being an early development theorist at Harvard. In this chapter, he give a useful summary of 
the emergence of a development approach in the West.
Advocated by economists such as W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non- 
Communist Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd. ed., 1971.
30 S.N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966, Ch. 1.
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encouraging individual effort and enterprise and by creating organizational structures 
which allowed specialized roles for individuals working in the institutional sphere. In 
particular the separation of the individual's occupational, political, family and kinship 
roles and responsibilities were considered to be critical, otherwise individual effort 
would be lost under the weight of social obligations. Social "mobilization" involved a 
change of people's attitudes, values, and expectations through the agency of wider 
education, more effective communications and mass media.
The development of political organizations in the first stage of modernization 
theory was guided by the "input-output" model of scholars from the American Social 
Science Research Council. Based on the political models of Easton and Lasswell, 
Almond devised a political-development model using input and output functions. His 
input functions involved what he called political socialization and recruitment, interest 
articulation, interest aggregation and political communication, whereas the output 
functions, similar to a "separation of powers" model, were composed of rule-making, 
rule application and rule adjudication. Almond also argued that this input-output- 
function model created not only the "modem" political system but also the "pattern of 
boundary maintenance" (political sovereignty).31
Western political concepts and frameworks were introduced to create "modem" 
nation states. In particular concepts of political groups (e.g. parties and the party 
system), political functions, interest and pressure groups (for increasing participation in 
politics by social groups throughout society), nation-state, territorial units and different 
forms of nationalism were introduced.32 After the period of decolonization, the 
Western pattern had been extensively imposed as a political model for most colonial 
countries, for instance, the reform of administrative practices, the establishment of 
taxation system to replace tributes in kind and corvdes of labour, the reform of secular 
and codified legal systems, the encouragement of liberal economic policies, and the
G.A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics", in G.A. 
Almond and J.S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1960, pp. 14-18.
32 L.W. Pye, "The Politics of Southeast Asia", in Almond and Coleman (eds.), The Politics of 
the Developing Areas, pp. 81-84.
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provision of Westernized educational systems.33 The difference between modern and 
traditional societies was seen in that the modem society was typified by a high rate of 
growth in the economy, public expression through pluralistic political organizations, the 
growing complexity of bureaucratic organizations and mechanisms, and cultural values 
which emphasized the individual and respect for their initiative and efficiency.3^
The outcomes from the application of modernization theory during the 1950s 
and 1960s were not as had been hoped for. Economically, despite generally 
encouraging rates of growth, there was very little "trickle down" from the rich to the 
poor. Disparities in the standard of living and in career opportunities between urban 
and rural areas accelerated and caused much urban migration, unemployment and crime. 
The process of industrialization did not lead to "the emergence of a politically relevant 
entrepreneurial or middle class" [my emphasis], because commercial activities were 
largely in the hands of foreign groups.35 Socially, however, the application of 
modernization theory resulted in most countries in the expansion of an educated "middle 
class" which was expected to transfer its "modernity" to the areas of traditional societies 
within the boundary of the state. But in many countries this middle class did not 
participate in economic activities and had no basis for political expression; it became 
frustrated with economic and social change in which it was playing only a limited role. 
The changes were brought into their society from outside through foreign investment, 
Western culture and political "pluralist" systems, and there was little scope for an 
"internal initiative" to function effectively in the new social structure.^ Political parties, 
interest and pressure groups were weak and ill-developed which meant that important 
sources of power to counterbalance "authoritarian" rule were missing.37 The middle 
classes soon began to doubt the application of the Western model of development to
Although Thailand has never been a colony, it could not avoid being heavily influenced by the 
West. For example, King Chulalongkom introduced the "reformation" in which traditional 
aristocrats were given new roles and responsibilities as "officials" in different departments set up 
by advisors from various Western countries. King Vachiravudh introduced fixed and standardized 
taxation to replace corv£e labour, and introduced university education with the foundation of 
Chulalongkom University for producing public servants. He also provided support for some 
students to study abroad (mainly in Western countries).
Eisenstadt, op. cit.. pp. 2-19. See also J.L.S. Girling, Capital and Power: Political Economy 
and Social Transformation. London: Croom Helm, 1987, pp. 136-138.
J.S. Coleman, "Conclusion: The Political Systems of the Developing Areas", in Almond and 
Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas, p. 537.
Eisenstadt, op. cit.. pp. 21-28.
Pye, op. cit.. pp. 115-116. Pye further argued that people were seeking political participation 
to resolve personal problems associated with their breaking from traditional systems and "there 
is no logic that [political behaviour under the guideline of modernization theory] can relate the 
specific needs of the individual to any specific goals of public policy" flbid.. p. 133].
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their particular stage of transition from traditional to modem society. Their doubt and 
frustration were soon being expressed through social demands and movements against 
foreign penetration and the abuse of power by domestic elites, resulting in growing 
political disorder at both national and international levels.38
Modernization theory had no clear answer as to how to increase people's 
participation in political development, or how to cope with increasing social demands 
and opposition movements.39 In the face of the growing problems of political disorder, 
there was a re-assessment of the modernization theory during the late 1960s and early 
1970s. The re-assessment which was based on the experiences of development in the 
1950s and early 1960s, retained the emphasis on economic growth but introduced the 
notion of political order as providing the essential context for growth to be effective. 
One of the reasons for adopting the political order model was the need for "effective 
authority" as proposed by Huntington:
They [the communist governments] may not provide liberty, but they do provide authority; 
they do create governments that can govern. While Americans laboriously strive to narrow the 
economic gap, communists offer modernizing countries a tested and proven method of bridging 
the political gap. Amidst the social conflict and violence that plague modernizing countries, 
they provide some assurance of political o r d e r t
The political order approach to development, which supported political stability and 
regime maintenance, became attractive at the ideological level among ruling elites in 
most Third World countries who sought to stay in power as long as possible by arguing 
that the extension of governments' terms were necessary for the implementation of 
national development policies in the crucial period of economic transformation. At the
Eisenstadt, op. cit.. pp. 131-133.
This issue was never satisfactorily resolved even though modernization theorists such as 
Huntington regarded people's participation in political development to be "the most fundamental 
aspect of political modernization" [S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 34].
Ibid., p. 8. Huntington argues further that ”[T]he no-party state is the natural state for a 
traditional society" and that the no-party state is "fragile" because modernization will lead to 
opposition to political parties and ultimately to instability and even military coups ribid.. pp. 
403-407]. It seems to me that Sarit's military regime set up under the banner "Prachathipatai 
baepthai" (Thai-style democracy) fits the political order model of Huntington which claims that 
power and authority in modernizing countries "... may be filled temporarily by charismatic 
leadership or by military force" hbid.. p. 461]. He thus seems to give approval for any form of 
stability that will provide a climate for growth even if this is not representative. This sort of 
approach by Huntington is reinforced by his approach to corruption which he argued "... is a 
direct product of the rise of new groups with new resources and the efforts of these groups to 
make themselves effective within the political sphere. Corruption may be the means of 
assimilating new groups into the political system by irregular means because the system has 
been unable to adapt sufficiently fast to provide legitimate and acceptable means for this 
purpose" fibid.. p. 61].
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same time, social and political movements and organizations including interest and 
pressure groups were prohibited. The political order approach thus helped in the 
creation of authoritarian regimes which, often with the support of Western aid donors, 
saw themselves as adopting the harsh and unpopular measures necessary to confront 
political chaos and economic stagnation while at the same time maintaining privileges 
for the elite.
Without any form of opposition from political movements, growth-led industrial 
development in this period was greatly expanded at the expense of agricultural 
development. The economic development was channelled into both small and large 
enterprises. Investors in small enterprises sought to take advantage of the massive 
pools of cheap unskilled labour which resulted from the extensive migration of people 
to the cities from rural areas. Investors in the large enterprises, mostly foreigners, 
introduced modem technology with high levels of productivity which were less 
dependent on labour. Fitzgerald argued that the "modem" industrial and "traditional" 
agricultural sectors in developing areas were interrelated in such a way that the modem 
sector benefited from the low wage structure in the "traditional" sectors (kept low by the 
state to prevent consumer good prices from rising), and the use of traditional and 
cultural values to ensure "labour discipline" and "political quiescence".41
The results of growth-led development following the Huntington model created 
not only huge social problems but eventually the breakdown of authoritarian regimes in 
developing societies. There appeared to have developed a structural duality with 
industrial growth and urbanization on one hand and the stagnation of rural areas on the 
other. This was seen in the weakening of the self-sufficiency of rural communities, the 
disruption of older pattern of production and traditional occupations (e.g. handicrafts), 
and the diminution of traditional security through kinship assistance, the growth in 
unemployment, underemployment and crime, as well as social and political conflicts 
within societies.42 The structural breakdown of authoritarian regimes was often marked 
by the emergence of various kinds of underground movements, the expansion of 
"outlawed" Communist parties, demands from different groups and the inability of 
central governments to deal with those social and political activities.
F.T. Fitzgerald, "Sociologies of Development", in P. Limqueco and B. McFarlane (eds.), Neo- 
Marxist Theories of Development London: Croom Helm, 1983, p. 15.
Eisenstadt, op. cit.. pp. 21-25, 83, 131; see concrete evidence in the Southeast Asian region 
provided by P.F. Bell and S.A. Resnick, "The Contradictions of Post-War Development in 
Southeast Asia", Journal of Contemporary Asia. Vol. 1, No. 1, 1970, pp. 37-40.
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Since the late 1970s, modernization theory has been moving towards a "public 
policy" approach or policy analysis which is the latest adaptation of modernization 
theory to cope with social and political chaos. Reacting to strong criticisms from the 
dependency paradigm, modernization theory changed its analysis to use a political 
economy approach to tackle the problems of underdevelopment. The new "political 
economy of development" is represented by American political scientists such as Apter, 
Almond and Easton who use "post-liberal theory", responding to the limitations of 
behavioural and liberal political theory of American liberal intellectual tradition to 
counter dependency and to refine modernization theory, leading to a so-called "public 
policy" approach to development.43
The public policy approach relies on the role of elites in the policy analysis 
process. The effective implementation of policy occurs on the basis of greater 
centralization of bureaucratic and technological control.44 Higgott claims that 
technocratic elites tacitly accept the existing order and points to specific weaknesses in 
the public policy approach. First, it fails to take into account the fact that, in developing 
countries, the process of policy making is often "cumbersome" and "wasteful". Often 
powerful groups (such as business and military groups) take part, behind the scenes, in 
the process of political bargaining and, as a consequence, policies are not radically 
changed but are merely modified, which in turn leads to stagnation in the decision­
making process 45 Secondly, it is limited in that it uses "within-system" analysis as its 
main methodology to analyse policy within a regime maintenance context rather than in 
the broader political and social context (including international). In other words, it 
analyses inputs and outputs within a system and often ignores the linkage with external
43 R. Higgott, Political Development Theory: The Contemporary Debates. London: Croom Helm, 
1983, pp. 24, 29. The "political economy of development" was the modernization theory 
response to Baran’s "political economy of underdevelopment" thesis which was a radical 
structuralist analysis akin to the dependency paradigm which came later.
44 Ibid., p. 33.
43 This claim might be reversed in a positive way and national policies changed to benefit the 
people in general, if the government, even composed of the national bourgeoisie and military, 
acts as a "true" representative of the people.
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factors involved and therefore has little power to change or restructure the system.46 As 
a consequence, the public policy approach may be regarded by some scholars to be a 
"vehicle for helping ruling elites improve their position", particularly as most Third 
World political elites have close links with foreign powers 47
From Marxism to Dependency
The second stage in the formulation of development theory which I outlined 
earlier, saw the emergence of the dependency paradigm which developed its analysis 
from orthodox Marxism and appeared to criticize both orthodox Marxism and 
modernization theory 48 The essence of orthodox Marxism lay in its threefold analysis:
"Structural-functional" or "within-system" approaches are ahistorical approaches and although 
they can describe the phenomenon of social change, they have not enough theoretical power to 
understand the reasons for change going beyond the existing structure. Chatthip Nartsupha of 
Chulalongkom University rejects the "within-system" approach and suggests that the study of 
social science should be conducted on the basis of the structure of the system, evolution of the 
system and contradictions within the system. He argues that social science researchers should 
analyse not only a particular part of the system but also the overall structure (especially in 
analysing the problems of Thai development). Secondly, social science researchers should 
emphasize the development of the system, because the study of human society comprises an 
understanding of historical processes of change and the application of theory. Thirdly, social 
science researchers should emphasize conflict within the system as the study of social conflict 
will lead to an understanding of wider problems (e.g. of underdevelopment). Studies along these 
lines, Chatthip argues, would contribute to achieving peaceful social change. See Chatthip 
Nartsupha, "Sangkhomsat samrap prathetthai" [Social Science for Thailand], in Chatthip 
Nartsupha et al.. Setthasat kap prawatsatthai [Thai Economics and History], [in Thai], 
Bangkok: Samnakphim sangsan, B.E. 2524 (1980), pp. 86-97.
Higgott, Political Development Theory, p. 35.
Theotonio dos Santos gives the definition of "dependence" as "[A] conditioning situation in 
which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and 
expansion of others. A relationship of interdependence between two or more economies or 
between such economies and the world trading system becomes a dependent relationship when 
some countries can expand through self-impulsion while others, being in a dependent position, 
can only expand as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant countries, which may have 
positive or negative effects on their immediate development. In either case, the basic situation 
of dependence causes these countries to be both backward and exploited. Dominant countries are 
endowed with technological, commercial, capital and socio-political predominance over 
dependent countries - the form of this predominance varying according to the particular 
historical moment - and can therefore exploit them, and extract part of the locally produced 
surplus. Dependence, then, is based upon an international division of labour which allows 
industrial development to take place in some countries while restricting it in others, whose 
growth is conditioned by and subjected to the power centres of the world." Quoted from K.K. 
Peng, The Malavsian Economy: Structures and Dependence. Kuala Lumpur: Institut 
Masyarakat, 1983, p. 9.
Peng, examined Malaysia as a case study of dependence in developing countries. He argues that 
developing countries are dependent upon developed countries in forms of direct economic 
impact, trade, finance and technology. At the same time, the developed countries gain surplus 
transfer from the developing countries in forms of investment, trade, finance and technology. In 
this regard, the developing countries are "conditioned by and subjected to" the developed 
capitalist countries structurally and dependently so that they can "suck out" surplus from the 
developing countries [ibid., pp. 9-10].
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the labour law of value; the base/superstructure model; and the idea of "organic 
totality".4  ^ Marx's law of value derived from his recognition of the labour value of 
human beings as both manual and intellectual labour in the production process. When 
productive inputs (e.g. land, technology, money, and labour) were inserted into the 
production process, Marx argued that the labour outputs, in particular of the unskilled, 
underprivileged workers, should be appropriated justly and not to be exploited in terms 
of "surplus value" by those who owned "the means of production".511
The base and superstructure model was composed of both the "economic base" 
(determined by the mode of production) and the political and cultural superstructure. 
According to this reductionist approach, the "economic base" was considered to play a 
pre-dominant role over socio-political ideas and institutions which conformed to the 
requirements of economic determinism; in other words, the political matter was subject 
to the economic matter.51 The third level of analysis, based on the concept of "organic 
totality", was composed of both the historical formation of various modes of production 
(including the law of value and the structural characteristic of base and superstructure 
models) and the development of historical process (e.g. social transformation dominated 
by the revolutionary means). The "organic totality" was predicted by Marx to move 
from one mode to another via the process of "dialectical materialism" [or to move from 
the present mode of production (capitalist) to the next mode (socialist)] according to the 
law of "historical materialism".52
Girling, Capital and Power. Ch. 1. M. Rader, Marx's Interpretation of History. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 3-136.
In the production process, Marx regards "value" and its appropriation as a central idea of 
Marxism in the forms of "exchange value" and "surplus value". A worker sells his labour to an 
owner of the means of production and receives payment which represents the "exchange value" 
(the amount of which is determined by social necessity). In addition to producing his "exchange 
value", the worker also produces the gross income of the employer by contributing "surplus 
value". For instance, if the worker works for eight hours, six hours may be enough to produce 
his exchange value (wage) while the remaining two hours represent the gross income, or 
"surplus value", generated for the owner. In order to extract surplus value, Rader points out, the 
owners of production (both foreign and domestic enterprises) require the political and legal 
endorsement of the state in terms of labour conditions and wages tibid.. pp. 39, 202-203]. See 
also J. Taylor, From Modernization to Mode of Production: A Critique of the Sociologies of 
Development and Underdevelopment. London: The Macmillan Press, 1979, pp. 109, 111; and 
Girling, Capital and Power, pp. 6-7.
Rader argues for Marx that the reductionist approach "misrepresents the full range and 
complexity of Marx's thought" [Rader, op. cit.. p. 135].
To understand Marxism, it is necessary to understand basic concepts used by Marx such as the 
forces of production, the relations of production, mode of production, historical materialism and 
dialectical materialism. Rader gives a useful explanation of these concepts as follows: ”[T]he 
'forces of production' are the labour power, raw materials, tools, techniques, and organization of 
the working personnel, involved in the production of economic goods and services. The 
'relations of production' are the social interactions into which human beings enter at a given 
level of development of the productive forces"; this relation deals directly with the division of
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Orthodox Marxism is theoretically distinct from the liberal theories of human 
value in the modernization school. First, the labour law of value was universally 
argued in terms of class antagonism (e.g. between workers and the owners of 
production in the capitalist mode of production). It also encouraged the "proletariat" or 
the working class, considered to be the most advanced force in pursuing social 
transformation, to emancipate themselves from the oppression of capitalism. Based on 
orthodox Marxism, Lenin argued that capitalism, which was established on the basis of 
free competition (or "out of free competition"), would gradually develop to the stage 
called "imperialism" and lead to "the transition from the capitalist system to a higher 
social-economic order".53 Lenin also argued that the world situation just after the first 
World War was "inter-imperialist" rivalry between the "imperialist countries" such as 
Great Britain, France, Japan and the U.S., and the socialist countries led by the Soviet 
Union. Both imperialist and socialist camps formed alliances to fight against the other 
so as to protect and expand their interests and their "spheres of influence".54 
Nonetheless, although both capitalist and socialist camps pursued their separate 
objectives, they both adopted the same means for achieving their economic goals,
labour, for example, the factory owners and industrial workers in the capitalist mode [ibid., p. 
12]. The mode of production then contains both the force of production and the relation of 
production and can be defined as the economic base.
In order to explain a model of social development, Marx formulated the "materialistic" 
interpretation of history. This concept of history "... relies on expounding the real process of 
production - starting from the material production of life itself - and comprehending the form of 
intercourse connected with and created by ... the mode of production" [ibid., p. 132]. 
Poulantzas explains that Marx’s concept of history is studied through various modes of 
production and social formations, and is used by Marx to predict the forms of historical 
transition from one social formation to another [N. Poulantzas, Political Power and Social 
Class, transl. T. O'Hagan, London: Lowe and Brydone Printers, 1968, p. 11]. Emphasizing the 
historical importance of mode of production, Marx predicted five historical stages of social 
development, namely, primitive community, feudalism, capitalism, socialism and communism. 
See details in A. Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, [added titles 
Vol. I: Power, Property and the State; Vol. II: The Nation-State and Violence], Berkeley: 
University of California, 1981.
'Dialectical materialism' is the Marxist philosophy or "process of thought" used to analyse the 
development of history (historical materialism). This "process of thought" acts as a "discipline 
in one single theoretical movement" which constitutes a view of the historical development 
process [Poulantzas, Political Power, p. 11]. From this it can be seen that history (mainly of 
the working class) develops from one mode to another because there is "contradiction" within 
society stirring people to find a better way.
V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 1947, Chs. 7, 9 and 10, p. 148. Also, according to Lenin, "permanent 
peace" was impossible; a peaceful period was only "a 'truce' in periods between wars" [p. 144].
54 See details in P. Keal, "Contemporary Understanding about Spheres of Influence", Review of 
International Studies. July 1983, pp. 155-172; and P. Keal, Unspoken Rules and Superpower 
Dominance. London: Macmillan, 1983, pp. 3-6, 16, 65-86, 90-93.
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namely the expansion of heavy industrialization. (The "imperialist" camp aimed to 
benefit private enterprise, whereas the "socialist" camp aimed to organize the working 
class).
Second, Lenin's view of social transformation was adopted by revolutionary 
movements, in particular in the formation of revolutionary agents such as the 
"Bolshevik" Party, the vanguard to mobilize the masses (mainly workers).55 Mao Tse 
Tung also succeeded in mobilizing the masses (mainly peasants) in the Chinese 
revolution of 1945 by using the guidelines of Marxism-Leninism.
Although orthodox Marxism was questioned in terms of its analysis, it had the 
theoretical power to challenge the social analysis of liberalism and, as we have seen, 
made leading scholars from the modernization school adapt their theoretical explanation 
to cope with social and political disorder. The challenge that Marxist ideas presented 
was evident in the nationalist or "anti-imperialist" movements of the 1960s and 1970s 
which were inspired by the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. However, orthodox Marxism 
itself was also subjected to challenge by the new or "neo-Marxism" (sometimes called 
"Revisionist Marxism").
About the 1970s, the neo-Marxists began to criticize orthodox Marxism 
primarily in relation to its analysis of class conflict. The neo-Marxists paid attention not 
only to the working class but also to the non-working classes such as the bourgeoisie 
(both national and petty bourgeoisie) and the peasantry as agents for social 
transformation. The neo-Marxists debated whether the bourgeoisie or middle class, 
even if created in the Western image, would be capable of promoting national 
development when they served the interest of those who blocked development (i.e. 
foreign interests).56
Second, instead of viewing the world situation as the theatre of inter-imperialist 
rivalry, the neo-Marxists were interested in a country's historical and cultural 
experience; the relationship between developed and developing countries in particular
Girling argues that these political instruments were not effectively conceptualized by Marx 
[Girling, Capital and Power, p. 2]. See also Poulantzas, State. Power. Socialism, p. 252.
While Frank's view was that the bourgeoisie could not support national development because 
they served the interests of the foreign investors, Leys argued, by examining the Kenyan Case 
Study, that the bourgeoisie could support development in their own interest and not solely that 
of the foreign interests. See C. Leys, "Capital Accumulation, Class Formation and 
Dependency: the Significance of the Kenyan Case", The Socialist Register. 1978, pp. 241-266; 
and A. Foster-Carter, "Neo-Marxist Approaches to Development and Underdevelopment", 
Journal of Contemporary Asia. Vol. 3, 1973, pp. 10-11, 23-24, 32-33.
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issues such as trade, raw material, outlets for investment, markets for finished products 
and the role of multi-national corporations (MNCs).57 Samir Amin, for instance, did 
not accept that there was a general law of history or of social formation which a country 
could follow without analysing its own historical and cultural background, even though 
it might be possible for "a set of scientific concepts", guided by modes of production 
and inter-relation between modes, to help formulate a framework applicable to a specific 
situation .58 And third, relating to the above, the neo-Marxist considered that both 
reform and revolution could be means for social transformation, depending on the 
particular condition of a country.59
Compared with orthodox Marxism, the neo-Marxist gained empirical strength 
but at the cost of theoretical divisiveness and weakness. The strength came from the 
recognition of the importance of a country's experience whereas the weakness appeared 
to be that the neo-Marxist did not have any overall theoretical standard to guide and 
evaluate social formation. For example, they had no criteria for selecting which class 
would be the main agent in bringing social change, or for choosing either reform or 
revolution as the means for social transformation in any particular situation.
Nevertheless, the neo-Marxist approach did reveal its explanatory power for the 
study of underdevelopment. According to I.S. Kon, it offers development analysts a 
macro-sociological approach to set up successful micro-sociological research. Second, 
it offered a dialectical model, with a focus on change, development, conflict and class 
struggle. Third, it had an emphasis on historical perspectives in interpreting social 
phenomena and as Kon argues:
[T]he faster the pace of social changes, the bigger is the scale of historical comparisons which 
is necessary for the interpretation of the relevant processes. ... without profound historical 
comparisons it is impossible to understand the nature of changes in modem society, . . .^
Foster-Carter, op. cit.. p. 12, 25.
S. Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism, 
transl. B. Pearce, Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1976, p. 363. For a critique of Amin's idea see S. 
Smith, "Class Analysis Versus World System: Critique of Samir Amin's Typology of 
Underdevelopment", in Limqueco and McFarlane (eds.), Neo-Marxist Theories of Development, 
pp. 73-86; and S. Smith, "The Ideas of Samir Amin: Theory or Tautology", The Journal of 
Development Studies. Vol. 17, No. 1, October 1980, pp. 5-21.
Foster Carter, op. cit.. p. 23.
Quoted from Higgott, "Competing Theoretical Perspectives", p. 38. See also I.S. Kon, "The 
Crisis of Western Sociology and the 'Second Discovery' of Marxism", in T. Bottomore (ed.), 
Crisis and Contention in Sociology. London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1975, p. 64.
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Loosely categorized as neo-Marxist, the dependency paradigm appeared briefly 
but influentially. Using the structuralist approach and taking the world as a single unit 
of analysis (the "world-system" analysis), Frank pioneered the "Development of 
Underdevelopment" thesis arguing that:
[AJnalogously to the relations between development and underdevelopment on the international 
level, the contemporary underdeveloped institutions of the so-called backward or feudal 
domestic areas of an underdeveloped country are no less the product of the single historical 
process of capitalist development than are the so-called capitalist institutions of the supposedly 
more progressive areas.6 *
Frank not only rejected the modernization thesis of "dual society"62 but also blamed 
foreign penetration in the form of "monopoly capitalism" for causing the 
underdevelopment of Third World countries by arguing that industrialization could not 
take place in developing countries because of a metropolis-satellite relation of 
expropriation 63
A.G. Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment", in C.K. Wilber (ed.), The Political 
Economy of Development and Underdevelopment. New York: Random House, 1984, p. 100. 
In 1963, Raul Prebisch of the Economic Council of Latin America (ECLA) school outlined the 
structuralist position in the analysis of economic development and the possibility of capital and 
technology transfer from the developed to the developing countries. The second intellectual root 
of the structuralist approach to development came from Paul Baran in his work: The Political 
Economy of Growth. (1954). Baran, who could be called the founding father of neo-marxism, 
argued that conventional development theories could not tackle the problems of 
underdevelopment and insisted that development through a revolutionary process was necessary 
due to the "deep conflicts of interest between Western capitalism and the progress of 
underdeveloped countries". Western development itself had, he argued, "taken place at the 
expense of the underdeveloped countries" [Foster-Carter, op. cit.. p. 19]. During the mid 
1960s, Andre Gunder Frank developed the dependency paradigm using the world-system theory 
approach and gave an initial explanation of the causes of underdevelopment which gained public 
acceptance.
Frank's thesis of underdevelopment was accepted more readily than others in the Third World 
mainly because he argued that development could not take place in the periphery. Prebisch, on 
the other hand, believed that, despite world market mechanisms, development could take place 
in the colonial or peripheral states by the transfer of technology and the redistribution of 
resources. Frank claimed that Prebisch's analysis depended on conditions which could not be 
controlled. For example, there was no guarantee of the distribution of product between the 
developing and developed countries because this task would be dominated by developed countries 
(centres) linked to those who served the centres' interest in the peripheral states. Frank argued 
strongly that monopoly capitalism led to the underdevelopment of the Third World through the 
metropolis-satellite chain of expropriation. See R. Stewart, "Dialectic of Underdevelopment: 
Imperialism, Class and State in the Coffee Industries of Papua New Guinea", Ph. D. 
dissertation, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, ANU, May 1986, pp. 7-8, 12- 
15.
Frank, op.cit.. p. 100. Frank explains the "dual society" thesis as the belief that one part of 
society becomes modernized and developed because of economic relations with the "outside" 
capitalist world; whereas the other part of society is underdeveloped because it is isolated and 
therefore remains as a feudal, subsistence-based society.
63 A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. London: Monthly Review 
Press, 1969, pp. 6-10. He also argues that the "metropolis-satellite contradiction" or chain of 
expropriation exists not only between the capitalist metropolis and peripheral satellite countries
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This argument can be explained in the manner by which the economic surplus 
was drawn out from the peripheries (developing countries) to the centres (developed 
countries). Frank argued that the metropolis-satellite relation was established between 
the foreign and domestic ruling elites in the earlier colonial period. Through this link, 
the surplus was "sucked out" while making peripheries dependent on centres for capital 
and technology, so that no fundamental change occurred in the peripheries. Since the 
period of decolonization after World War II, this dependent relationship has remained 
unaltered and continued in the form of neocolonialism.64 Frank therefore proposed a 
solution for Third World development by the eradication of capitalism as "a world 
system of unequal exchange relations" and replacing it with socialism.65
Frank's analysis had sufficient influence on development thinking to make both 
Marxist and modernization scholars reconsider their analysis.66 It undermined the 
assumptions of modernization theory by rejecting its diffusionist capability, and 
highlighted the uneven nature of development in capitalist societies on a global scale in 
terms of "unequal exchange".67 At the same time, it explained the relationship between 
developed and developing countries, in terms differing not only from orthodox 
Marxism but also from other theories of imperialism. For example, distinct from the 
classical theme of Lenin's theory of "inter-imperialist rivalry", Frank argued that, in the 
relationship between developed and developing countries, "monopoly capitalism" 
determined the distribution of surplus and dominated the relationship between centres 
and peripheries throughout the social formation. Galtung's theory of imperialism 
differed from Frank's analysis in that instead of emphasizing monopoly capitalism,
at the international level but also occurs within peripheral countries between industrial cities 
and agricultural districts.
64 Stewart, op. cit.. p, 14.
65 Higgott et al.. "Theories of Development", p. 35.
66 M . ,  p. 30.
67 Amin, op. cit.. pp. 138-154, 238. I borrow Amin's term. However, although Amin and Frank 
have similar ideas about the causes of underdevelopment, Amin accepted the crucial importance 
of monopoly in shaping the peripheral economy, he did not accept that the metropolis-satellite 
chain of expropriation was the only mechanism that caused underdevelopment. He argued that 
production structured in the periphery was also directly determined by the peripheral economy's 
relations with the world market Nonetheless, Amin concluded that autonomous development 
in the periphery was impossible because economic structures in the periphery were not highly 
integrated among themselves. Instead, they were integrated into the capitalist world market 
system.
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Galtung used a structuralist approach to analyse how developed countries took 
advantage of developing countries economically, politically and culturally.6**
About the first half of the 1970s, the dependency analysis had a wide impact. 
For example, development critics argued in dependency terms that foreign penetration 
was creating massive external debt for Southeast Asian countries. Foreign investors 
were extracting surplus capital while providing little employment, effecting little 
technology transfer, monopolizing economic decision-making and extending foreign 
ownership of the productive forces. Moreover, they were creating domestic ruling 
groups who concentrated power and wealth in the initial stages of growth. In order to 
protect their capital interest, foreign investors supported the maintenance of authoritarian 
regimes in the Third World (most of which were military regimes) through association 
with domestic ruling groups. Therefore, dependency became a very potent political and 
ideological weapon for a host of political groups in Third World countries, even though 
it had a problem at the practical level in explaining how subordinate classes intervened 
in state affairs.69
Some features of the development debate from the late 1970s to the 
present
Critique of modernization theory
The inadequate explanatory power of modernization theory is seen in several 
ways when it is applied in developing countries. Its concepts (including models and 
approaches), e.g. nation-state, political order, behaviourist approach, and public policy 
approach, are open to criticism. For example, the concept of nation-state which refers 
to state sovereignty70 as "the most useful unit of analysis in international politics" is 
increasing challenged because most Third World countries "are incapable of measuring 
up to the normal indicators of sovereignty".71 Because of the lack of genuine
J. Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 8, No. 2, 
1971, pp. 81-118.
Higgott et al„ "Theories of Development", pp. 36-37.
This concept is simply based upon the idea that every sovereign state has autonomous power in 
relations with other states. See H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World 
Politics. London: Macmillan, 1982, pp. 8-9, 36-37.
71 Higgott, "Competing Theoretical Perspectives", p. 37
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autonomous power, weak states such as colonial states or new states find it very 
difficult to compete with strong states in the international market.72
Other approaches of modernization theory were also criticized. For instance, 
Pennock criticizes the theory of political order in that if political goods satisfy 'needs', it 
should not only be the needs of the state, "but human needs whose fulfilment makes the 
polity valuable to man and gives its justification ,..".73 The outputs are not merely 
material goods but symbolic goods also, such as the feelings of dignity, self-reliance 
and self-consciousness in development. Higgott argued, too, that although the public 
policy analysis was a logical consequence of the integration of political order and 
growth theories, it focused on the centralization of power and authority as a necessary 
factor in the modernization process.74 With these sorts of criticisms, modernization 
was shown to be an inadequate model for analysing development in Third World 
countries.
Modernization theory does not give a clear indication of the intended 
beneficiaries of development. Pratt and Nafziger argue that the structural-functional 
model says very little about political questions such as which social groups would 
appropriate the productive resources, how they would be allocated and for whose 
specific benefit.75 It also ignores the crucial importance of the international influence 
upon the internal politics of developing countries and on the historical dimensions of
R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1981, pp. ix-xxix, 371-398.
In addition, Hintze suggests that the state’s structure and form depend as much on the conditions 
of its external-power position as on the social-structure conditions of its internal process [O. 
Hintze, "The State in Historical Perspective" in R. Bendix et al. (eds.), State and Society. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973, p. 156]. That means the maintenance and 
status of the boundary of new states relies relatively heavily upon external factors. The 
structural role played by international political and economic factors in the formation and 
survival of the new nation-states creates a severe analysis problem for the political 
developmentalists. They are unable to go beyond the boundary of the nation-state. Thus, the 
failure of the modernization theory is not only a mere oversight of internal historical analysis of 
Third World countries, but also a direct result of the limitation of the theoretical framework 
[Stewart, on. cit.. p. 5].
R. Pennock, "Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods", World Politics. 
Vol, 18, No. 3, April 1966, p. 420.
Higgott et al.. "Theories of Development", p. 22.
R.B. Pratt, "The Underdeveloped Political Science of Development", Studies in Comparative 
International Development. Vol. 3, No. 1, 1973, pp. 88-112; and E.W. Nafziger, "A Critique 
of Development Economics in the U.S.", Journal of Development Studies. Vol. 13, No. 1, 
October 1976, p. 20.
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outside involvement.76 Sandbrook adds that neither the Binder nor Almond models 
raise issues such as the great powers’ involvement in constraining development through 
military intervention; intrusion via security and intelligence agencies; their provision of 
economic and military aid to dictatorships; and their penetration of national economies 
with foreign capital and aid; nor did they mention the unequal structures of international 
trade.77
We may summarize the critique of the modernization theory by referring to 
Bernstein who, along with Weinberg, argued that modernization theory had some 
explanatory power for Western development because it was built on the ground of 
Western "historical and sociological factors", in particular, "on a model of the American 
political system". However, when modernization theory was applied outside the 
Western context on the assumption that the underdeveloped countries were simply at a 
pre-capitalist stage of development and could modernize following the Western pattern, 
it became "painfully obvious" that it did not work.78
Critique of the dependency paradigm
Some criticisms of the dependency paradigm which are still debated among 
Marxist scholars can be seen in commentaries on Frank's work. According to Laclau, 
for example, Frank's concept of the mode of production was vague and he did not 
clearly distinguish between different modes of production which led him to conclude 
that any production for a market meant the existence of capitalism.79 As an extension of 
this, his analysis of the metropolis-satellite relation of expropriation could be regarded 
as a reductionist approach which, because it was based on limited evidence of capitalist 
intrusion, was inadequate to analyse the complexity of Third World development. 
Taylor for his part argues that Frank’s hypothesis failed to answer a number of 
fundamental problems including:
Pratt, op. cit.. p. 94. Sandbrook, op. cit.. pp. 174-177.
Sandbrook, op. cit.. p. 179. In the area of domestic politics, modernization serves the interest 
of ruling elites, while in the area of international politics, it serves the interest of international 
enterprises.
H. Bernstein, "Modernization Theory and the Sociological Study of Development", Journal of 
Development Studies. Vol. 7, No. 2, January 1971, pp. 143, 147, 154.
79 E. Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin American", New Left Review. No. 67, May- 
June 1971, p. 28.
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... the structure of non-capitalist social formation, the effect upon these of different forms of 
capitalist penetration, the bases for the existence of these different forms, the bases for the 
development of capitalist production itself, and ... the extent to which elements of the 
superstructures of non-capitalist social formations can continue to survive and be reproduced 
even when a capitalist mode of production is dominant.8^
On the issue of exploitation and how it occured, Stewart believed, contrary to 
Frank, that international capital entered the periphery in various forms and types, not 
only in the monopoly form as Frank argued, and that there was therefore a need for 
dependency theory to clarify where and how exploitation occurs, whether through the 
external centre -  periphery relations, or internally in the process of social formation via 
capital and labour relations. Stewart further claimed that while evidence suggested that 
exploitation had taken place at both levels and in both forms, post-dependency theorists 
had further work to do to explain the impact of external factors on internal 
development.81 In summary, therefore, Frank's hypothesis was merely useful to 
describe the general nature of exploitation between developed and developing countries, 
not to explain them in a concrete sense.82
Leys and Warren were also critical of Frank's view that development could not 
take place at the periphery, arguing that in fact such development did occur, and that the 
national bourgeoisie in the periphery performed an historically progressive role in that 
development.83 Leys argued further that where there was struggle between classes, 
each attempted to shift the boundaries of appropriation in their own favour. However, 
he did not show systematically how the boundary was shifted between classes inside 
the periphery, and how it was affected by external factors. Both Frank and Leys 
therefore still had theoretical problems in dealing with the connection between the 
internal analysis of class location (in production) and class relations across national 
boundaries.84
Difficulties with class analysis and the identification of who should benefit from 
development also left the dependency theory open to criticism. Wallerstein argues that 
one of the first principles of class analysis was that:
J. Taylor, "Neo-Marxism and Development —  A Sociological Phantasy", Journal of 
Contemporary Asia. Vol. 13, No. 1, 1973, p. 16.
Stewart, op. cit.. p. 20.
Higgott, "Competing Theoretical Perspectives", p. 34.
Leys, "Capital Accumulation", pp. 257-263; and B. Warren, "The Internationalization of 
Capital and the Nation State: A Comment", New Left Review. No. 68, July-August 1971, pp. 
83-88.
84 Stewart, op. cit.. p. 45.
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... classes do not have some permanent reality. Rather they are formed, they consolidate 
themselves, they disintegrate or disaggregate, and they are re-formed. It is a process of 
constant movement, and the greatest barrier to understanding their action is reification. ... 
[t]here are patterns we can describe and which aid us to identify concrete realities and explain 
historical events. But the patterns themselves evolve over time, even within the historical- 
bound phenomenon of the modem capitalist world-economy.86
Recognizing the complexity of class analysis, Bernstein, who worked on the analysis of 
class locations in the periphery and on the articulation of modes of production, 
concluded that "the whole range of classes has to be theorized".86 To some extent, 
therefore, dependency theory could not decide who (which class) should benefit in the 
development process because it was still unclear about its class analysis.87
Another major problem confronting dependency theory was in its analysis of the 
role of the periphery state which is considered to develop functionally in the context of 
class antagonism.88 A state, in Marxist terms (remembering this to be largely the basis 
of dependency paradigm), is "... a complex network of class relations in which many 
different class interests can be registered".89 In this view, the function of state is 
revealed in the extent to which different classes can gain representation in a state's 
institution and use that agency to make demands over and against other classes and 
institutions within the state machinery. The state therefore represents a consensus 
between classes through the creation of a binding ideology which may be defined as "an 
interest-based philosophy of a particular social group around which the group can be 
mobilized", and is varied according to which group is the dominant class at any 
particular time.90 The dependency theorists, however, seem to downgrade the role of 
the periphery state because of domination by the centre and the impact of international 
class struggle (i.e. in the context of foreign enterprises and international capitalism). 
Hence dependency theorists did not satisfactorily explain the occurrence of autonomous
86 I. Wallerstein, "Class-Formation in the Capitalist World Economy", Politics and Society, Vol. 
5, No. 3, 1975, p. 369. Wallerstein explains the term "reification" following L. Goldmann as 
"the replacement of the qualitative by the quantitative, o f the concrete by the abstract" and 
"closely tied to production for the market, notably to capitalist production ..." fibid.. p. 369, fn. 
3]. Stewart adds that the self-maximizing actions of classes in both centres and peripheries can 
be seen in two main ways -  one is "by forging alliances with other classes", the other is "by 
developing a coherent ideological strength" to give them a dominant role over other classes. 
[Stewart, op. c i i . p. 50.]
86 Stewart, op. cit.. p. 57.
87 Fitzgerald, on. cit.. p. 18.
88 Stewart, op. cit.. pp. 89-93.
89 J M ..P .4 1 .
Ibid., p. 88.90
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state policies (in the periphery) which encourage indigenous capitalism at the expense of 
international capitalism.9!
Because dependency scholars were unclear in their view of class struggle, yet 
reduced the role of the peripheral state to be subject to class antagonism, their proposed 
solution necessitated the eradication of capitalism. As this solution was revolutionary it 
was not widely accepted and was criticized by most theoretical analysts. For example, 
Goldsworthy argues that "... revolution seems so very 'unlikely' to happen in the 
majority of poor countries within a medium-range time scale".92 Sandbrook also 
criticizes the radical analysts in that they "downgrade the value of stability and advocate 
intervention in social processes to promote certain changes ...”.92
Compared with modernization, dependency paid more attention to the role of 
people in development and their place in relation to the state, as well as to the 
responsibilities of the state to all its citizens. This in part draws from the Marxist view 
of production as involving a double relationship between people, and between people 
and nature, which must play a fundamental role in any explanation of social 
developm ent.94 Modernization on the other hand has the strength of proposing a 
practical path to development, and the proponents of modernization have claimed 
theoretical strength from their strong determination to use the state and political 
institutions, across the boundary of time and place, to put its ideology in practice. It is 
the role of the state which is critical to an analysis of development and I will consider it 
further in the following section.
The role of the state and the need for a countervailing force
One of the crucial unsolved problems in the current debate on development is the 
role to be given to the state when considering development goals and strategies. 
Poulantzas points out the weaknesses of both the Marxist reductionist approach and of
For example, while the dependency paradigm was able to largly explain the evidence in Latin 
American cases, it was not satisfactory in explaining development in East Asia (especially 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea) where the periphery states exercise autonomous power 
so that they, and not the foreign enterprises alone, benefited from development. See Girling, 
Capital and Power, pp. 36-37.
Goldsworthy, op. cit.. p. 28. Goldsworthy does not, however, totally reject revolutionary 
means, adding "At the same time, this is not to be construed as a necessarily anti-revolutionary 
position". See also Wertheim, op. cit.. pp. 17, 54-62.
Sandbrook, op. cit.. p. 169.
P.F. Bell, "Class Relations and Thai Development", in E.E. Boesch (ed.), Thai Culture; Report 
on the Second Thai-European Research Seminar. Socio-Psychological Research Centre on 
Development Planning, Saarbruecken, 1982, p. 112.
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Modernization in relation to the role of the state. He criticized both the generalization of 
modernization theory and orthodox Marxism when he argues that there is no "general 
theory" of economy and of political "science" or "sociology" without considering 
"immutable boundaries" (which he relates to the mode of production). As he says:
It is rather the mode of production itself - that totality of economic, political and ideological 
determinations - which fixes the boundaries of these spaces, sketching out their fields and 
defining their respective elements. ... Now, the very fact that the space, field and respective 
concepts of the state-political and the economy (relations of production) present themselves in 
different ways according to the mode of production, leads to a conclusion that runs counter to 
all formalist theoreticism.9^
On the problems confronting Marxist analyses is the relationship between class analysis 
and the role of the state, he further argues that:
In the order of theoretical explanation, it makes no sense whatever to speak of a social field of 
class division of labour and class power existing prior to the State... Wherever, there is class 
division and thus class struggle and power, the State already exists as institutionalized political 
power.... State is the heart of the exercise of political power [italic as in original].9*>
Poulantzas puts the view that "the genuine State or real power are [here] located not on 
the shady side (the side of classes) but on the other, sunny side".97 The state, he 
argues, has a dual nature and role. One the one hand, existing side by side with classes 
and the class struggle, the state has a moral obligation to protect its citizen from being 
harmed by intruders. On the other hand, being directly related to class and the class 
struggle, the state by definition is destined to be utilized by the dominant classes.
If we accept Poulantzas’s argument, we can see a place for interest and pressure 
groups (e.g. NGOs) to counter the the full impact of the dominant class (the "shady 
side") and play a role in producing a state which responds to its people (the "sunny 
side"). In neo-Marxist terms, Third World development is constrained by both internal 
factors, (e.g. the "bureaucratic polity" and authoritarian regimes) and external factors, 
(e.g. the great powers' influence over economics and politics, and over the government
Poulantzas, State. Power. Socialism, pp. 17, 19.
96 M l.,  pp. 39, 258.
Ibid., p. 13. See also Beitz's argument which raises some questions about the relationship 
between "state autonomy" and "individual liberty", for instance, in pointing to the moral 
obligation of the state to its citizen he argues that "the rights of states rest on the consent of 
their members" and the state not only protects "individual lives and liberties" but also its 
"citizens" [C. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979, pp. 76-77]. For his argument about state autonomy and domestic 
social justice see ibid., pp. 121-123.
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and people), and a third party, especially NGOs, would be useful in the "checks and 
balances" process.
In practical terms, however, Third World development has been dominated by 
the modernization theory, in particular through the revised form of public policy 
approach (which I have discused above) applied in most Third World countries,98 and 
through international financial institutions — the World Bank and the IMF — which 
have played a leading role in manipulating the world financial system since the end of 
World War 11.99 In addition there is a significant role played by the international UN 
agencies such as UNDP, FAO, UNICEF and WHO. Together these organizations 
represent powerful instruments which can seriously compromise the role of the state in 
many Third World countries by imposing their analyses and strategies on host 
governments.
A counter to some extent to the domination of the Bank, the Fund and UN 
agencies, and to the emergence in the 1960s of significant levels of bilateral 
development assistance, has been the emergence of non-government organizations 
(NGOs) working largely to counterbalance the self-interest of the international 
organizations and the donor states by promoting humanitarian concerns and the welfare 
of the poor in Third World countries. These NGOs were founded by groups of people 
who saw themselves as independent of government boundaries (even though some 
members are government officials). From the end of World War II until the 1970s, the 
number of NGOs was somewhere in the vicinity of 2,500 to 3,000 ( depending on the 
definition used) working mainly in the developed countries.100 They were operating in 
many fields, e.g. health, economics, political science, law and technology, and began
Higgott, Political Development Theory, pp. 26-58.
C. Payer, The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1974, pp. 
215-219. In 1966, these two organizations clarified their responsibilities, whereby the Bank 
would serve as a "loan broker and guarantor" for development programmes and project 
evaluation whereas the Fund would control exchange rates, assist the country members to adjust 
their balance of payment and to plan for their economic advance. According to Payer, these 
organizations also have a close connection with the "same persons" working on both Boards of 
Committee and their joint publication: Finance and Development magazine aims to publicize 
their programmes and philosophy. However, there recently appears to have been some areas of 
co-operation between the World Bank and NGOs through the World Bank-NGO Committee. 
The World Bank-NGO Committee, which includes 21 NGOs and Bank staff, was set up in 
1982 to "encourage dialogue on development policy", to "facilitate Government -  NGO -  Bank 
operational co-operation", and to "promote co-operation in development education" [Leaflet of 
Australian Labor Party (ALP), Third World Forum, Canberra, January 1990].
K. Skjelsback, "The Growth of International Non-governmental Organization in the Twentieth 
Century", in R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye (eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics, p. 
71.
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more and more to extend their operations to the Third World countries during the 
1970s. Examples may be seen in organizations such as International Commission of 
Jurists (ICJ), Bread for the World, Amnesty International (AI), and Dutch Organization 
for International Co-operation (NOVIB). More and more from the mid 1970s and the 
1980s, indigenous NGOs began to emerge in developing countries performing similar 
activities to the NGOs from the developed countries.101
NGOs from developing countries as well as the developed countries pay 
particular attention to rural development in the Third World:
[R]ural development in the Third World is not only a life and death matter for two billion 
peasants, but also a problem affecting the peace and security of every nation.10^
Counter to the macro-economic plans emphasized by the World Bank and the IMF, the 
NGOs have attempted to implement an "alternative development" concept which 
involves not only the purely economic dimension of development but also the socio­
political and cultural dimensions.10^  Through this strategy, NGO activities include 
"wide ranging skills across disciplinary line",104 providing economic, social and 
political assistance to Third World countries in the short and medium terms while at the
101
102
103
104
B. Schneider, The Barefoot Revolution: A Report to the Club of Rome, transl. A.F. Villon, 
London: IT Publications, 1988, Ch. 7; D. Weissbrodt, "The Role of International Non­
governmental Organizations in the Implementation of Human Rights", Texas International Law 
Journal. Vol. 12, 1977, p. 296.
B. Schneider, op. cit.. p. xii.
See further explanation by P. Streeten, "The Concept of 'Alternative': Alternatives in 
Development", World Development. Vol. 2, No. 2, February 1974, pp. 5-6. Examples of this 
new concept appear in various publications such as C.I. Itty (ed.), Searching for Asian 
Paradigms. Bangkok: Asian Cultural Forum on Development (ACFOD), 1984; R. Crocombe, 
The Pacific Wav: An Emerging Identity. Suva: Lotu Pasifika Productions, 1976.
Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade on Canada's 
Official Development Assistance Policies and Programmes (The Winergard Report), For Whose 
Benefit?. May, 1978, p. 22.
Lipton also proposes a similar view and suggests that the development for the poor in less- 
developed countries requires problem-oriented analyses at both micro-level and macro-level, via 
an inter-disciplinary studies (IDS) approach. He argues that by comparison with developed 
countries, most people in developing countries are less literate, and social structures are more 
loosely organized and are less structuralized and functionalized. People's economic behaviour is 
understood in terms of social and cultural factors and therefore requires several disciplines to be 
integrated in the analysis of problems.
While an IDS approach has the advantage of offering a wider and stronger interaction among 
factors studied from various disciplines, it requires more time and effort for individual social 
scientists to work through various disciplines and to interact with other experts. Lipton 
suggests the possible way to overcome the weakness of the IDS approach would be to assign 
groups of problem to individual academics. See M. Lipton, "Interdisciplinary Studies in Less 
Developed Countries", Journal of Development Studies. Vol. 7, No. 1, October 1970, pp. 5- 
18.
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same time providing "development education" for both donor and recipient countries in 
the long term . 105 NGOs, on the whole, also regard the principle of basic human rights 
to be "one of the most important conditions for a true development process".10**
Compared with government work (often under the influence of the World Bank 
etc.) NGO activities, even though conducted on a small scale, closely touch the lives of 
the people and thus have a direct impact on government. Most governments seem to be 
quite sensitive to NGO criticism of government policies, behaviour, and attitude 
towards the people. NGO campaigns and movements which highlight the people 
participation concept in development and the need for representative democratic 
institutions, can be the catalyst for governments to adjust development policies 
appropriate to people's needs, to change some decisions offensive to people and to 
recognize the fundamental rights of their citizens.
Development debate in the Thai context: the rationalization of the role of 
the state in national development
Following the discussion of the theoretical development debates above, this 
section aims to show that while the mainstream of development thinking in Thailand has 
been broadly influenced by both modernization and Marxist theories, the discussion of 
Thai development since the post-war period, has proved "to be much more complex 
than any single 'blanket' conceptualization had yet been able to show".107
On the one hand, most scholars from the modernization school focus their 
studies on the concept of state and its role and explain them through various economic 
and political science theories. Thai economic development plans have followed the 
economic growth models of international organizations such as the World Bank and the 
UN development agencies, and of academics such as Muscat.108 The models, which 
were widely accepted, stressed the role of the private sector in the process of capital
1U3 Development education is a program of providing information about Third World development 
in developed countries and of drawing attention to similar or related issues in the developed 
countries to change the attitudes of people in the developed countries so that they become more 
aware of the problems of underdevelopment and realize that they have a responsibility to help 
solve those problems. See A. Curtis, "Overseas Study of National Development Education 
Programmes", Report to the Committee for Development Co-operation, Australian Freedom 
from Hunger Campaign, 1988, pp. 26-27.
10** The Winergard Report, p. 33.
107 Chairat Charoensin-o-lam, "Understanding Postwar 'Reformism' in Thailand: A Reinterpretation 
of Rural Development", Ph.D. dissertation in Political Science, Graduate Division of the 
University of Hawaii, August 1985, p. viii.
108 R.J. Muscat, Development Strategy in Thailand: A Study of Economic Growth. London: 
Praeger Publishers, 1966.
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accumulation and reduced the role of the state in the economic development process. At 
the same time, Thai political development has been influenced by mainly European and 
American sources to follow a "Western" democratic model. Thus the Thai political 
system has been regarded by the modernizers as an effective and neutral agency which 
could be transformed into Western style democratic state by the injection of appropriate 
inputs. The inputs they saw as necessary were political parties and interest and pressure 
groups in which the majority of Thai would be expected to participate actively and 
thereby become involved in a Western-style political system. With the proper 
introduction and functioning of the inputs it was expected that political outputs would 
emerge in the form of modem laws and policies.
During the 1960s, a number of American scholars analysed Thai political 
development using different political science theories. For example, Wilson, using the 
behavioural approach, generally found that the Thai ruling elites - in particular the 
military and bureaucracy after the change of 1932 - had badly lost direction and purpose 
leading to a decline in self-control and to a "moral ambiguity of authority". He added 
that he could not see a way out of the "cliquism and corruption" that had developed but 
hoped that there would appear an "extragovernmental power", which he did not 
specifically identify, to counterbalance the role of the government.109 Using 
behavioural and institutional approaches, Riggs and Siffin characterized Thai politics as 
an example of the "bureaucratic polity" model (i.e. the bureaucratic dominance over 
politics) and explained that Thai politics had not developed far because there was a 
"struggle for power as an end in itself among competing cliques and factions" and "the 
instrumentalities for popular control" were "weak or embryonic."110 Jacobs put 
forward his "patrimonial" thesis, which was drawn from Weber, and which he claimed 
could explain why little real development resulted from implementing "modernization" 
in an "Asian-patrimonial society" like Thailand. His thesis explained the relationship 
between patrons and clients in .terms of "power" and its relation to other factors such as 
personal allegiance and bureaucratic structure. He described the Thai political system in 
Riggs's term as "bureaucratic polity" which is "a patrimonial administrative apparatus 
which is its own decision maker, and which, defines and enforces its own role in the 
society and is beholden to no outside agent for regulation or review" and which had "...
109 D.A. Wilson, Politics in Thailand. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962, pp. 278, 281.
F.W. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity. Honolulu: East-West 
Centre Press, 1967, p. 212; and W.J. Siffin, The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and 
Development. Honolulu: East-West Centre Press, 1966, pp. 253-254.
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first successfully blocked and subsequently thwarted the growth of outside control over 
and competition with the bureaucratic decision making monopoly".111
Criticisms of the modernization approach in Thailand has grown significantly 
since the 1970s, particularly following the urban middle class uprising of 1973. 
Hewison criticizes the work of Wilson, Riggs and Siffin on the grounds that while the 
study of the behaviour of elites had become a central topic in their studies of Thai 
politics, the majority poor were regarded as unconcerned, passive, individualistic, and 
easily dominated by civil and military elites.112 Chairat argued too that Riggs 
"oversimplifies the complexity of Thai politics as merely a rivalry among big 
bureaucrats who want to enhance their power and interests" and therefore failed to see 
that Sarit's achievement of political power was not just a matter of factional rivalry 
against the Phin-Phao and Phibun groups (see details in Chapter 2 pp. 62-63), but also 
a result of the economic concerns and pressures applied by the World Bank, as well as 
the support of the US. Wilson and Riggs also failed to foresee the rise of the "extra- 
bureaucratic force" and institutions outside the bureaucracy which came to 
counterbalance the power of the "bureaucratic polity".113 Bell and Boonsanong for 
their part criticized Jacobs for overlooking necessary socio-political factors in various 
patterns of development and argued that his thesis "denies any possibility of structural 
change due to any possible forces, internal or external or both" (italic as in original) and 
that his methodology ignored conflict in social change and therefore could not "capture" 
any social force bringing a new stage of development.114
In a study on the role of interest and pressure groups in Thailand, Prudhisan 
examined patron-client relationship between the "bureaucratic polity" and the emerging
111 N. Jacobs, Modernization Without Development: Thailand as an Asian Case Study. London: 
Praeger Publishers, 1971, p. 30.
112 K.J. Hewison,"The State and Capitalist Development in Thailand", in R. Higgott and R. 
Robison (eds.), Southeast Asia: Essays in the Political Economy of Structural Change. 
London: Routlege & Kegan Paul, 1985, p. 266. Historical evidence such as the 14 October 
1973 uprising in Thailand can provide an outstanding example of a people's attempt to achieve 
a Western democratic system. Eventually, those groups (trade unions, interest groups, 
opposition parties) were dominated, subverted and destroyed by state intervention.
113 Chairat, op. cit.. pp. 112-113; see Girling, Thailand: Society and Politics. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1981, pp. 11-12.
114 P.F. Bell and Boonsanong Punyodyasa, "The Sources of Social Change in Thailand: A Review 
Article of Norman Jacobs, Modernization Without Development: Thailand as an Asian Case 
Study", Journal of Contemporary Asia. Vol. 4, No. 2, 1974, pp. 212-213; see similar opinion 
to Bell and Boonsanong in Saneh Chamarik, " 'Reviews': Norman Jacobs, Modernization 
Without Development: Thailand as an Asian Case Study", The Journal of the Siam Society, 
Vol. 61, January 1973, pp. 327-331.
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"non-elite groups" such as agricultural co-operatives, teachers' association, and 
workers' organizations.1^  In particular, he explored the weakness of interest groups 
formed at the initiative of the bureaucracy rather than being created from an actual 
demand of the citizens in response to their own needs. The interest groups set up under 
the patronage of the "bureaucratic polity" served as part of the bureaucratic machinery 
albeit under the banner of popular control. Political development in this form could, 
Prudhisan argued, encourage the formation of popular participation in state activities but 
could not create "the growth of popular control over government" in the real sense of 
democratic system [italic as in original].116
According to Prudhisan it was not until the 1973 uprising that the "non- 
bureaucratic" groups appeared to have, at least to some extent, the autonomous power 
to actively represent the people's interest. These groups, which comprised mainly the 
middle class with the support of urban and rural populations, were the result of the 
economic development and expansion of education during the 1950s and 1960s. They 
were not dominated or initiated under the auspices of the bureaucratic system. The main 
activities of the non-bureaucratic groups from 1973-1976 was to encourage the creation 
of various kind of interest groups such as the Peasant Federation of Thailand (PFT), 
Federation of Labour Union of Thailand (FLUT); and of pressure groups such as the 
National Student Centre of Thailand (NSCT), the Federation of Independent Students 
of Thailand (FIST), People for Democracy Group (PDG) and Union for Civil Liberty 
(UCL). The ultimate aims of these "non-bureaucratic groups" were not only to 
encourage people to participate in state activities but also to attempt to influence the
116 Prudhisan Jumbala, "Interest and Pressure Groups", in Somsakdi Xuto (ed.), Government and 
Politics of Thailand. London: Oxford University Press, 1987; and Suksan Bunyakon, "Ongkon 
prachachon kap nganpatthana: khwamkloenwai thangkhwamkhit nai phakratthaban" [People's 
Organizations and Development Work: The Conceptual Movement in the Government's 
Sector], Thanglu'ak kanpatthana [Alternative Development Dossier], [in Thai], Vol. 2., May- 
June B.E. 2529 [1986], pp. 1-9. Suksan reveals that people's organizations were created under 
the initiatives of both the Kings and the bureaucrats following the Western pattern since the 
turn of the century. For example, in 1892, King Chulalongkom made an initial experiment of 
the election of village leaders [Kamnan-Phuyaiban Election] at Ban Ko, Bangpa-in District, 
Ayudhaya Province. In 1953, Phibun initiated the village council system which he had seen 
during his tour around Europe and America. The people's organizations created under the 
government's initiatives brought little benefit to the people.
116 Prudhisan, op. cit.. p. 117. In addition, Prudhisan does not totally agree with the perspective of 
"patron and client" relationship applied to the Thai society. He prefers to characterize the 
relationship between superiors and inferiors as "entourage" which means a group of people of 
different status who bind themselves together. Each entourage may work independently after 
taking an order from a leader and would be able to move from one leader to another. He argues 
that this kind of relationship - entourage - prevents us from looking at the pattern of Thai 
relationships "purely from a 'patron-client' perspective" fibid.. pp. 112-113].
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government's decision and policies for the benefit of the people. These groups formed 
the basis of the NGO movement in Thailand which I emphasize in this thesis.117
Marxist scholars also examined Thai society and the role of the state. They 
adopted political economy or structural approaches in works published both before and 
after World War II. Publications before the War may be traced back to the economic 
plans of Phraya Suriyanuwat (Koet Bunnag) and Luang Pradit Manutham (Pridi 
Phanomyong), both of which were influenced by Marxist analysis and which I will 
discuss in more detail in Chapter 2. In the post-War period there have been a range of 
studies from the early 1950s to the present which have been summarized by Reynolds 
and Hong.118
As well as the translations, articles and summaries of Marxist socio-economic 
theory in periodical and weekly magazines such as Aksonsan and Pivamit. there were 
several publications which were influential in Thai economic and political thinking. For 
example, Supha Sirimanond's Capitalism, published in 1951 and 1974, presented a 
basic explanation of Marxist concepts such as "exchange value" and "surplus value" and 
was used as a textbook in the Faculty of Economic, Thammasat University. Thailand: 
A Semicolonv. published in 1950 and 1979, was written by Udom Sisuwan (under the 
pen name "Aran Phomchomphu"), and characterized the Thai society from 1855 to the 
late 1950s as a "semi-colonial and semi-sakdina" system or a combination of Western 
imperialism and the sakdina system. The Real Face of Thai Feudalism [Chomna 
sakdinathai] written by Chit Phoumisak (under the pen name "Somsamai 
Srisudravama"), was published in Nitisat 2500 (the Thammasat Law Faculty Yearbook) 
in 1957.119 In this work, Chit analyses the "sakdina" system as a system of 
"exploitation" over the peasants in various forms such as taxation, corvee labour, and 
through the implementation of legal codes and decrees.120
More recent political economy (Marxist) studies emphasize internal and external 
factors in the analysis of Thai society and the state. For example, the "Chatthip school"
117 ML, PP-132-162.
118 CJ. Reynolds and L. Hong, "Marxism in Thai Historical Studies", Journal of Asian Studies. 
Vol. XLIII, No. 1, November 1983, pp. 77-104. This article provides a comprehensive review 
of Marxist studies on Thailand.
119 This work was translated in English by Reynolds in C.J. Reynolds, Thai Radical Discourse: 
The Real Face of Thai Feudalism Today. Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Programme, 1987, pp. 
43-148.
120 Chit Phumisak used the ancient Thai legal term "sakdina" as an equivalent of the Marxist term 
"feudalism". In modem Thai studies this new meaning of the term is widely used.
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has concentrated a number of academic studies on the sakdina system as a major internal 
cause of underdevelopment in Thai society, following Chatthip and Suthy who argued 
that "[Cjentralized sakdina control was an obstacle to the development of a capitalist 
mode of production" [underlining as in original].121 They also argue that the 
emergence of a national bourgeois class was restricted before 1941 because of the 
dependence of the "bureaucratic capitalists" on the sakdina class and of the 
subordination of the "compradore capitalists" to foreign enterprise.122 As for external 
influence, Chatthip and Suthy regarded the Bowring Treaty of 1855 as an important 
factor in bringing Thailand into the international process of the division of labour and as 
a consequence:
Siam had been transformed into a source of raw material supplies, a new investment outlet, 
and a new market for Western capitalist countries. Further expansion of dependent commodity 
production inevitably led to the formation of Siam as a semi-dependent economy.122
Hewison also emphasized the role of the external factors in causing 
underdevelopment in Thailand and put the view that since Thai foreign policy became 
pro-American in the 1950s, Thailand, as an exporter of primary products, was tied up 
by the Bretton Woods agreements, "which locked Third World countries into a system 
of trade and finance designed by and for the advanced capitalist nations".124
Chatthip Nartsupha and Suthy Prasartset, The Political Economy of Siam 1851-1910. 
Bangkok: The Social Science Association of Thailand, 1981, p. 31. In addition, Chatthip, 
Suthy and Montri show that the government, representing the landowners, domestic and foreign 
capitalist classes, may actively pursue a policy of raising agricultural productivity, but tends to 
shift the responsibility in promoting agriculture to smallholders without tacking the basic 
problems such as the lack of security in land rights or the need to improve the land [Chatthip 
Nartsupha, Suthy Prasartset and Montri Chenvidyakam (eds.), The Political Economy of Siam 
1910-1932. Bangkok: The Social Science Association of Thailand, 1981, pp. 1-2 and 4-5].
122 Chatthip and Suthy, op. cit.. p. 34; see also Bell, "Class Relations and Thai Development", 
pp. 107-127.
122 Chatthip and Suthy, op. cit.. p. 7.
124 In addition, Hewison claims that the military government (the Sarit regime) allowed the 
exploitation of Thai peasants and workers by giving facilities to the international capitalists:
"With the assistance of the United States Operations Mission (USOM) the government 
withdrew the 1954 Investment Promotion Act which had been criticized in the IBRD Report, 
and replaced it with the Promotion of Investment Act B.E. 2503 (1960), and established the Bol 
[Board of Investment]. Section 18 of the new Act contained two specific guarantees for private 
enterprise, stating that the government would neither compete with nor nationalize any private 
industrial activity. It also allowed for the conditional repatriation of profits, the right to land 
ownership, some import duty exemptions, a two-year income tax holiday, and additional 
benefits which could be granted by the Bol in specific cases" [Hewison, "The State and 
Capitalist Development in Thailand", pp. 278-279].
In 1962, the Sarit government promulgated a revised Act, providing more privileges and 
benefits to particular foreign investors. Hewison indicates that:
"this Act provided for duty and business tax exemption on all imported capital goods and raw 
materials, a five year tax holiday, wider opportunities for profit repatriations, and gave wider
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Commenting on the internal and external factors, Apichai and Montri see the main 
feature of the Thai economy since 1957 as having been the implementation of 
modernization and the simultaneous increase of dependency which had resulted in a 
"structural crises",125 while Grit was influenced by the dependency paradigm in his 
analysis which focused on the limitation of the Thai state in responding to the world 
capitalist domination:
the dependent capitalist development in Thailand, during the past two decades [from the 1960s 
to 1970s], showed a limited capacity to rationalize itself in response to the political-economic 
crisis, and especially in response to the economic contradictions between the accumulation 
needs of the capitalist class and the development of subsistant needs of the working class.12^
While orthodox and neo-Marxist analyses were well represented in Thai 
literature, they came under criticism from both Marxist and modernization scholars. 
Udom's model of "semi-colonial and semi-sakdina" society, which played a major role 
in determining the strategy of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), was strongly 
challenged by some social critics and academics.127 Udom's model was criticized also 
by Reynolds and Hong who argued that it:
"... was faulted on theoretical grounds ..." and "... was not a genuine social formation or mode 
of production in the Marx-Engels schema but was derived from Mao's 'The Chinese 
Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party' of 1939, and on a number of crucial points this 
social formation simply did not apply to Thai conditions.12^
Reynolds and Hong argued too that although Chit's thesis of Chomna sakdinathai 
focused on the structure of a system rather than the change in the mode of production, it
discretionary power to the Bol. The Act had the desired effect, as an increasing number of 
companies applied for promotional privileges" [Hewison, "The State and Capitalist 
Development in Thailand", p. 279]. Bell adds that ”[T]he strengthening of traditional social 
relations did not mean that external forces were not powerful in shaping Thailand’s pattern of 
development" [Bell, "Class Relations and Thai Development", p. 121].
Apichai Puntasen and Montri Chenvidyakam, "Political Economy of Development in Thailand: 
Models, Strategies and Consequences", mimeo, Thammasat University, Bangkok, n.d., p. 64.
Grit Poemtanchit, Political Economy of Dependent Capitalist Development: Study on the 
Limits of the Capacity of the State to Rationalize in Thailand. Bangkok: Chulalongkom 
University Social Research Institute (CUSRI), 1982, p. 249.
For example, Songchai Na Yala, "Sangkhomthai mai chai sangkhom ku'ng mu'ang ku'n ku'ng 
sakdina" [The Thai Society is neither Semi-Colonial nor Semi-Sakdina], Parithat "Chabap 
sangkhomthai" [Thai Social Issues], n.d., pp. 31-35; Prachae Changtham, "Wichan thatsana 
Thirayut Bunmi" [The Criticism towards Thirayut Bunmi's Perspective", ibid., pp. 10-20; and 
Srisamai U'angsakun, "Kankhayaitua khong thunniyom nai chonnabot" [The Expansion of 
Capitalism in the Rural Areas], Parithatsan. "Chabap thitthang sangkhomthai" [Thai Social 
Directions], Vol. 11, October B.E. 2525 (1982), pp. 12-16.
128 Reynolds and Hong, op. cit.. p. 82.
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was able to show the role of the peasantry as a social force in class conflict resulting 
from the complexity in the sakdina system.129
Criticism of the debate over whether internal or external factors predominated in 
forming the Thai polity was usefully summarized by Nidhi who argued that, in fact, 
there was an inter-relation between internal and external analysis shown in Thai society 
in particular as it affected the pre-Bowring and post-Bowring periods ("old Siam" and 
"new Siam"):
Indeed, external pressures per se cannot really determine the direction of change in any society. 
To understand changes in any society, attention should be given to the seeds of changes that 
have already existed in that very society. Without these seeds, external forces will never 
develop internally. Thus, to understand changes in Thai society in the mid-nineteenth century, 
we need to search for and then analyse these seeds of change, notably the structure of interest 
groups and their struggle to enhance their interests in the process of change. Therefore, the 
dominant static picture of the "old Siam" must be replaced by the more dynamic one, and more 
attention should be devoted to the study of the continuity of change from the "old Siam" to the 
"new Siam" (emphasis as in original).13^
At the same time, Suwinai Paranawalai of Thammasat University argued that the 
Marxist approaches were unable to provide an explanation of change at the micro-level, 
for instance in the expansion of capital, nor could it anticipate the dynamic change of 
capital in developing countries. Nor, according to his overview of political economy 
studies, could Marxist studies in Thailand provide a systematic analysis of the peasant 
class because of what he called their "uni-linear mode". He concluded that he would 
like to see "multi-linear modes" in analysing Thai society.131
The theories and approaches adopted by scholars in their analyses of Thai 
society have been varied but have also proved inconclusive in formulating any widely 
accepted explanations of development. As we have seen there has been lively debate 
and many issues raised. The key problem to some extent seems to be that while the 
modernization scholars address the question of state as fundamental to their analysis, 
the Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches emphasize international and national dynamics
129 Ibid., pp. 84-85.
130 Quoted from Chairat, op. cit.. p. 153.
131 Suwinai Paranawalai, "Sathanaphap khong setthasat kanmu'angthai nai thotsawat thi 1980" 
[The Status of the Thai Political Economy in the Decade of 1980s], in Kraiyuth 
Thiratayakhinun (ed.), Khwamru nak setthasatthai pi 2529 [The Knowledge of the Thai 
Economists in B.E. 2529 (1986)], [in Thai], Bangkok: The Economic Association of Thailand, 
B.E. 2530 (1987), pp. 185-230. Suwinai reviewed the use of the political economy approach 
in studying Thai society and maintained there were three categories: the "imported theoretical 
study", comparative, and empirical studies. See also Napapom Ativanichayapong, "The 
Development of Political Economy Thought in Thailand, 1932-1982, M.A. Thesis (English 
version), Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University, 1986.
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in different terms (class analysis, mode of production, dependency etc.). Nevertheless, 
an interesting attempt was made by a political scientist, Chai-anan Samudhavanija (who 
was trained in America during the 1960s), to address these issues.
To counter the Marxist uni-linear approach (i.e. following the historical 
materialism of various modes of production) in analysing Thai society, Chai-anan 
pointed out that the uni-linear approach was based on European experience and failed to 
analyse the sakdina society. Chai-anan argued in Sakdina kap patthanakan khong 
sangkhomthai [Sakdina and the Development of Thai Society], that the pre-capitalist or 
sakdina society was characterized by an "Asiatic mode of production" which was 
typified by an absence of private ownership of land and control by the king over all land 
which people were allowed to work on his behalf, not a "feudal mode of production" as 
argued by Chit who had adopted orthodox Marxism in his work: Chomna sakdina 
thai.132 The unique characteristic of the Thai sakdina system required a special 
supporting theoretical explanation. Chai-anan chose Wittfogel's model of "oriental 
despotism" (or sometimes called "hydraulic society") which described Asian society as 
a totalitarian society in which the top elites centralized their power by controlling water 
resources.133 In accord with the model of "oriental depotism", he argued that the Thai 
sakdina had continued its superstructure role without interruption from either internal 
conflicts (revolt, opposition from periphery) or external powers (colonialism). Unlike 
the European feudal system which distributed power to hierarchical landlords, the Thai 
sakdina system greatly centralized power while weakening any peripheral powers which 
had a potential to challenge the central state power.
Chai-anan Samudhavanija, Sakdina kap patthanakan khong sangkhomthai [Sakdina and the 
Development of Thai Society], [in Thai], Bangkok: Namakson kanphim, 1976, p. 11, 15-27, 
Chs. 4-5. His work is based on K. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of 
Total Power. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. Chatthip commented that instead of 
criticizing Chit's Chomna sakdinathai. Chai-anan's thesis helped support Chit's study. For 
example, while Chit indicated that there was an exploitation between classes in the sakdina 
system, Chai-anan further argues that besides the exploitation between classes, the sakdina 
system caused the stagnation of economic and political change [Chatthip Nartsupha, "Sakdina 
kap patthanakan khong sangkhom thai: A Comment", in Chai-anan, Sakdina kap patthanakan. 
n.p.].
Following Wittfogel who argued that the central power controlled productive resources, in 
particular water resources, in the production process, Chai-anan claimed that Sukhothai, 
Ayudhaya and Bangkok after the Bowring Treaty had been "hydraulic societies". However, his 
analysis was later refuted because historical evidence revealed that the Thai sakdina state did not 
construct any irrigation work or agricultural technology for peasants' production purpose, 
although there were hydraulic work done for royal or official purposes such as the control of 
floods in the central plains. See S. Tanabe, "Historical Geography of the Canal System in the 
Chao Phraya River Delta from the Ayudhaya Period to the Fourth Reign of the Ratanakosin 
Dynasty", Journal of the Siam Society. Vol 65, No. 2, pp. 39-40.
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Although there appeared to have been peasant revolts against the severe 
exappropriation of the Absolute Monachy or the sakdina system, their opposition was 
weakened and suppressed by the state's m achinery .134 For example, peasant 
opposition was weakened by the administrative-legal system through the Kot 
monthienban (legal code), or was suppressed by central military force. Reynolds and 
Hong noticed that Thai people under the sakdina system lived in the totalitarian regimes 
described by W ittfogel's model.135 Chairat argued that Chai-anan's analysis of 
"oriental despotism" model came close to Chatthip's analysis and claimed that the 
sakdina system constrained the development of the capitalist class in Thai society.136
Chai-anan in his second approach rightly argues that Marxists downgrade the 
role of the state by subjecting it to economic determinism, but he is not completely 
successful when he attempts to generalize the characteristics of the Thai state across time 
and space. In examining the characteristics of the Thai state across several centuries, he 
argued that the Thai state had been capable of adapting itself to survive because it has 
three dimensions, namely security, development, and democracy. "Development" he 
defined as a new method used by the state to expand its old mechanism to penetrate into 
various aspects of society horizontally and vertically by allowing the monarchy, religion 
(monks) and bureaucracy to get involved in the state's affairs. He argued that 
"democracy" limited the state’s role by preventing these three institutions from 
becoming involved in politics while, at the same time, it encouraged the role of the 
private sector. "Security", in his terms, was the state's legitimate machinery of force to 
be used, for example, in case of confrontation with "communism". Even if this 
machinery was used to suppress "democracy", he claimed that the state had the legal 
power to do so.137 Although Chai-anan supported a "representative" democratic 
system, he faced a similar problem to Wilson, Riggs and Siffin in that he failed to
134 See details in Chatthip Nartsupha, "The Ideology of Holy Men Revolts in North East 
Thailand", in A. Turton and S. Tanabe (eds.), History and Peasant Consciousness in Southeast 
Asia. Senri Ethnological Studies No. 13, Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 1984, pp. 
111-134; and S. Tanabe, "Ideological Practice in Peasant Rebellion: Siam at the Turn of the 
Twentieth Century", in ibid., pp. 75-110.
135 Reynolds and Hong, op. cit.. p. 89.
136 Chairat, op. cit.. p. 159.
Chai-anan Samudhavanija, Büi [The State], [in Thai], Bangkok: The Faculty of Political 
Science, Chulalongkom University, B. E. 2530 [1987], pp. 149, 154, 157, 193, 197-198.
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foresee the systematic development of social force outside the boundary of the state's 
initiative.138
Chai-anan's analysis of the characteristics of the Thai state hardly addressed the 
question of development stagnation in Thailand. He assumed that economic 
development was blocked by causes such as the variety and inconsistency of economic 
sub-systems in Thai society, and the inability of capitalist economic sub-systems to 
expand their accumulation in other parts, for example in agricultural sectors, due to the 
domination of foreign enterprises and "ethnic characteristics" (referring to Chinese 
business leadership).139 His answer may have been partly right but it did not strike at 
the heart of the underdevelopment problems because his analysis of the Thai state did 
not stress the responsibility of the state in pursuing development for the majority. His 
arguments based on this three-dimensional model of the Thai state said very little about 
the fundamental issues of power and wealth, and in particular, who controlled power 
and wealth, how it was to be used and who should benefit.
The ideas of neo-Marxism are subject to considerable debate. For example, Bell 
argues that the thesis of Chatthip and Suthy mainly emphasized the internal factors such 
as the sakdina system, whereas Chairat seems to overemphasized external factors such 
as the influence of the Bowring Treaty of 1855. The thesis of the "Chatthip school", in 
my opinion, is related to both internal and external factors by starting with the analysis 
of the sakdina system. Therefore, the weak point of the thesis is neither the internal nor 
the external emphasis but the historical fact that the sakdina system gradually changed
138 For example, he explains the failure of the Thai "bureaucratic polity" since 1932 in that 
"[B]efore 1932, the bureaucracy was at least accountable to the King, who was considered to 
represent the public. After 1932, with the ruler's loss of monarchical powers, the bureaucracy 
was expected to be accountable to the public in the real sense of the word, but this was not to 
be the case. The 'public', so essential for democratic government, has remained an unorganized, 
faceless, powerless mass, subject to domination by civil and military bureaucrates" [Chai-anan 
Samudhavanija, "Political History", in Somsakdi Xuto (ed.), Government and Politics of 
Thailand, p. 22]
My emphasis is put on the word systematic in analysing Chai-anan’s perspective because 
although his works have focused on historical figure like Thianwan and events like the 1973 
uprising as monuments of the representative democratic system, his point of view is still 
centred around the study of "superstructure" (state, state machinery, ideology etc.) and his three 
dimensions (security, development, democracy) are generalisations which can be applied in any 
time (i.e. they are a-historical). Because of this static view, Chai-anan could not predict the 
emergence of forces outside the state. For details about Thianwan, see Chai-anan 
Samudhavanija, Chiwit lae ngan khong Thianwan lae K.S.R. Kulap [Lives and Works of 
Thianwan and K.S.R. Kulap], [in Thai], Bangkok: Samnakphim bannakit, 2nd. ed., B.E. 2524 
(1981).
139 Chai-anan, Rai-, p. 167.
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due to external influence, as Nidhi argues, and the Bowring Treaty of 1855 was the 
turning point for the change.140
Marxist academics still have problems in class analysis of explaining which 
social forces will carry out development and how the various classes will participate in 
the state's affairs. Chatthip and Suthy consider Thai society as a sakdina society and 
argue that foreign capitalism is subordinate to the sakdina system, thereby preventing 
the emergence of an independent bourgeois class in Thailand. However, Hewison does 
not agree with this argument and claims that there is evidence of the formation of a 
bourgeois class in particular banking and business groups and asserts that a "powerful 
capitalist class has emerged in Thailand, having developed a strong, domestic 
accumulative base".141 These arguments may remain open ended until there is more 
concrete evidence to either prove their correctness or re-assess them.
Neither modernization nor Marxist theories provide a satisfactory analysis of 
power and wealth (including the international link) and are largely inadequate in 
analysing Thai underdevelopment. The explanation of modernization theory may be 
useful to understand some internal problems constraining national development but it 
does not have enough power to explain other important factors such as why the political 
parties, interest and pressure groups are still weak and ineffective,142 or how the 
international political and economic context obstructs development in developing 
countries. The study of an elite's behaviour alone cannot account for the failure of Thai 
democracy. Since the structural-functional model fails to assert that the benefit of 
development should be equally distributed to the majority poor, their argument that 
democracy fails in Thailand and that Thai people are apolitical individuals, politically 
passive and unconcerned, is weak. The simple judgement implying this reason for the 
failure of Thai democracy may stem from a neglect of an in-depth and continuous study
The ideas of Chatthip and Nithi are not contradictory. In my opinion, however, Nithi provides 
a useful analysis of internal change before the Bowring Treaty.
K.J. Hewison, "The Development of Capital, Public Policy and the Role of the State in 
Thailand", Ph.D. dissertation, Murdock University, 1983, pp. ii-iv, Chs. 4-5. Although 
Suehiro does not discuss class formation, he claims that in relation to multinational enterprises 
"... leadership and co-orporate control principally remain in the hands of Thai managers" [A. 
Suehiro, Capital Accumulation in Thailand 1855-1985. Tokyo: The Centre for East Asian 
Cultural Studies, 1989, p. 271]. In my view, Suehiro's claim could support either view as it 
highlights the importance of a domestic economic control which could be either sakdina or a 
new capitalist class.
Pye, op. cit.. pp. 97-98, 84. Even though Pye claims that the modernization theory has had a 
great impact on Thai development through the traditional elites and Western-educated aristocrats 
since the Absolute Monarchy, it should be noted that after the monarchy lost its autocratic 
power, the power fell into the hands of the military and bureaucrats who had received a western 
education.
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of mass movements in Thailand. Mass movements, in my opinion, express people's 
views of their own needs and, therefore, they are among the roots of democracy. 
Unless democracy and development concepts are applied, the local initiatives would not 
be able to promote Thai development.143 And although the Marxist scholars put 
considerable emphasis on the study of mass movement, they have not yet provided a 
clear solution.
According to Roxborough, the nature of most developing countries is complex 
because they have differences in regions, language, ethnic groups and an absence of 
any sense of nationhood among many of the rural populations. Some radical 
dependency theorists, he adds, tend to have a one-sided perspective in determining the 
role of the world market, and have seen development within Third World countries as 
mere reflections of, or response to, external changes. To correct the inadequacy of 
development theories is by no means an easy task, but, as Roxborough suggests, a 
possible solution to the complexity of the Third World is to combine both internal and 
external factors in a single integrated theory.144 In addition, Chatthip argues that, in 
most developing societies there has not yet been distinctive social differentiation as in 
the developed societies. Thus, the study of the economy cannot be detailed by the 
economic approach (e.g. Marxism and "liberal" economic theories) alone and has to be 
explained by other approaches such as anthropology and socio-economics or by 
combining the pure economic approach (in particular Marxism) and others as 
"appropriate" for any particular issue.145
The key factor to emerge from the overview given in this chapter is that there is 
a particular place in Thai development for popular movements or interest groups - these 
can be seen as social forces which can counterbalance the state role and ensure
143 See the argument of "Development and Democracy" in J.L.S. Girling, The Bureaucratic Polity 
in Modernizing Societies: Similarities. Differences, and Prospects in the ASEAN Region. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1981, pp. 53-56.
144 I. Roxborough, Theories of Underdevelopment. London: The Macmillan Press, 1979, pp. 25, 
50. Higgott also supports this idea by arguing that ”[I]t is important to incorporate analysis 
of global exchange relationships into the reformulated theory of imperialism which has 
emanated from the macro-analytical approaches of dependency theory and world systems theory. 
The tendency to swing from macro-analytical circulation theory to micro-analytical production 
theory has to be avoided at all costs" [Higgott et al.. "Theories of Development", pp. 34-35].
145 Chatthip Nartsupha, "Kansuksa prawatsat setthakit" [The Study of Economic History"], [in 
Thai], in Chatthip Nartsupha el al.. Setthasat kap prawatsatthai [Thai Economics and History], 
pp. 74-75. Higgins proposes an idea that anthropologists and economists should learn from 
each other so that they would be able to help develop a "traditional" society to suit the people’s 
needs. See B. Higgins, "Anthropology: Social Science, Regional Science, Development 
Theory - or Literature?", paper presented in the seminar, Canberra: Department of Antropology, 
ANU, 10 April 1990.
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democratic development. In the following chapters I will consider various functions of 
the state, such as the preparation and implementation of development plans, and 
examine the role of Thai NGOs in the Thai development process with a view to 
establishing whether there is a special role for them as a counterbalancing power in Thai 
political and economic development. The Thai NGOs, which have emerged since the 
mid 1970s, are, as we shall see, part of an international NGO movement which 
generally speaking, does not have any particular "ideology" but uses the representative- 
democracy concept to guide its work. They employ an "alternative development" 
strategy to meet the people's needs and their analysis of the problems of 
underdevelopment covers both macro and micro levels as well as internal and external 
links. This chapter provides the mainstream of development thinking within which the 
NGOs need to find analytical guidance to assess their work because, as Moore says:
Without being guided by some purposes and values that transcend such a narrow and technical 
view of disciplined inquiry into human affairs, ... social scientists will rapidly become mere 
technicians selling their skills to any unscrupulous power-seekers who want to manipulate 
society for their own ends. 146
146 b . Moore, "The New Scholasticism and the Study of Politics", World Politics. Vol. 6, No. 1, 
October, 1953, p. 124.
CHAPTER 2
Historical Assessment of Thai Development Plans
Development means creating the conditions for the realization of human personality. Its 
evaluation must therefore take into account three linked economic criteria: whether there has 
been a reduction in (i) poverty; (ii) unemployment; (iii) inequality. G.N.P. can grow rapidly 
without any improvement on these criteria; so development must be measured more directly. 
The conceptual and practical problems of a number of indicators are discussed and also the 
implications for planning, both national and international.
D. Seers, "What Are We Trying to Measure?" *
We have seen, in the previous chapter, the inter-relation within development 
thinking and debates between the international context and the Thai society. Some 
important questions remain for further discussion, in particular the role of the state and 
dynamic social forces in formulating national development policies. This chapter aims 
to assess the development plans proposed in 1911, 1933 and from 1961 until the 
present time, with a view to seeing the extent to which they have indicated the role of 
the state, the role of social forces and a place for the majority poor to participate in 
national development.2 In showing some of the limitations of the state's capacity to 
implement development and some reactions of the majority poor towards the state's 
policies, this chapter also aims to establish that there is a special role for non­
government organizations (NGOs) in encouraging the poor to participate in 
development.
Because of the different historical factors evident in such a wide ranging period, 
not least of all being the number of different regimes under which the Thai people have 
been governed, the assessment of the development plans will selectively focus on 
development ideas showing the attempts, in the decades before Sarit's regime (1911- 
1957), to extend the role of the state in development; and, after Sarit's regime (1958- 
present) to reduce the role of the state as a supporter in development. However, other 
relevant information will be discussed to clarify and show the impact of development 
especially on the poor.
1
2
Seers, op. cit.. p. 21.
As we shall see, the plans in 1911 and 1933 were not implemented for political reasons but did 
have some influence on later development thinking in Thailand.
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To achieve the aim of this chapter, a number of factors will be addressed as 
follows: first, the aim of development in the Thai society; second, the development 
ideas and government policies before Sarit's regime (1911-1957); third, the 
development plans since Sarit's regime (1958-present); and fourth, the reaction of the 
majority poor towards development plans and the role of NGOs in the Thai 
development context.
The aim of '’development” in Thai society
In 1974, Puey Ungpakom, a Thai economist, expressed the following view 
concerning Thai national development objectives:
the important essence of development is to promote the maintenance of a suitable living 
standard ["yu di kin di"] for individual human beings, and a high quality of welfare for the 
human society or community. When we [government officials] understand the needs of 
individuals and consider those needs as being "appropriate", we would be able to 
comprehensively assess the responsibility of government. Presumably its duty is to provide 
for and respond to the "appropriate" demands of citizens, every person and class [my 
translation, italics as in original].^
He defined "appropriate" as the degree to which the government is able to 
achieve the demands of every person in all classes, providing always that when 
considering the difference between rich and poor, the priority is given to the poor. The 
government, he said, should stress the need for development to improve the standard of 
living of the poor and use tax measures and the creation of a welfare system to help the 
poor. Only then, he concluded, could the government take full responsibility for 
achieving the goal of "yu di kin di" for the people.4 In addition, he focused on the 
development programmes for the rural poor as the major aim of development in the Thai 
society. He argued that: 1) the income of the rural poor had to be satisfactorily 
increased; 2) the increase of income needed to be steady and stabilized; and 3) the rural 
poor needed to be able to help themselves and one another.5 Besides putting people and 
their needs at the centre of development, Puey also set the priorities for the state's role 
in development.
Sireeten and Burki argued that the development problem of the rural poor in 
general was "not growth as such, but the structure of ownership and power, and the 
policies pursued by the governments, which prevented the poor from benefiting from
Puey Ungpakom, Sia chip va sia sin [(Poetic) "If you (must) lose your life, do not lose your 
reputation"], [in Thai], Bangkok: Kletthai Publishing, B.E. 2517 (1974), pp. 105-106.
Ibid., pp 106-107
Puey Ungphakom, Settathat [The Economic View], [in Thai], Bangkok: The Association of 
Economics, Thammasat University, B.E. 2523 (1980), p. 165.
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growth".6 The problems of the rural poor in Thailand have, especially since the 1970s, 
been analysed from the view not only of their economic problems but also social and 
political problems as well. In order to overcome the factors preventing the Thai rural 
poor from achieving economic growth, Turton suggests that besides increasing 
production, which is regarded as the basis of their livelihood, the poor need to control 
their production and to have power to control their own future. He also argues that 
"popular participation", defined as "the organized efforts to increase control over 
resources and regulative institutions in given social situations, on the part of groups and 
movements of those hitherto excluded from such control",7 gives a place for the 
underprivileged poor to increase their power in controlling not only economic benefits 
but also a wider range of human and social issues such as community health and 
education.8
Like Puey and Turton, Galtung proposes the concept of "self-reliant" 
development which implies "a pattern of regeneration through one's own efforts, of 
fighting dominance by beginning to rely on oneself [autonomy], meaning the individual 
self and the collective Self [sic] with others in the same position".9 Galtung adds that 
the double nature of self-reliance, regarded as a part of an historical process, is to break 
up relations in the social structure and to build new ones. Self-reliance therefore 
depends on people participation because the people must be the masters of their own 
decisions in determining their needs and creating the solutions, not only the subject of
Sireeten and Burki, op. cit.. p. 412.
A. Turton, Production. Power and Participation in Rural Thailand: Experiences of Poor 
Farmers' Groups. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNRISD), 1987, p. 3 [with reference to A. Pearse and M. Stiefel, Inquiry into Participation. 
Geneva: UNRISD, 1979]. However, Turton argues that "participation" is not a panacea for 
development. Villagers are regarded to be passive or unwilling to participate in a new 
development initiative proposed from outside. For example, at the community level, there is 
the overlapping of and interpenetration from politics and administration which make 
participation a particularly complex issue ribid.. pp. 75-76 and 92-106] For further 
information, see N. Uphoff and E.J. Milton, Local Organization for Development in Asia. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974. I will discuss the concepts of "people participation", 
"basic needs", "basic human rights" and "self-reliance" in Chs. 3 and 4.
Turton, Production. Power and Participation, pp. 48-50. In addition, Apichai and Montri 
argue, following Chamlong Atikul (1981), that to satisfactorily answer the question of 
development for whom, three criteria need to be satisfied: first, whether those who will be 
affected by the economic development plan have any opportunity to participate in the planning 
process; second, whether the government's intention specified in the plan is consistent with the 
budget allocated for it; and third, the intended beneficiaries of the development plan are in fact 
the actual beneficiaries [Apichai and Montri, op. cit.. p. 50].
J. Galtung, "Self-Reliance: Concepts, Practice and Rationale", in J. Galtung, P. O'Brien and 
R. Preiswerk (eds.), Self-Reliance: A Strategy for Development. London, Bogle-d'Ouverture 
Publications Ltd., 1980, p 23.
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government-designed assistance and relief.10 In the Thai context, this concept can be 
related to the principle of "self-reliance" in Buddhist philosophy. However, this 
principle has been explained in conjunction with the "law of merit" which has placed an 
emphasis on the individual self rather than the collective self so that the Thai social 
structure would not be challenged.11 Nevertheless, some Thai scholars (like Dr. 
Prawet Wasi, recipient of a Magsaysay award for public service, and Sulak Sivarak, a 
Thai social critic) have attempted to reassess the Buddhist principle of "self-reliance" as 
an aim of Thai development. If successful this could be a powerful concept in 
redirecting development in Thai society.
The aim of development in Thailand will be accepted in this thesis as the need to 
address the problems of the "common people"12 through methods reflecting 
participation, self-reliance and the meeting of basic needs. However, "the evolution of 
a development policy and its implications cannot be analysed in complete isolation from 
its historical context".13 In the following sections therefore, I will provide an historical 
treatment of the various development plans which have been produced in Thailand and 
seek to determine to what extent they incorporate the concepts of "people participation", 
"basic needs" and "self-reliance" as presented in Chapter l . 14 I will consider the Thai 
development plans in two stages — the period before Sarit's regime (from 1911 to 
1957) and the period from Sarit's regime to the present (from 1958 onward) —  as the 
plans of the former period are "informal" plans generally characterized as representing 
"Economic Nationalism" or "State Capitalism" whereas, in the latter period, 
development plans were formal National Plans representing "industrialization" or
Ibid., pp 26-34. Galtung adds that the self-reliance concept also has some practical problems. 
For instance one could ask whether there is a maximum size of a self-reliant unit (a sort of 
local "democracy") which would allow the meaningful participation of every individual. See 
details in the case study of the Phichit Experience in Ch. 4.
H. Phillips argues that the loose relationships of the rural Thai people may be traced to 
Buddhism which highlights individual action and responsibility. J. Bunnag, on the other hand, 
argues that the practice of Theravada Buddhism includes a certain degree of co-operation, for 
example, individuals assist one another, are involved in religious ceremonies together and share 
the burden of expenses. See details in H.P. Phillips, "Social Contract vs. Social Promise in a 
Siamese Village", in J.M. Potter, M.N. Dias, and G.M. Foster, Peasant Society: A Reader. 
Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1967, pp. 363-364; and J. Bunnag, "Loose Structure: Fact or 
Fancy? Thai Society Re-examined", in C.D. Neher (ed.), Modem Thai Politics: From Village 
to Nation. Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1976, p. 152.
By the "common people", I simply mean the poor peasants and wage workers. See further 
discussion on pp. 84-85 in the fourth section of this chapter: Problems of common people and 
their reaction towards the government's implementation of development policies.
Apichai and Montri, op. cit.. p. 1.
The concepts of "people participation", "basic needs" and "self-reliance" are inseparable from 
the "basic human rights" which I will discuss further in relation to the NGO concepts in Ch. 
3.
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"private enterprise"15 approaches influenced by world development ideas and 
institutions.
Development ideas and government policies before Sarit’s regime
The development ideas during the pre-Sarit period can be best understood from 
two outstanding publications. One was Sapsat [The Science of Property], written by 
Phraya Suriyanuwat (Koet Bunnak) in 1911. The other was "The National Economic 
Plan" (also widely known as "The Draft Economic Plan") written by Luang Pradit 
Manutham (Pridi Phanomyong) in 1933.16 Although the plans were not implemented 
as such, they were influential in the development of "Economic Nationalism" in the 
period between 1933 and 1957.
Phraya Suriyanuwat: The Science of Property
In "The Science of Property", Phraya Suriyanuwat gave a systematic analysis 
of Thai economic problems and proposed some possible solutions. Unlike many other 
Thai thinkers at that time, he did not simply urge Thai peasants to follow the Buddhist 
admonition to reduce "craving" (tanha), but argued that the fault for lack of progress lay 
in both material and social factors - that is with labour, markets, money and land. 
Moreover, he commented that the sakdina system which was based on hierarchy and 
self-sufficient farmers, needed to be replaced by a market economy with efficient 
division of labour and exchange of products.
"The Science of Property", regarded as the first Thai economic text, revealed 
that farmers under the sakdina system were poor and led hard lives, that Thai society 
was composed of classes, and that there was oppression between classes. Phraya 
Suriyanuwat proposed that to resolve this situation and to achieve progress in economic 
development required the reformulation and establishment of new proprietary rights. 
He considered agriculture as the most important sector in the Thai economy, and 
farmers as the group who most needed help: "the progress of Siam" he said "rests upon
A. Suehiro, Capital Accumulation in Thailand 1855-1985. Tokyo: The Centre for East Asian 
Cultural Studies, 1989, Ch. 6. "Economic Nationalism" (or so-called "State Capitalism") will 
be discussed later.
There was a claim in the Bangkok Times Weekly Mail of 12 August 1918 that Phraya 
Suriyanuwat's works on political economy were a "practical translation". The article, 
however, did not suggest an author of the original work [personal communication]. Suehiro 
for his part argues that Luang Pradit's Draft Economic Plan was prepared with the help of 
Mangkhon Samsen (1888-1947) [Suehero, op.cit.. Ch. 4, fn. 6, p. 360]. In my opinion, 
these claims, even if true, are not important in that they do not change the main outline of 
Thai History during those periods. Both Phraya Suriyanuwat and Luang Pradit had their own 
ideas on changing society and they were held fully responsible for their economic proposals 
which, in the end, ruined their futures both in terms of careers and families.
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farming more than other things. The country will develop quickly or slowly depending 
on how much benefit farmers are allowed to retain...".17 He therefore suggested 
structural changes to proprietary rights (land, labour and capital), and a change of 
relationship in production between producers (farmers) and the owners of productive 
forces (landlords in the sakdina system). Moreover, he proposed an active role for the 
state, under the Absolute Monarchy, in the formation of capital among common people 
and the protection of people's proprietary rights.
In his writing against private property, inheritance and social inequality, Phraya 
Suriyanuwat reflected the ideas of western scholars such as David Ricardo, Saint- 
Simon, Robert Owen and Herbert Spencer who adopted a political economy approach. 
Even though he encouraged capital accumulation, he did not approve the capitalist lines 
of distribution. He also opposed the competitive system of the West that was then 
encroaching on the sakdina system in Thailand. While he considered that the sakdina 
system itself had to change, he rejected the emergence of a capitalist system because of 
what he saw as its nature of exploitation.
Phraya Suriyanuwat's idea did not find much favour with the king and even less 
with government officials and merchants.18 King Rama VI asked Phraya Suriyanuwat 
to stop writing and made his own comments on the Science of Property. He claimed 
that "In Thailand nobody is higher than anyone else, except the king. Everyone is 
equal. In Thailand we do not have super-millionaires [sic] or even millionaires as in 
Europe. But we also do not have the poor like in Europe either".19 The King added 
that Thailand could not follow western examples because:
Thai people donate things to poor relatives and friends. That is in the Dharma. We learn by 
being Buddhists in distributing to each other. Hence it is not necessary to teach one side to be 
possessive and the other side to confiscate others' property. We men do not have to be 
separated into different cliques and made to hate each other. Why begin?
As a result, the "Science of Property" was banned by the King in 1926 and Phraya 
Suriyanuwat was forbidden to return to government. Further enforcing the opposition
17 Phraya Suriyanuwat, Sapsat. [The Science of Property], [in Thai], Bangkok: Pikhanet 
kanphim, B.E. 2518 (1975), p. 73. First published in 1911, it was subsequently banned by 
King Rama VI in 1926.
18 Ibid., pp. 15-16. For example, already in 1906 while he was Senabodi Krasuang Pra Khlang 
Maha Sombat [comparable to the Minister of Finance] he cautiously nationalized the opium 
trade and determined to collect taxes in relation to it. Seeing their interests threatened, the 
officials and merchants used their strong influence at court to attack him. Eventually King 
Rama V asked him to resign from his position, on 15 February 1907, to avoid conflicts.
Quoted from Yuangrat Wedel, Modem Thai Radical Thought: The Siamization of Marxism and 
its Theoretical Problems. Thai Khadi Research Institute, Research Series No. 4, Bangkok: 
Thammasat University, 1982, p. 58.
Ibid., p. 58.20
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to the structural change of property rights as proposed in the "Science of Property", the 
new King Rama VII passed a law banning any form of economic teaching. After that 
few could be encouraged to write about economic theory.
Phraya Suriyanuwat's ideas did not, however, disappear from Thai society. 
Chatthip Nartsupha of Chulalongkom University argues that the essence of "The 
Science of Property" relied upon the analysis of the Thai economy under an Absolute 
Monarchy and that in showing the poor conditions of Thai farmers, it explained that 
poverty emerged from the alienation of surplus value. Chatthip accepts Phraya 
Suriyanuwat's view that the farmers' poverty resulted from the unjust economic 
structure of property rights and adds that the "Thai economy has lacked the necessary 
structural change in the sixty-three years since the Sapsat was first published by Phraya 
Suriyanuwat" (1911-1974).21 Although the book was banned by the king its ideas 
formed one source of inspiration for the Draft Economic Plan proposed by Pridi 
Phanomyong, a leader of the People's Party, in 1933, twenty-two years after the first 
edition was published in 1911.
Luang Pradit Manutham: The Draft Economic Plan
The National Economic Policy (or Draft Economic Plan), written by Luang 
Pradit Manutham (Pridi Phanomyong) in 1933, was the second attempt to present a 
systematic economic plan. Sharing similar fundamental ideas with "the Science of 
Property", Luang Pradit analysed economic problems in terms of land, labour and 
capital.22 He argued that "all land undercultivation was controlled by individuals; 
undeveloped lands were not yet cleared; and 99 percent of farmers were in debt and had 
either mortgaged their land or given it as a security to their creditors".23 Moreover he 
concluded that the economic system (in 1933) was in a stage of instability in which not 
only the poor but also the rich and middle classes were subject to the same 
uncertainties.24 In order to eradicate the poverty and economic uncertainties, Luang 
Pradit directed his attention to the rural poor and proposed the idea of an economic 
administration run by the government and set up by dividing the economic system into
Chatthip Nartsupha, "Introduction to the Third Edition", in Phraya Suriyanuwat, op. cit.. p. 
32.
Chanwit Kaset-siri (transl.), "National Economic Policy of Luang Pradit Manutham", in Thak 
Chaloemtiarana (ed.), Thai Politics 1932-1957. Extracts and Documents. Vol. 1, Bangkok: 
The Social Science Association of Thailand, 1978, p 117. See also K.P. Landon, Siam in 
Transition: A Brief Survey of Cultural Trends in the Five Years Since the Revolution of 1932. 
New York: Greenwood Press, 1968, p. 266.
Chanwit, "National Economic Policy", p 112; and Landon, op,cit., pp. 263-264.
Chanwit, "National Economic Policy", pp 113-114.
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co-operative associations.25 He encouraged the government to secure land, labour and 
capital by using statutory mechanisms (rather than expropriation, force etc.) with the co­
operation of the poor and the rich to accomplish the aim of eradicating economic 
uncertainties;26 in other words, he proposed the reformation of proprietary rights.
In addition to the above proposals in the Draft Economic Plan, Luang Pradit 
added that the ultimate aim of the Plan was to achieve a six-point platform, namely; 
(economic and political) independence, internal order, economic welfare for the people, 
equality of rights, liberty and education.27 The Plan also included a Draft Social 
Insurance A ct28 and a Draft Economic Administration Act which in particular promoted 
the establishment of a national bank.29
Although Luang Pradit's plan was approved by the majority of the Committee 
set up to consider a National Economic Policy, it could not be implemented.30 A 
struggle over the plan developed among the members of the People's Party and high- 
ranking government officials, in particular the Prime Minister, Phraya Manopakon 
Nitithada. Moreover, King Rama VII wrote a considerably unsympathetic analysis of 
the Plan. He pointed out what were, in his view, the economic plan's weak points; for 
instance, he argued against Luang Pradit's statement concerning poverty-stricken people 
by retorting that "not even one of our people or beggars have ever starved to death." He 
claimed too, citing Zimmerman's studies, that the "Thai standard of living is the highest 
among Asian people."31 Furthermore, the King claimed that the Social Insurance Act 
proposed exactly the same system of social security as used in Russia and would turn 
the people into slaves of the government, as he believed had happened in Russia.32 He 
therefore warned that in managing the country's economic activities the government 
would have to take great care not to inhibit the freedom of the people.
25
26
27
28 
29
30
31
32
Ibid., p. 110; and Landon, op.cit.. pp. 260, 268.
Landon, op. cit.. pp. 270-274.
Chanwit, "National Economic Policy", pp. 144-149.
Ibid., pp. 150-155.
Ibid., pp. 155-160. Landon argued that the attempt to establish the National Bank was due to 
the loss of capital funds because the ruling elites put their money into overseas foreign banks 
(e.g. in Switzerland) [Landon, op. cit.. pp. 64-68]. The Bank was later established and called 
the Bank of Thailand.
Chanwit Kaset-siri (transl.), "Minutes of a Meeting of a Committee to Consider a National 
Economic Policy at Parusakawan Palace, March 12th, 1933", in Thak (ed.), op. cit., pp. 161- 
185. Participants included members of the State Council and the People's Assembly as well 
as H.S.H. Prince Sakon Warawan, adviser to the Minister of the Interior.
Chanwit Kaset-siri (transl.), "Report of the Commission on the Alleged Communism of 
Luang Pradit Manutham", in ibid., pp. 193-194.
Ibid., p. 195.
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In line with the King's comment, Phraya Manopakon claimed that he himself 
did not approve the policy even though the majority of the Committee (in which he 
participated) had resolved to approve the economic policy. The policy left him in a very 
unfortunate position for two reasons. First, he did not feel competent to comment on 
economic matters. Second, although he felt the plan was inappropriate, as Prime 
Minister, he would have had to accept full responsibility for the principles and methods 
of the plan if it had been promulgated. He firmly believed that the plan could not be 
earned through to a successful conclusion "because we lack experts, we lack reserved 
funds, we lack the confidence of the people at large".33
Even though the Committee had approved the plan and allowed it to be 
published under Luang Pradit’s name, the Economic Plan was shelved for several 
reasons. First, there arose an internal conflict between those who benefited from the 
sakdina system and those who wanted to reform it by changing the economic system 
into co-operative associations run by the government (which was seen to be the true 
representative of the people). It was clear that these two groups represented the royalist 
and the non-royalist groups in Thai society at that time. The crucial point was that the 
King himself opposed the Plan. That made it difficult for Luang Pradit to answer his 
critics directly, not because he and his supporters could not respond but because Luang 
Pradit did not hold real political power, having little popular support from the majority 
poor who were bound to the sakdina system. Second, within the People's Party, there 
was no common ideology and while conservatives and liberals argued, the military 
bureaucrats preferred to play a passive role. This potential for ideological conflict not 
only prevented the foundations of democracy being established in Thailand at that time, 
but also worked against the liberals in fostering any radical changes through their 
politico-economic schemes. Eventually, Luang Pradit was accused of being communist 
and the publication of the National Economic Plan was delayed.34
33 Chanwit, "Minutes of a Meeting", p. 181.
34 The Commission set up to determine whether Luang Pradit Manutham was communist found 
him to be not guilty. However, Phraya Mano passed an Act to suppress communist activities 
in 1933 and dissolved the parliament [Chanwit, "Report of the Commission", pp. 236-237].
Yuangrat Wedel, inspired by the Marxism-Leninism that was prominent in some circles in 
Thai society during the mid 1970s, considered Luang Pradit's plan to be naive and idealistic. 
She also considered Luang Pradit's knowledge and expression of Marxism was not very deep, 
particularly in its interpretation of the distinction between classes. For example, Luang Pradit 
"seemed to be trying to put peasants and aristocrats together in one class - civil servants". She 
argued too that Luang Pradit "did not share the Leninist concern and appreciation of the 
possibilities of a revolutionary party as the necessary agent of radical change," and that "he 
believed that the Thai labourer did not work hard or long enough (quite a contrast from Marx), 
therefore it should be the government's role to regulate and motivate labour." Furthermore, 
she criticized Luang Pradit in that "he did not seem to consider that effective employment of a 
labour force is something a bit more complicated than simply telling people to work". She 
concluded that Luang Pradit did not understand the Thai economic problems.
58
In terms of development, the Draft Economic Plan reflected many of the 
objectives of more recent development strategies. The Plan contained the notion of a 
basic needs approach in the provision by the government of food, clothes and housing 
through the Social Insurance Act; other basic benefits from the development of 
infrastructure such as railroads, roads, docks and canals were also envisaged. The Plan 
also reflected notions of human rights and self-reliance in its view that the government 
administration must not "reduce mankind to the level of animals"35 and that the people 
must work with the government to advance welfare for themselves.36
In summary, the rejection of the economic development proposals o f Phraya 
Suriyanuwat and Luang Pradit Manutham meant that there was no opportunity for either 
of them to show whether or not they could solve the problems of the majority poor. 
The debate as to whether the proposals were idealistic or realistic still lingers. 
However, both leaders attempted to attack what they saw as the root causes o f the 
problem —  proprietary rights, land holding, and the surplus gained by the landlords 
through exploitation —  while the majority remained poor and uncertain of their futures. 
But although these proposals were not accepted at that time, some of the ideas in them 
were later implemented. For example, both Phraya Suriyanuwat, who served the 
country from 1933 to 1936 as an adviser to the Phahon government, and Luang Pradit, 
who from 1938 to 1941 was Minister of Finance in the first Phibun government, were 
key persons in influencing the nationalization of enterprises affecting common people's 
lives in the context o f a the "self-sufficient economy" policy pursued by both
It seems to me that Yuangrat's arguments are superficial. Luang Pradit’s Draft Economic Plan 
failed neither because he did not slavishly follow Marx, Engels and Lenin in depth, nor because 
he failed to clearly distinguish between classes or propose the use of a revolutionary party as 
the tool for radical change. To be fair to Luang Pradit, I think that, as he stated in the Plan, he 
"borrowed elements of value from various systems" whenever he "found in them something 
appropriate to Siam" [Chanwit, "National Economic Policy", p. 110]. Moreover, he argued 
that "this plan is not COMMUNISTIC! It is a combination of capitalism and socialism" 
[Chanwit, "Minutes of a Meeting", p. 163]. His statement implied that he, in the first place, 
could see what would happen when he proposed the Plan and, therefore, tried to protect himself 
from being misunderstood. What can be argued against Luang Pradit, in my view, is that he 
was too optimistic about the role of the state, especially in regarding the government and 
people to be of the same institutions. See further discussion about the characteristic of the 
state and its obligation to citizen in Poulantzas, State. Power. Socialism, pp. 1-27.
Also, Yuangrat misinterprets Luang Pradit's ideas on a number of issues such as the emphasis 
on the role of government in manipulating waste labour and economic infrastructure. At the 
present time, we can see that the government is putting much effort in creating projects of 
rural employment after the planting season and forming co-operatives many of which prove 
successful.
Chanwit, "National Economic Policy", pp. 134-135.
According to Luang Phetkasem Withisawat, Luang Pradit abolished the system of corv6e 
labour on the basis that a person was not a tool to be used by others for their own needs 
["Rawipha" (pen name), "Luang Phetkasem Withisawat: The Man Whose Name is the Name 
of the Thai Longest Road", Ban-Mai-Ru-Rov. [Everlasting Bloom Magazine], [in Thai], Vol. 
6, September B.E. 2530 (1987), p. 75].
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governments. In addition, the National Bank was later established as Luang Pradit had 
proposed and recently a Social Insurance Act was also proclaimed for the benefit of the 
people.37 In stimulating the growth of agriculture, the government is today putting 
much effort into forming seasonal-employment co-operatives, a policy which recalls 
Luang Pradit's ideas. Many of these co-operatives have proved successful.
Economic Nationalism
After Luang Pradit's plan there were no more national plans prepared until 
1961. However there were some significant changes in the Thai economic and political 
system in what has been referred to as the period of Economic Nationalism (or State 
Capitalism). The following section on economic nationalism is divided into two parts in 
accordance with the different aims and characteristics of economic administration in the 
periods before and after World War II. The period before World War II begins with the 
Phahon government (1933-1938) and extends to some time in the first Phibun 
government (1938-1944). The period after World War II extends from the second 
Phibun government (1948-1957) until Phibun was overthrown by the 1957 coup led by 
Sarit. The intervening years from 1944 to 1948 are not mentioned here because the 
economic policies in this period were very much in flux - in domestic politics there were 
ten government changes within four years and in international relations there was an 
increasing US influence, replacing Japanese and British influence. The growth in US 
involvement in Thai politics after World War n is a subject which warrants separate in- 
depth study.38
Economic Nationalism before World War II
After the defeat of the Draft Economic Plan in 1933, the government decided to 
follow a moderate economic reform programme. The Phahon government (1933-1938) 
relieved some tax burdens on farmers, stimulated educational expansion for the poor 
and made some attempts at economic and political decentralization to counter the 
increasing tendency towards the centralization of power by the royalist groups, and the 
domination of the economy by foreign enterprises before 1932.39 However, in 
addition to the problems of opposition from the old regime and of a chaotic 
parliamentary system (resulting from its being unfamiliar to the Thais generally), the
37 A leading figure in this issue was Nikhom Chandharawitun, the former Head of the Labour 
Department in the Ministry of the Interior.
38 The periods of time are worked out from Kanok Wongtra-ngan, Khumue kanmu'angthai: 2475- 
2525: khomun phu'nthan thang kanmu'angthai [The Manual of Thai Politics: 1932-1982: 
Primary Sources in Thai Politics], [in Thai], Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, 
Chulalongkom University, B.E. 2526 (1983), pp. 170-171.
39 Suehiro, op. cit.. Chs. 1-3.
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government had to cope with financial problems such as very limited foreign exchange 
reserves, high inflation (partly resulting from the great depression in the 1930s), and an 
excessive deficit run up during the reign of King Rama VI. Moreover, most industries, 
trade and commerce were in the hands of the British, Chinese and Japanese. The 
government, therefore, adopted the policy of nationalizing some industries so that it 
could derive revenue for public expenditure.
Under the Phahon government, the Ministries of Defence and Economic Affairs 
were given responsibility for controlling and promoting industrial activities. For 
example, the Fuel Division, which was set up in April 1933 during the Mano 
government within the Ministry of Defence, was in charge of directly importing fuel 
from abroad, replacing two US private enterprises, namely the Asiatic Petroleum 
Company of Siam and Standard Vacuum Oil.411 In 1935, the Ministry of Defence also 
established a spinning and weaving factory, Siam Cotton Mill, equipped with modem 
technology, for the purpose of supplying clothes to the military; and a paper mill, the 
Siam Paper Co. Ltd. (the second paper mill in Thailand). In 1936, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs set up its Industrial Division and established the first state-owned 
sugar mill, the Thai Lampang Sugar Mill, which was soon followed by a second mill in 
Utaradit province.41
With the advent of the first Phibun government (1938-1944), two factors 
signalled that the Thai government was ready to continue to pursue a strong policy of 
economic nationalism. First, the unequal treaties with Western countries had been 
abolished in 1937 and second, Phibun appointed Pridi as Minister of Finance (1938- 
1941) thereby enabling the latter to re-introduce some of the programmes he had 
proposed in the Draft Economic Plan which had been aborted in 1933. Thus from 1938 
to 1944, according to Suehiro, the government gained control of several categories of 
industries and business which it regarded as impacting directly on the welfare of the 
majority poor, namely; rice milling and related industries such as insurance and 
shipping services; imports; distribution of imported and domestically produced goods; 
commercial banking business; and manufacturing.42 Although the government was not
411 Ibid., p. 123. Since 1953, the Fuel Division has become the Fuel Organization, a huge state 
enterprise under the Ministry of Defence.
41 Apichai and Montri. op. cit.. p. 8.
42 Ibid., pp. 9-10; and Suehiro, op. cit.. pp. 122-130. Suehiro claimed that the government, 
under Phibun as Prime Minister (1939-1944) and Pridi as the Minister of Finance (1939-1941) 
produced "[SJtate control, rise of a bureaucrat capitalist class, and the alliance between Thai- 
national Chinese businessmen and political leaders" and that the policy benefited mostly 
members of "political groups which dominated the power structure, and not the Thai common 
people or indigenous merchants who were supposed to be promoted in its original economic 
programmes" [Suehiro, op. cit.. pp. 134, 1331. Although his argument appears to be a 
reasonable assessment and economic nationalism did fail, Suehiro did not take historical
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able to fully accomplish its economic programmes and the Thai economy remained 
largely in the hands of foreign enterprises, the implementation of economic nationalism 
did reduced a great deal of foreign influence and allowed more Thai businessmen to 
enter manufacturing and commercial businesses.
Differences between the Prime Minister and his Minister of Finance became 
apparent when Japanese troops landed in Thailand on 8 December 1941.43 Pridi was 
removed by Phibun from the Ministry of Finance to the pseudo-honorific position of 
Co-Regent (out of the cabinet) so that Phibun could co-operate freely with the Japanese, 
whose attention was focused on Thailand economically as well as strategically.44 From 
the Japanese occupation in 1941 until Phibun was defeated in Parliament in 1944, Pridi 
consistently opposed Phibun's political, economic and military policies, especially in 
the relation to the use of the Japanese Yen in Thai markets and the role of the "Free Thai 
Movement" against the Japanese troops.
During the War, the Thai economic and political life suffered extensively. From 
1942, Thailand's international trade was cut off for over three years, except for trade 
with Japan.45 After the end of World War II, Thailand suffered several changes of 
government until the 1947 coup led by General Phin Chunhawan and the re­
establishment of the second Phibun government.
Despite this, many scholars noted that in general from about 1933 onward, the 
common people in Thailand benefited, to some extent, from the governments' economic 
policies through a redistribution of income, expansion of education, and the 
encouragement of home industries and savings. In February 1943, H.G. Deignan 
recorded that:
circumstances into account and therefore did not, in my view, give the government credit for 
having tried.
For comparison, see Thuan Kangananaga, Report of National Economic Development B.E. 
2482 (1943-19441. Bangkok: Sataman Publishing House, 1944.
In the early 1930s, Japan became interested in Thailand as an export market after the reduction 
of British and French influence. It also considered Thailand as a source of rice and as a 
strategic step in its Masterplan for East Asia. At the same time, Phibun intended to join 
hands with Japan to fight against Western powers. Consequently, he signed a Pact of Alliance 
with Japan on 21 December 1941.
44
45
Apichai and Montri, op. cit.. pp. 10-11.
T.H. Silcock, "Outline of Economic Development: 1945-65", in T.H. Silcock (ed.), Thailand: 
Social and Economic Studies in Development. Canberra: ANU, 1967, p. 5.
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During the decade just past the Government has initiated a positive program aimed at raising 
the standards of living of the common people and especially of the peasants who constitute the 
great majority. Among the means adopted have been ... the education of the farmer in 
livestock breeding and scientific agriculture; the establishment of agencies to enable him to 
obtain a fair market for his produce; the spread of public-health and medical services in far 
comers of the provinces. The results of this experiment had not yet become clear when the 
war interfered to hinder its fulfilment. The political aspect of the program leaned heavily 
toward economic nationalism, in an endeavour to counteract the excessive proportion of 
foreign capital in the country and to encourage more active participation by the Thai in the 
building-up of their own land.4^
Economic Nationalism after World War II
The main points of difference between the first Phibun government (1938-1944) 
and the second Phibun government (1948-1957) are exemplified by two main factors. 
First, the political struggle between groups caused a shift in the policy of economic 
nationalism from economic sufficiency, supposedly for the general good of the Thai 
people, to an emphasis on generating an economic surplus for political purposes; and 
second, amidst internal political divisions, the political intrusion of the United States 
(which perceived a threat of communist expansion in the region in the climate of the 
"Cold War" and following the 1949 success of the Chinese revolutionary war led by 
Mao Tse-tung) played an influential role in Thailand. These two factors provided the 
conditions for military government to gradually intensify its grip on Thailand and would 
shape Thai development policy from the mid-1950s.
1. The impact of domestic political struggle on economic 
development
The justifications for the 1947 coup led by Field Marshal Phin Chunhawan 
focused on the economic crisis after the War which saw high inflation, the drain of 
foreign exchange reserves, the lack of help for War veterans and the several changes of 
civilian governments which had prevented attention being given to improving economic 
conditions. The 1947 coup cleared the way for the military to become involved in 
business activities through the War Veterans Organization and Tahan Co-operation Co., 
Ltd organized by Phin to allegedly help the abandoned War veterans. However, 
Suehiro argued that it was the "silent coup" of 1951 which was the turning point for 
Phin to virtually gain "absolute power over the military group" and, at the same time, to 
break up the unity of the Phibun group into two factions.47 One was the "Phin-Phao 
faction" which included influential figures in the police and military establishments who
H.G. Deignan, Siam -  Land of Free M en. Washington: Smithsonian Institution, War 
Background Studies, No. 8, 1943, p. 18.
Suehiro, op. cit.. pp. 136-137; see also Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: the Politics of 
Despotic Paternalism. Bangkok: the Social Science Association of Thailand, 1979.
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also had strong family ties with Phin. These included the Police Director-General Phao 
Sriyanon (Phin's eldest daughter's husband); Brigadier-General Praman Adireksan 
(Phin's second daughter’s husband) and Chatichai Chunhawan (Phin's only son). The 
other was the "Sarit faction" led by First Army Commander Sarit Thanarat who played a 
leading role in the "silent coup" of 1951. Sarit was originally in the Phin-Phao faction 
but later organized his own group within the army against both the Phibun and Phin- 
Phao groups. Eventually, the 1957 coup and the ensuing 1958 "revolution" gave Sarit 
"absolute power" over the army and Thai politics.48
Although Phibun tried to pursue the same policy of economic nationalism as 
before World War II, namely to create employment opportunities for Thai people 
outside the bureaucracy, to contain the role of ethnic Chinese in commerce and industry 
in order to prevent them from rising to political domination, and to enlarge the economic 
base in order to offset the power of the royalist faction, his policies failed because he 
had insufficient power to control the military rivalry between the Phin-Phao and Sarit 
factions. In order to maintain political power, Phibun used some state enterprises and 
related businesses under his control to reward his supporters. The military factions did 
the same thing with some enterprises under their patronage. After the 1951 "silent 
coup", the military became widely involved in a range of industries and sectors, 
including banking, trading, mining and manufacturing, "largely in terms of the scope of 
business and the numbers of the Firms concerned,"49 with a view to exploiting and 
appropriating the economic surplus for political purposes. Besides the military leaders' 
regular income they received bonuses and other benefits but paid little attention to 
improving technology and expanding production capacity. At the same time, business 
groups could do little to develop their enterprises without military patronage.50 Overall 
the industrial sector grew at a very slow pace during this period.
With regard to the agricultural sector, the Phibun government introduced a 
premium on rice exports as a temporary measure to keep the domestic price of rice 
lower than that on the world market.51 The revenue from the rice premium was
48 On Sant's 1958 "revolution" see Thak, Thailand, pp. 140-152.
49 Suehiro, op. cit.. pp. 137-138. From a total o f 101 firms, the Phin group "was involved in 
32 firms (10 financial institutions, 15 industrial and transporting firms, and 7 trading and 
service firms), while the Sarit group had interests in 37 firms (12 financial institutions, 15 
industrial and transporting firms, and 10 trading and service firms)". See further details of the 
military involved in business in ibid., pp. 140-150,169-172, 190-191, 206-207, 263-264.
50 M L .p p . 137-152.
51 Chaiyawat explains that rice exports taxed by the government"... are subjected to two kinds of 
taxes: an ordinary export duty and a special tax called the "rice premium". The range of export 
duty, depending upon the grade of rice, has been between 3 and 7 per cent of the average export 
price. On the other hand, the average rate of premium, based on the ratio of the total premium 
to the value of exports, has ranged from 25 to 35 per cent" [Chaiyawat Wibulswasdi, "Thai
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consistently high and grew from 15 per cent of total government revenue in 1951 to 18 
per cent in 1955. As time passed, the government came to use the premium as a major 
source of revenue. The rice premium was supposedly collected from the rice exporters 
but, in practice the exporters made farmers pay the premium for them. As a result, the 
farmers were exploited without any improvement being introduced in agricultural 
technology.52
2. The external influence on economic development
At the Southeast Asian regional level, there were "anti-colonialism" movements 
in a number of countries including Vietnam Cambodia, Laos and Malaysia. The 
communist parties rose to the fore in these movements. In 1947, the Southeast Asian 
League with anti-colonial policies was organized in Bangkok.53 Regarding Thailand as 
a centre and haven for the movements, the US, as a leading power in the "Cold War" 
and afraid of the perceived threat of communist expansion in the region, became deeply 
involved in Thai affairs, strategically, politically and economically.
According to Rotter, in 1949, some American officials in the State Department 
(most from the embassy in Bangkok), the Policy Planning Staff and the Far Eastern 
Office's Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (renamed the Bureau of Far Eastern 
Affairs) began to lobby for an increased US influence in Thailand. For example, on 29 
March 1949, the Policy Planning Staff released the "United States Policy toward 
Southeast Asia" or "PPS-51" which advised that the US government:
... should seek to strengthen Siam [Thailandl, help maintain the relative stability which its 
government [has] achieved, and generally cultivate that nation as a strategically located centre 
of stability ... in Southeast Asia [bracket as in original].5^
Rice Exports: an Analysis of its Performance in the 1960s", in Prateep Sondysuwan (ed.), 
Finance. Trade and Economic Development in Thailand. Bangkok: Somphong Press, 1975, p. 
171].
Apichai and Montri, op. cit.. pp. 23-25. See also Chirmsak Pinthong, "The Political 
Economy of Rice Policy in Thailand", paper presented at the International Conference on Thai 
Studies, ANU, 3-6 July 1987.
A. J. Rotter, The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987, pp. 75-76. Rotter said that the Laotian and 
Cambodian resistance movement had their headquarters in Bangkok.
Ibid., p. 76. Acheson also argued that the US concern with Thai affairs "would bring not only 
strategic advantage but also the economic advantage to the US in terms of the acquisition of 
new materials and new markets for the American manufacturing and agricultural products". 
Quoted from Apichai and Montri, on. cit.. p. 16.
In August 1949, the State Department allowed an American mission to survey the natural 
resources in Thailand. And in the same month, Truman approved an economic assistance to 
Thailand of almost $US 44 million in gold as payment for goods and services provided by 
Thailand during the War. At the same time, American investors increasingly paid attention to 
Thailand as a place for investment [Rotter, op.cit.. p. 78).
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The Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, in 1949, supported the above policy by arguing that 
Thailand was under the threat of communism both internally and externally and:
If Thailand collapsed, it was "unlikely that Malaya could be held. This would mean that from 
Korea to India there would be no place on the Asian mainland where the United States would 
have an open friend and ally". ... [i]f Thailand and Malaya fell, the United States would be 
denied strategic raw materials such as tungsten, tin, and rubber. It was clearly "of considerable 
political and economic importance to the United States to support Thailand in opposition to 
the forces of communism" [quotes as in original].55
On 10 March 1950, US President Truman, allowed the State Department to give $US 
10 million military aid to Thailand in addition to military equipment. On 12 April 1950, 
a further $US 11.4 million was granted as economic assistance "to supplement the 
military appropriation" and $4.5 million was given "for Thai industry, especially for the 
extraction of exportable raw materials".56 By the end of 1950, the government signed a 
technical assistance agreement with the US. Silcock said that:
from this time American assistance has not merely provided capital and technique but also 
influenced the character of Thai development American influence played a considerable part in 
checking the trend towards state enterprise, in transferring interest from rail and river transport 
to highways, and in delaying the adoption of a national economic plan (at least of the 
indicative type favoured during the 1950s by Malaya and other countries in the Colombo 
Plan).57
In relation to the Thai military split between the Phin - Phao and Sarit groups, 
the US chose to support the Sarit faction which proved to be the most politically 
acceptable to the US interest. The Phin-Phao group was not supported because Phao 
was distrusted for several reasons, including the brutality of political murders 
performed by his subordinates58 and his excessive financial corruption. Phibun was 
also not favoured by the US because of his extraordinary efforts to promote his own 
image as a supporter of democracy. Phibun had attempted to gain popular support by 
passing several acts to support his new political programmes,59 allowing the 
establishment of trade unions, permitting students and journalists to visit the USSR and 
the People's Republic of China (in the hope of balancing international relations away 
from the West alone) and announcing a general election in February 1957. When there
55
56
57
58
59
With the support of the US, Thailand became a member of both the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the early 1949 [Silcock, op. cit.. p. 9].
Rotter, op. cit.. p. 79.
Ibid., pp. 136, 195.
Silcock, op. cit.. p. 12.
For example, Peurifoy, an American ambassador to Thailand in 1954, was killed in an 
automobile accident on his way back to Bangkok from Hua Hin in August 1955. Four 
socialist-oriented ministers were allegedly murdered on Phao's orders.
Including an act for the registration of political parties.
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was widespread protest against voting irregularities in this election, Sarit, supported by 
the US, staged a coup to overthrow both Phibun and the Phin-Phao factions on 16 
September 1957.
In summary, although economic nationalism had been, to some extent, initiated 
with a view to attaining a self-sufficient economy for the poor, it eventually failed. 
Muscat (1966) and Suehiro (1989) claim that it had instead created "bureaucratic 
capitalism".60 According to Suehiro, capitalist development in Thailand did not create 
an independent domestic capitalist class with its own political power base, but rather, 
businessmen (in particular Chinese) expanded their business on the basis of political 
connections with the military command and, in return, the military gained financial 
support to build their political power. For these reasons the policies of economic 
nationalism appears to have had little influence on the economic development of the Thai 
people because any gains were primarily used in the struggle between interest groups.
However, Phibun allowed the people to organize by way of trade unions and 
political parties primarily in order to gain support from the people and to assist him with 
his difficulties in controlling rivalries among senior cabinet members (particularly under 
Phin and Sarit). While indirectly this to a limited extent encouraged the concept of 
people's participation in the economy and in politics through the experience of 
democracy, economic and political crises within the country eventually paved the way 
for external involvement. The people's enjoyment of participation in national politics 
was ended by the coup staged by Sarit on 16 September 1957 with the support of the 
US. Soon after, the 1958 "revolution" changed the face of national economic 
development from economic nationalism to a free-enterprise economy with a limited role 
for the state. From the point of view of economic development what was also 
significant was the growing influence of the W orld Bank, the IMF, and UN 
development agencies which encouraged countries such as Thailand to prepare 
economic development plans.61 The First National Economic Plan for Thailand was 
presented by the government in 1961. This and subsequent five year plans have since 
formed the basis of economic development policies in Thailand.
Main directions of development plans during and after the Sarit regime
Since the end of World War II, the main directions of development in most 
Third World countries, including Thailand, have, more or less, been influenced by the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Three broad development
60 Muscat, op. cit.. pp. 197-198; Suehiro, op. cit.. Ch. 5.
61 These plans had to meet the approval of the international institutions if development assistance
was to be given to the country concerned.
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strategies have been promoted by these institutions at different times: Import- 
substitution Industrialization (ISI), applied during the 1960s; Basic Needs strategy 
(BNs) or Re-distribution with Growth (RwG), was used during the early 1970s; and 
Export-substitution Industrialization (EOI) with structural adjustment, since the late 
1970s. In the following sections I will discuss these strategies in the context of Thai 
development plans and activities.
Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI)
The World Bank's development strategy, conceptualized during the 1960s as 
"import-substitution industrialization" (ISI), was to encourage Third World 
governments to create conditions under which private enterprise, in particular foreign 
enterprise (through joint ventures etc.), would be able to undertake development of the 
country's resources in order to create national economic growth. Thus, governments 
would cease investing directly in state industries and, instead, assist domestic and 
foreign private enterprises to set up new industries by expanding the transportation, 
irrigation and communication infrastructure to serve the new private industrial sectors, 
by providing capital on special terms to support industries which produce goods for 
local consumption (in order to save foreign exchange), and by imposing high levels of 
import duties and prohibiting certain types of manufactured imports.62
For Thai economic development, application of the ISI strategy was advocated 
by many agencies.62 For example, in September 1957, the Bank sent its first economic 
research mission to Thailand to survey the economic problems. After one year of 
research, the mission presented to the Thai government a report entitled A Public 
Development Program for Thailand (1959) suggesting a change in the direction of Thai 
development from state capitalism to private enterprise.64 At about the same time, a US 
investment survey team, led by G.B. Beitzel, submitted a report entitled Expanding 
Private Investment for Thailand's Economic Growth. (November 1959), suggested 
similar measures for maximizing economic growth by increasing the role of private 
enterprises (both domestic and foreign), reducing government participation in 
investment, exempting productive machinery from import duty and establishing a single
62 D. Baldwin, "The International Bank in Political Perspective", World Politics. Vol., 18 
October 1965, pp. 68-81.
62 For instance, the World Bank (1960), the Bank of Thailand (1960), a United Nations mission 
(van Rijnberk, 1961) and the Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE, 1964). See 
K.J. Hewison, "National Interests and Economic Downturn: Thailand", in R. Robison, K. 
Hewison, and R. Higgott, Southeast Asia in the 1980s: The Politics of Economic Crisis. 
Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987, p. 55.
64 The World Bank, Public Development Program for Thailand. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 
1959, Chs. 1 and 3.
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institution to oversee private investment.65 The basic idea of this strategy, Suehiro 
argued, came from the US National Economic Committee, led by Rostow, which 
proposed the "economic development" strategy as a countermeasure against growing 
communist movements.66 In applying Rostow's strategy generally in the Southeast 
Asian region, the US was particularly concerned with the security question. It feared 
the spread of communism, certainly far more so than did the Thai government. 
Thailand was of key strategic importance and therefore became the main aid recipient of 
the US in the region.67
Even though the First Plan was not formalized until 1961, preparations had 
begun in the late 1950s. Sarit pre-empted much of the First Plan by putting in place a 
number of Revolution Party Proclamations to set the political scene for the 
implementation of the Plan without challenge from interest and pressure groups. These 
Revolution Party Proclamations aimed to legitimize the implementation of the First Plan 
instead of passing through the process of parliament.68
The IS I strategy is reflected in the First National Economic Development Plan 
(in two phases covering 1961-1963 and 1964-1966) initiated under the Sarit regime 
(1958-1963) and the Second National Economic Development Plan (1967-1971) under 
the Thanom-Prapass regime (1963-1973). In order to "raise the standard of living of 
the people of Thailand" the First Plan set out to achieve an increase in GNP which it 
expected would be "equitably distributed ... [to] all citizens and not merely a priveleged 
few derive benefit from it".69 To do this, the Plan proposed to encourage economic
Grit, op. cit.. pp. 118-119. Apichai and Montri added that, following the report of US 
investment survey team, the Thai government revised the Investment Promotion Act in 1960 
and then in 1962. As a consequence, the private investment from the US increased 34 per cent 
during 1960 and 1964, and 44 per cent during 1965 and 1972 [Apichai and Montri, op. cit.. p. 
33].
Suehiro, op. cit.. p. 179.
For example see A. Caldwell, American Economic Aid to Thailand. Lexington: Lexington 
Books, 1974 and Rotter, op. cit.. pp. 76-79
For instance, the Revolutionary Party Proclamation No. 33 facilitated private and foreign 
investment (Royal Gazette B.E. 2501 (1958), Part 103); followed by Proclamation No. 47 to 
promote foreign investment (Royal Gazette B.E. 2502 (1959), Part 7); Proclamation No. 49 
repealed the Limited Land Tenure Act of B.E. 2497 (1954) (Royal Gazette B.E. 2502 (1959), 
Part 8); Proclamation No. 19 of 30 October B.E. 2501 (1958) abolished the Labour Act of 
B.E. 2499 (1956) as well as the Land Code of B.E. 2497 (1954) [Kotmai Thi-din B.E. 2497]. 
In addition, following Beitzel, an adviser from the United States Operation Mission (USOM), 
the revision of the Investment Promotion Act of B.E. 2503 (I960) authorized the Board of 
Investment (Bol) to conduct overall industrial promotion. This act was later revised in 1962. 
See Apichai and Montri, op. cit.. pp. 33-34; and Suehiro, op. cit., pp. 179-180.
The National Economic (and Social) Development Board (NEDB/NESDB) The National 
Economic Development Plan (1961-1966k Second Phase (1964-1966). Bangkok: NEDB, 
Office of the Prime Minister, 1964, p. 9. The NEDB (later changed to be NESDB in 1972) 
was set up in 1959 for making and carrying out the development plans. It is under the
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growth in the private sector supported by government programmes which would 
provide means and opportunities for increased production and enable the private sector 
to further expand on its own initiatives.70 The Second Plan had similar aims of "... 
strengthening the efficiency and growth of the private sector, maintaining a stable 
monetary environment, and making more effective use of the substantial investment in 
national infrastructure under the First Plan".71 As a result of the Plans, Thailand 
enjoyed an increase of GNP of seven per cent per annum,72 one per cent more than the 
annual target growth rate of GNP proposed by the first UN "Development Decade" of 
the 1960s. The ISI strategy, which the Bank argued would help the government 
remedy the balance of payments and trade problems, remained the predominant strategy 
for Thai economic development throughout the 1960s.
However, in terms of domestic politics, the ISI strategy seemed secondary to 
the support of the US which satisfied both the US security concerns as well as the 
ambitions of the Thai military regime of Sarit to remain in power. Besides the 
elimination of his political enemies, especially the Phibun and Phin-Phao groups, Sarit 
gained military, political and economy support from the US especially through two 
programmes of development. One was the programme of Mobile Development Units 
(MDUs) to help develop the Thai army. The other was the Accelerated Rural 
Development (ARD) Programme to help support the civilian administration and develop 
the Northeast region. These two programmes were extensively financed by the US 
through its Operation Mission (USOM) and were continued under Thanom who became 
Prime Minister on Sarit's death in late 1963.73
The Second Plan (1967-1971), drawn up during the Thanom-Prapass regime, 
also focused attention on national security in response to US advice.74 For example,
supervision of the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) which was reorganized 
from the National Economic Council of 1950 [Suehiro, op. cit.. p. 179]. I was unable to 
locate the first part of the First Plan (1961-1963) in Australian libraries.
There have been six Plans to date. Subsequent references in the text and footnotes will use the 
short titles "First Plan", "Second Plan", "Third Plan" etc.
The First Plan, p. 9.
The National Economic (and Social) Development Board (NEDB/NESDB), The Second 
National Economic Development Plan 0967-19711. Bangkok: NEDB, Office of the Prime 
Minister, 1967, p. 2.
Ibid., p. 11.
H. Demaine, "Kanpatthana: Thai View of Development", in M. Hobart and R. H. Taylor 
(eds.), Context. Meaning and Power in Southeast Asia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1986, p. 98. The MDUs and ARDs carried out highway construction and village development 
projects with the aim of ensuring political support for the government in the zones considered 
to be subject to communist infiltration from Indochina. See also Thak, Thailand. Ch. 5.
74 The Second Plan, p. 23.
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the Plan addressed the activities of the MDUs under the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Defence operating with US assistance; military Civic Action groups under the Central 
Security Division of the Communist Suppression Headquarter; the Remote Areas 
Development Project (especially the southern part of the Northeast areas); and the Hill 
Tribes Development Project; all designed to counter insurgency in the rural areas.75 In 
the educational areas, while the First Plan was mainly concerned with the expansion of 
primary education, the Second Plan focused on the quantitative expansion of secondary, 
technical, professional and teacher education so as to provide manpower required for 
economic development. This manpower development planning was organized under 
the supervision of the joint Thai-USOM preliminary study 1966-1970 and supported by 
SEATO technical school as stated in the First Plan.76
The plans proposed some important projects in the agricultural sector, but were 
vague on implementation. The First Plan stressed a recognition of the need to expand 
agricultural production by improving techniques and encouraging greater self-reliance 
by the establishment of farmer co-operations and other associations. There was some 
consideration too of land tenure issues and of the need to improve the agricultural 
administration.77 The Second Plan addressed land survey projects for which the 
Accelerated Rural Development Programme would take the responsibility, and which 
were to be implemented by 1988.78
The outcome of the First and Second Plans from 1961 and 1971 were varied. 
Although the Second Plan stated that "the allocation of land is a major bottle-neck to 
successful rural development efforts" there seems to have been little real concern for 
rural development as the state's first priority, as industrialization grew rapidly at the 
expense of agriculture. For instance, the agricultural share in the GDP dropped from 37 
per cent in 19617^  to 29.8 per cent in 19718^  whereas the industrial share in the GDP
75
76
77
78
79
80
Ibid., p. 73. In 1965, the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) was 
established by Deputy Prime Minister Prapass Charusatien to co-ordinate military, police and 
civil counter-insurgency operations and to work in the area of community development 
programmes [H.U. Luther, Peasants and State in Contemporary Thailand: From Regional 
Revolt to National Revolution. Hamburg: Mitteilungen des Instituts fur Asienkunde, 1978, p. 
108]. The CSOC was later changed to be the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC).
The First Plan, p. 44.
Ibid., pp. 47, 48, 51, 70, 71, 78, 79.
The Second Plan, p. 89.
The First Plan, p. 34.
Hewison, "National Interests and Economic Downturn", p. 53.
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increased from 19 per cent in 196181 to 26.2 per cent of in 1971.82 The relative 
decline of agriculture, which absorbed four-fifths of the labour force, created a great 
deal of problems for farmers including increasing debt and landlessness, migration from 
rural areas to the cities, as well as problems of urbanization. While the Plans proposed 
that the development of the industrial sector was intended to absorb unemployment, 
their success was very limited. The Board of Investment (Bol) could provide only 
9,000 jobs annually whereas the labour force increased by about 2.5 million.8^  Suehiro 
pointed out that the government promoted the development of large-scale firms owned 
by foreigners and domestic manufacturing merchant class, but overlooked the 
development of the small-scale domestic firms. He also argued that the small, 
traditional domestic firms contributed to employment creation more than the big 
industries encouraged under the plans.84
Demaine has shown, too, that the infrastructure-development programmes were 
undertaken without discussion with the common people and without regard for their 
needs. These programmes were often ill-managed and poorly co-ordinated with other 
development sectors and there were a number of cases in which farmers lost their lands 
for road construction or new industrial areas without compensation from the 
government. Much of the regional construction and service sector activities went to 
support the thirteen (some large) American military bases then set up in Thailand.85
The aim of development as stated in the First and Second Plans to increase the 
standard of living of the people of Thailand failed and, instead, huge social problems 
emerged in various forms during this period despite the increase in GNP.86 The failure 
of the development plans had much to do with the emphasis on the counter-insurgency 
programmes. Thak and Muscat argued that there was a constant shift of priorities for
81 The First Plan, p. 34.
82 G. Abonyi and Bunyaraks Ninsananda, Thailand: Development Planning in Turbulent Times. 
Toronto: University of Toronto - York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, Asia 
Papers, No. 3, 1989, p. 27.
83 The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), The Third National 
Economic and Social Development Plan (1972-1976). Bangkok: NESDB, Office of the Prime 
Minister, 1972, p. 200.
84 Suehiro, op. cit.. pp. 183-186.
85 Demaine, op. cit.. p. 98. Apichai and Montri argued that Sarit cancelled Phibun’s Land Tenure 
Act of 1954 because it "had become a major obstacle for Sarit and his supporters to occupy a 
sizable amount of land for the construction of new roads connecting different parts of the 
country" [Apichai and Montri, op.cit.. p. 33).
86 J.C. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand 1850-1970. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1971, p. 227. In fact, the growth came substantially from a number of foreign enterprises and 
as a result of the American military presence in Thailand during 1967-68.
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political and military reasons,87 no clear and concrete long-term objectives for the 
change in economic or social structure of the country.88 Even the growth in GNP was 
not all it seemed and later dropped because the US military spending, about 10,000 
million baht ($ US 476 million) on construction and service in Thailand, declined from 
1966-1968 due to the completion of US facilities to support the war in Vietnam War.89 
Moreover, development for security reasons drove the governments to suppress and 
alienate the people and thereby enabled the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) to 
expand its movement rapidly.90
Basic Needs strategy
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, conscious of the failure of "trickle- 
down" development and the growing incidence of authoritarian regimes in most Third 
World countries, the World Bank moved its strategy away from ISI towards 
Redistribution with Growth (RwG) or Basic Needs strategies (BNs). This new 
development strategy was articulated by the then chairman of the World Bank, Robert 
McNamara, at the Nairobi Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors in 1973,91 four 
year after the ILO had formulated its strategy of the "basic human needs" in 1969. 
McNamara pointed to the conditions of life of Third World people who were degraded 
by disease, illiteracy and malnutrition, and to the structures which caused these 
conditions; however, his solution lay in increased aid and finance, which he believed 
was a moral obligation of the rich countries, but, almost incredibly, did not address the 
key problem of how to change the structures which produced these conditions. In order 
to receive development aid and assistance, therefore, the development policies of the 
poor countries would be required to meet criteria which took account of distribution of 
benefit, land reform, water supply, public service and new rural institutions designed to 
benefit the poor.92
87 Muscat, op. cit.. p. 282. Muscat criticized the plans as stepping up resource exploitation, 
relying heavily on foreign capital, and limiting government's role in the process of 
development to be only a provider of an economic infrastructure.
88 Thak, op, cit.. p. 230.
89 The Third Plan, p. 6. The US had constructed large bases in Thailand to support its Vietnam 
operations and these were fed by roads and other infrastructure necessary to support the bases.
90 See details in D.E. Weatherbee, The United Front in Thailand: A Documentary Analysis. 
Columbia: Institute of International Studies, University of South California, 1970; R.S. 
Randolph and W.S. Thompson, Thai Insurgency: Contemporary Developments. Georgetown: 
The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1981; and A. 
Turton, J. Fast and M. Caldwell (eds.), Thailand: Roots of Conflict. Nothingham: Bertrand 
Russell House, 1978.
91 McNamara, op. cit.. Ch. 12.
92 Although McNamara addressed the interesting problem of people’s quality of life in Third 
World countries, his solution lay in the analysis of internal situations of each country rather 
than in the relations of international links (in terms of trade and aid like Brandt and Pearson
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The Third Plan (1972-1976) was being drawn up since 1968 and while it 
incorporated approaches similar to those formulated by the ILO and later by McNamara, 
it did not explicitly refer to a basic needs approach. It was funded by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID)93 and was designed to solve the 
economic and social problems which had arisen during the First and Second Plans by 
putting an emphasis on social aspects such as primary health and education, i.e. the 
expansion of non-formal, vocational and literacy education. These socio-economic 
problems included the fluctuation of world market prices, the decline of foreign 
investment, unemployment (in particular of the educated population), problems of land 
shortage, migration from rural areas, working condition, and decline of morality.94 
The Plan argued that these problems occurred largely because of the rapid expansion of 
trade and industrial activities in the private sectors. It therefore proposed that the private 
sector should take some responsibility to help solve problems.95 The Plan also 
emphasized the land holding policy which encouraged "farmers" to own their land, to 
protect them from losing their ownership and to provide justice and security for those 
who leased land. In so doing, the government would accelerate the work of the Land 
Acquisition for Farmers Fund to provide land for, especially low-income "farmers".9^ 
While the Plan proposed many measures to improve income distribution, it also said 
that there would be difficulties because government officials lacked the infrastructure to 
prepare and implement rural development projects and co-ordination between 
agencies.97
The Fourth Plan (1977-1981) had similar objectives to the Third but focused 
more on the distribution of income and planning for human development. It
Reports respectively). This example supports my discussion in Ch. 1 about the limitation of 
official perspectives; cf. p. 6, fn. 18.
However, the Bank's new approach failed to achieve 'long-term stable economic growth' for 
agricultural smallholders [The World Bank Annual Report. Washington D.C., The World 
Bank, 1978, p. 17]. McNamara set a target for Bank lending for agriculture or rural 
development efforts directed towards low-income farmers at $ 4,400 million during 1974-78. 
This was a 40 per cent increase over the previous year and represented 20 per cent of total 
projected lending. To support his activities, he claimed that "without rapid progress in 
smallholder agriculture throughout the developing world, there is little hope either of achieving 
long-term stable economic growth or of significantly reducing the levels of absolute poverty." 
Nonetheless, the Bank claimed it could not evaluate the result of the loan projects of 1974- 
1978 because of the increasing rural population, limited land resources, and an inadequate 
supporting system to reach agricultural smallholders [ibid., p. 20).
Demaine, op. cit.. p. 100.
The Third Plan, pp. 26-27.
Ibid., p. 200.
Ibid., p. 15.
Ibid., p. 39.
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emphasized land problems, noting for instance that the average land holding for 
agricultural purpose had been reduced from 14.7 rai in 1963 to 11.6 rai in 1975; the 
increasing numbers of landless peasants (more than 50 per cent of the rural population 
in Central Thailand);98 the increasing land tenancy for agricultural production (40.7 per 
cent in Central Thailand, 18.3 per cent in the North, and 15.7 per cent in South);99 
expanding destruction of forest for agricultural purpose; and increasing conflicts over 
land. In addition, it claimed that the problem of insurgency was increasing in particular 
in the Northeast where 52.5 per cent of the population were in "sensitive areas" 
compared with 9.4 per cent in Central Thailand.100 In order to solve these problems, 
the Plan proposed to create more jobs in rural areas, to provide information of the 
labour market and vocational training for the youth, to start new land settlement 
projects, and to encourage the private social welfare organizations to help solve rural 
problems. Significantly, the Third and Fourth Plans began to set the importance of 
non-government organizations, in principle, participating in the development process.
Economically, the Third and Fourth Plans adopted a strategy of industrialization 
by maintaining the import-substitution industrialization (ISI) in some areas such as 
textile and banking; at the same time, gradually moving towards the export-oriented 
industrialization (EOI) in other areas in order to counter the growing trade deficit.101 
Suehiro argued that, during 1974 and 1976, the Thai economy faced two serious 
problems: the increase in imported value of crude oil and the decline in US military 
aid.102 He also claimed that Thailand would have a deficit of about 17.2 billion baht in 
1976 but for a boom in the export of agricultural products which helped the Thai 
government to gain some 23 billion baht during 1972 and 1976. Due to this success, 
the government began to promote agro-business in the Fourth Plan (1977-1981) and 
made it the first priority in the Sixth Plan (1987-1991).103 In addition, the Investment 
Promotion Act was revised in 1972 to implement the EOI strategy. Consequently, the 
value of manufactured exports increased from US$40 million in 1970 to US$270
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The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), The Fourth National 
Economic and Social Development Plan (T977-198I f  Bangkok: NESDB, Office of the Prime 
Minister, 1977, p. 158.
Ibid., p. 158.
Ibid., p. 150, 157-158.
The EOI strategy was based on the "comparative advantage" of the nation in producing exports 
for the world market which I will discuss further in the next section.
Suehiro, op. c i t . p. 267. The value of crude oil imported increased from 3.1 billion baht in 
1972 to 16.7 billion baht in 1976 as a result of the oil crisis, and US military aid declined 
after the end of the Vietnam War from 4.4 billion baht to 0.76 billion baht in 1976.
Ibid., p. 268.
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million in 197 3.104 As a result, the EOI strategy has been accepted among Thai 
planners and political leaders and endorsed by the World Bank for labour intensive, 
export-oriented industries. We may see, however, that the Redistribution with Growth 
strategy was generally dominated by either the ISI or EOI or both and was not yet the 
state's first priority.
Socially and politically, the Third and Fourth Plans continued to be guided by 
the growing security problems and government centralization. Watson observed that 
the Thai educational system was also used and:
"[t]hrough the text books, syllabus and curriculum content, the government exercises subtle 
political influence in its desire to foster a sense of nationalism and loyalty to Thai culture. In 
the history syllabus there is a strong propaganda bias which advocates Thai nationalism and is 
strongly anti-communist".10^
Demaine added that schools and primary health care facilities were built up extensively 
in the "sensitive" areas where Communist insurgency was expanding, especially in the 
Northeastern and Southern regions. He argued that the objectives of social 
development for the rural poor were not clearly defined, for instance, in terms of 
appropriate curriculum, standards of education to be provided, and the kinds of 
educational facilities to be used in rural areas.106 Similar problems also appeared in the 
area of health care which was criticized in the World Bank Report of 1978. The Report 
said that although the Fourth Plan recognized the need to reduce differentials in health 
care between rural and urban areas, concrete rural differentials were not discussed.107 
In addition, the Report attacked the government’s development administration for being 
"highly centralized", having "excessive functional duplication", and being generally 
short on co-operation between government departments.108 The Bank's criticism was 
later addressed in the Fifth and Sixth Plans with the introduction of a structural 
adjustment strategy.
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Hewison, "National Interests and Economic Downturn", p. 57.
K. Watson, Educational Development in Thailand. Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1980, p. 
143.
Demaine, op. cit.. p. 101.
The World Bank, Thailand: Toward a Development Strategy of Full Participation. The World 
Bank Country Study, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1978, p. 108. The Fourth Plan’s 
programmed targets for the health sector were 500 district hospitals, 5,000 health centres and 
4,000 midwifery centres to be finished in 1981 tibid.. p. 118], which was rather unrealistic.
There are a series of occasional World Bank country reports which are referred to in the text by 
the short title "Bank Report" for the designated year.
Ibid., pp. 84-87. The Report also says that the government development administration was 
not only poorly distributed but also was uneven in its quality of service "which favours 
residents in Bangkok and urban centres generally" and therefore "the problems of rural areas 
simply tend to be neglected" tibid.. p. 86).
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We may conclude, briefly, that the failure of four development plans covering 
the 1960s and 1970s to address the problems of the common people, was due not only 
to the negligence of the government (most under the military regimes) but also to the 
impact of US security concerns. Buckley is right when he argues that the military-style 
leadership lacked any genuine commitment to the target groups (farmers and workers) 
and failed to correct the weaknesses of the Plans. The public expenditure for 
development had not been defined in terms of budgets by sectors and by sources, 
leading to considerable difficulties in project preparation and implementation. Only 
limited funds were actually disbursed on development while the expenditure on defence 
and internal security became higher than the development expenditure; taxation policies 
were not seriously assessed because the military was afraid of losing the support of rich 
elites.1^  However, Buckley did not mention the influence of the World Bank and 
other international institutions over Thai development plans and the US support to the 
Thai military regimes for pursuing US strategic interest.
The failure of development plans (from 1961-1971) under the guideline of 
modernization theory created various socio-economic problems. In particular the 
mounting problem of educated unemployed may be considered as a major cause of the 
political upheaval on 14 October 1973.110 The 1973 uprising, led by student 
movements [organized under the name of the National Student Centre of Thailand 
(NSCT)] mainly involved the urban middle class and has, to some extent, had an impact 
on structural change in Thailand ever since. Politically, the military-dominated regime 
has been weakened and gradually replaced by a parliamentary system and the increasing 
role of participatory institutions.111 A new national constitution was put in place in 
1978 followed by three elections (in 1979, 1983 and 1986) without successful military 
interruption (there were two abortive coups led by a group of "Young Turks" in April
M J. Buckley, "Planning and Budgeting in Thailand: The Plight of Rural Farmer", The South 
East Asian Economic Review. Vol. 3, No. 1, April 1982, pp. 28-29, 32, 34, 49, 51.
Hoogvelt explains that social mobilization in particular through education creates social 
expectations. When the social expectation cannot be satisfied, the result is social frustration 
[Hoogvelt, op. cit.. p. 1433. I think this analysis can be applied to explain the 1973 uprising 
in that the growth strategy created the social expectation of good jobs through education. In 
reality, the expectation appeared at the time of a high rate of unemployment, in particular 
graduate unemployment. Besides seeing the unjust behaviour of high-ranking officials, the 
university students were also frustrated with their uncertain future and prospects of 
unemployment due to the fact that the social structure was not changed.
Although the businessmen, military and bureaucrats have still actively participated in the 
parliamentary system, these groups have to follow the rules of the game, i.e. through the 
process of representative system which Suchit calls "open politics" and Girling calls the 
"bureaucratic-parliamentary system," which differs from Riggs's model of "bureaucratic polity" 
in that there appears an increasing role for non-bureaucratic organizations such as the NGOs.
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1981 and September 1985).112 Economically, the domestic capitalist groups such as 
banking business groups and exporters of agricultural products, were relatively 
reluctant to forge business links directly with the Thai political leaders because of the 
strict regulation of civilian government and the criticism from the press and students 
who, since the 1973 uprising, had greater opportunity to participate in the state's 
affairs.
Export-Oriented Industrialization (EOI) and structural adjustment 
strategies
Since the late 1970s, the World Bank and the IMF have promoted Export- 
Oriented Industrialization (EOI) and structural adjustment strategies which have come to 
play a predominant role as the guidelines for Third World development. EOI draws its 
support from economic growth theory and encourages industries to produce goods for 
export. From an economics points of view, the ISI strategy, which dominated 
development thinking during the 1950s and 1960s, created comparative disadvantage 
and protectionism. For instance, it discouraged competition between enterprises 
because government provided subsidies to domestic enterprises and protected them by 
tariffs, bans, quotas, and import licensing; these import protection measures also 
inhibited the growth of export-oriented industries. In addition, the industries emerging 
from the support of the ISI were heavily dependent on imports of capital and 
intermediate goods but failed to solve the problems of unemployment.112 By the mid to 
late 1960s, the ISI strategy began to reach "saturation point" especially in terms of 
consumer goods for internal use, and countries were ready to produce goods for export. 
In addition, the transnational corporations which had expanded since the post-war 
period behind the high tariffs in Third World countries, were also arguing for an EOI 
strategy to be implemented because it would create expansion for their own benefit.114
The way in which the EOI was to be achieved was through the implementation 
of structural adjustment policies which were designed to respond to the external 
economic shocks of the 1970s, especially the oil price increases of 1974 and 1979.115
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Suchit Bunbongkan, "The Military in the Participant Politics of Thailand", paper presented at 
the International Conference on Thai Studies, ANU, 3-6 July 1987, p. 1.
P.G. Warr and Bandid Nijathawom, "Thai Economic Performance: Some Thai Perspectives", 
Asian Pacific Economic Literature. Vol. 1, No. 1, May 1987, p. 66.
R. Robison, R. Higgott and K. Hewison, "Crisis in Economic Strategy in the 1980s: the 
Factors at Work", in R. Robison, K. Hewison and R. Higgott (eds.), Southeast Asia m the 
1980s: The Politics of Economic Crisis. London: Allen & Unwin, 1987, pp. 4-5.
Balassa defines structural adjustment policies as "... policy responses to external shocks, 
carried out with the objective of regaining the pre-shock growth path of the national economy. 
Regaining the growth path, in turn, will necessitate improvements in the balance of payments 
following the adverse effects of external shocks, since a country's balance of payments position
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Structural adjustment represented a public policy approach and required developing 
countries to put their economic houses in order by a range of measures including 
controlling inflation and balance of payment problems; increasing saving accounts; 
introducing pricing reform; improving government administration; encouraging the 
private sector to increase production; and cutting down public policy expenditure.1^
Higgott, Robison and Hewison were sceptical about the implementation of the 
Bank's new strategies. Firstly, the emphasis was put on macro-level industrialized 
development without government subsidy for small factories (compared with the ISI). 
Governments would support large enterprises which could provide cheap goods for the 
international market while leaving small factories integrated in the large enterprise 
system. Secondly, the political institutions under the public policy approach would be 
regarded as subordinate to economic policy which implied a tendency to favour 
authoritarian regimes in order to maintain a high level of economic growth. Thirdly, 
there would be the impact on human development policies because public expenditure 
for them would be cut off.117
The new strategies recommended by the Bank were incorporated in the Fifth 
Plan (1982-1986) and Sixth Plan (1987-1991), both of which required the Thai 
government to adjust economic structures to raise productivity for export. The Bank 
Report of 1984 indicated that the growth in GNP had slowed down to average about 5 
per cent per annum during 1980-82 (8 per cent in the 1960s, 7 per cent in the 1970s). 
The Report also noted that during the latter half of the 1970s, Thailand was already 
facing economic problems such as "accelerating inflation, growing dependence on 
foreign borrowing, large budgetary deficits”.118 The Bank, therefore, urged the Thai
constraints its economic growth. ... A broader definition will also include adjustments to 
internal shocks which may find their origin in inappropriate policies ... internal shocks 
adversely affect economic growth and the balance of payments, requiring the application of 
structural adjustment policies" [B. Balassa, "Structural Adjustment Policies in Developing 
Economies", World Development. Vol. 10, N o .l, 1982, pp. 23-38]. See further details of 
how the structural adjustment policies have been implemented by the World Bank and the IMF 
in H.G. Chau-Eoan, "The Debt Police", Time. 31 July 1989, pp. 42-48.
116 Higgott et al.. op.cit.. (1985), p. 40.
117 Ibid., pp. 40-41. A similar scepticism is shown by M. Ziauddin, a Pakistani financial 
journalist, whose country is in the process of structural adjustment proposed by the IMF in 
1988. As he says: "[Countries like ours tend to place the burden on the poorer people, who 
can least afford to suffer but do not have political clout" [Chau-Eoan, op. cit.. p. 44].
118 The World Bank. Thailand: Managing Public Resources for Structural Adjustment The World 
Bank Country Study, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1984, pp. xix, 2
Pairoj argues that the slow-down in growth rate occurred due to many reasons: "[T]he relatively 
conservative fiscal monetary policy in Thailand during the 1960s is well known and 
documented. The turbulent world economy in the next decade (as manifested in rising 
inflation, high nominal interest rates and oil prices, world recession, declining world trade 
volume, the worsening of the terms of trade, decline in price of primary products, growing
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government to reform five major areas: fiscal policy and resource mobilization; 
monetary policy; energy; industry; and agriculture, to achieve economic stability at both 
domestic and international levels. These recommendations were clearly reflected in the 
Fifth Plan (1982-1986). Further, in support of structural adjustment, Thailand received 
two special Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) from the World Bank, the first in 1982 
and the second in 1983.
The Bank Report of 1986 indicated there would be a big economic challenge for 
the Sixth Plan (1987-1991). For instance, national saving was very low, the trade 
deficit had risen to $US 9.4 billion (equivalent to 5.3 per cent of GDP) in 1981-1985 
and external debt rose to $US 14.9 billion (long-term debt $US 11.7 billion and short­
term debt $US 3.2 billion) in 1985 (equivalent to 39 per cent of GDP).119 The Bank 
insisted that, in the Sixth Plan, the Thai government should give a firm commitment to 
bring down the current deficit by a cutback in government expenditures, increase tax 
revenues by 15-16 per cent of GDP, improve public investment programmes, and 
promote export growth.120 The structural adjustment policy, however, excluded
protectionism and foreign currency fluctuation) have severely hit the open economy of 
Thailand from the mid-1970s onward,... Growth rate declined from 7.4 per cent per annum 
during 1976-1980 to 4.5 per cent during 1981-85. Only a 3.6 per cent growth was registered 
in 1986." and "the actual GDP growth rate during the Fifth Plan (1981-1986) was around 4 per 
cent compared with 6.6 per cent per annum in the Plan forecast" [Pairoj Vongvipanond, 
"Reflection upon Thailand’s Economic Development", mimeo, Chulalongkom University, n.d. 
pp. 7-8].
In contrast to Pairoj, Hewison argues that, in 1986, the Thai economy achieved "no-growth" 
budget mainly due to a huge debt and large military expenditure [Hewison, "National Interests 
and Economic Downturn", pp. 61, 66]. Based on Wilson, Hewison adds that between 1951 
and 1967, the Thai government received military assistance from the US of over US$ 1,000 
million. When the US decreased its military spending in Thailand, the government had to fill 
the gap in the huge expenditure and did so by further borrowing, thus adding to the debt burden 
accumulated since the 1960s [ibid., p. 63].
Hewison adds that Thailand was hit twice by the oil price crises -  first in 1973 and the second 
in 1978 -  and remained in a vulnerable financial position. Also the 1976 coup aftermath, to 
some extent, brought the military back to power. Consequently, defence expenditure rose 
rapidly and between 1976 and 1978 "at least US$ 242 million was lent by various transitional 
banks for arms purchases at rates considerably higher than market rates and over short terms" 
tibid.. p. 65]. By the end of the first quarter of 1983, total external debt had risen to US$ 
13,000 million fBangkok Post. 27 June 1985]. In 1985, there was a decision to purchase 
advanced F-16 fighter aircraft and equipment from the US at the cost of 9,467 million baht 
amidst criticism from academics, students and people from various professions, fBangkok 
World. 21 June 1985] protesting the policy of "guns today and rice tomorrow" fThe Nation. 2 
July 1985, p. 5], The Thai economic status in 1986 was designated to be a low growth with 
23 per cent of total expenditure going to debt servicing and 21 per cent for defence and security 
compared with 9 per cent for health and social service combined fThe Nation. 3 July 1985, p. 
19].
The World Bank, Thailand: Growth with Stability: A Challenge for the Sixth Plan Period. A 
Country Economic Report, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 2.
Ibid., p. 8.120
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human resource development in terms of health and education, "in the medium term", 
because the state's priority was to increase economic investment for export.121
The Fifth Plan (1982-1986) set to "adopt a 'new line' of thinking for national 
development" and it was called a "policy plan" because it proposed national 
development objectives through "the adjustment of economic structure" rather than 
"economic growth".122 It also stressed "poverty alleviation" for people in backward 
rural areas because it recognized that one-fourth of the population was still living in 
"absolute poverty" in the rural areas, particularly in the Upper North and Northeast. 
The Plan's target areas covered 216 districts and 30 sub-districts in the North, 
Northeast and South (out of a total of some 5,000 districts in Thailand) where the 
people were to be raised from poverty and given an "adequate living standard" which 
was defined as "an education system and training relevant to their works", "good 
health", and the satisfaction of "daily basic needs as may be appropriate in different 
areas".123
The Sixth Plan (1987-1991) aimed to review the role of government in national 
development, using "the programme system as a focus for the operations of various 
departments" and adjusting "the quality and quantity of government manpower". In 
addition, it aimed to support people participation, in terms of strengthening local 
organizations to achieve basic minimum needs.124 The Plan says that:
121
122
123
124
The World Bank, Managing Public Resources, p. 247.
The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), The Fifth National 
Economic and Social Development Plan (1982-19861. Bangkok: NESDB, Office of the Prime 
Minister, 1982, pp. 2-3. It seems to me that none of the previous Plans was a "policy plan" 
and this was an anachronistic type of national development.
Ibid., pp. 8 , 12  and 14. The Plan clearly stated the problems when it revealed that much land 
holding was in the hands of a small number of people, about five per cent owning 21 per cent 
of land, and that the inspection of Labour Department had not yet met the requirement of the 
Labour Protection Act fibid.. pp. 242-248 and 343]. The Plan promissed that the policies 
concerned with the use of land would be implemented, e. g. the enforcement of land tax and 
land reform policies, as well as of the Agricultural Land Rent Control Act of B.E. 2517. The 
Plan also said that the amendment of the Land Act, which proposed to limit the size of land 
holding to not more than 50 rai, was at the stage of acceptance in principle fibid., pp. 12-13, 
346]. However, there has not yet been any further progress. See also Turton, Production. 
Power and Participation, pp. 25-33.
The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), The Sixth National 
Economic and Social Development Plan. (1987-1991). Bangkok: NESDB, Office of the Prime 
Minister, 1987, pp. 12, 19, 107, 171-190, 338, 351 and 356.
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An important principle of rural development policy is in encouraging the people to play a 
greater role in rural development by understanding the nature of the problems involved, finding 
solutions to the problems and taking the initiative in solving their own problems and those of 
their communities wherever possible. Meanwhile the government would play a catalytic role 
in forging closer co-operation between the government and the people and the private 
sector... 125
However, the implementation of development policy, as stated in the Sixth Plan, puts a 
strong emphasis on the role of the private sector in the development process, reflecting 
the strategy of export-oriented industrialization (EOI) in both the agricultural and 
industrial areas.
Both the Fifth and Sixth Plans had a number of shortcomings. For example, as 
Turton argued, "the dominant definition of [people] participation, which development 
planners such as the National Economic and Social Development Board (N.E.S.D.B.) 
seem to share with the World Bank (1978), primarily refers to greater involvement in a 
capitalist market economy".126 In line with Turton, Helm argued that, under the Sixth 
Plan, the role of government would be limited to paving the way for the agro-industrial 
companies which the government expected to improve in managerial skill and marketing 
arrangements. He also argued that while the rural community might benefit from 
infrastructure and social services developed by the companies, at the same time, the 
companies' aim of maximizing their profits might leave only a small surplus for rural 
producers (and for the government in the form of tax), as had occurred in Latin 
American countries. Eventually, small-holder production might be changed to 
plantation production which tends to use modem machines rather than be labour 
intensive.127 This direction of rural development, therefore, needed to be carefully 
planned if it was to take account of the huge problem of rural unemployment and under­
employment accumulated since the inception of the First Plan in the 1960s.128
With regard to the industrial sector, Bankers and academics argue against the 
prediction that Thailand will become a newly-industrialized country (NIC) saying that 
Thailand would be "a suffering tiger". The reason given is the lack of several basic 
factors such as a shortage of quality manpower, particularly in science, engineering,
125 M L , p. 367.
126 Turton, Production. Power and Participation, p. 11. Because the government put an emphasis 
on the private sector to manage the rural development in forms of agro-business. The new 
phenomena that occurred were that the agro-business companies as well as urban-based 
landowners purchased a large amount of land for business. The government policies towards 
agriculture would benefit farmers with middle and higher incomes rather than the great majority 
of small farmers which the plan had mentioned.
127 F.G. Helm, "Implication of Snoh's Rural Development Policy", Bangkok Post. 3 April 1987, 
p. 5. Hewison, "National Interest and Economic Downturn", p. 78.
Under-employment means that people have jobs but are not fully occupied and do little real 
work.
128
82
medicine, and other technological fields; as well as the need for technology transfer.129 
In addition, the government would face the problems of a huge unskilled labour force, 
numbering about 700,000 in 1987 and expected to increase to 800,000 in 1988; and an 
unemployment figure of 2.4 million in 1988, in particular among middle-level 
graduates.130 Therefore the comparative advantage of having cheap labour is doubtful 
because most Third World countries also have cheap labour, but in any case the very 
role of modem technological innovation in increasing productivity tends to replace the 
advantage of cheap labour in the Third World. As most countries are implementing the 
export-led growth strategies, Thailand might also be affected by trade wars (especially 
between the European Community, the US and Japan) in the form of protectionism in 
the world market. In this regard, the government may have to re-assess the major 
direction of development if it is to be more suitable for the aims of Thai society.131
With regard to the structural adjustment policy applied in the public sector, 
Demaine was sceptical on several points. Firstly, to introduce a new policy such as the 
structural adjustment policy is not simply a technical change but it is a part of, and is 
determined by, political processes. For instance, in the private sector, the government 
remains dependent on the support of political interest groups, mainly businessmen, 
landowners, and the military, which have played a dominant role in economic growth 
through the formal development periods (over twenty years). For any change to occur, 
it "must obtain at least the tacit acceptance" of these groups.132 Secondly, the 
administrative decision-making in the public sector is highly centralized. Each
The educational system can produce only 2,700 engineers a year, while the market demand is 
running at 7,000 engineers a year [The Thai Farmers Bank, "New Government Faces Problems 
despite High Growth", The Nation. 11 August 1988, p. 18]. Kraisak Chunhawan, of Kasetsat 
University, supports this argument by giving an example of the Eastern Seaboard Programme 
to show that Thai education has not developed sufficiently to adjust to the rapidly changing 
needs of industry. In the long run, the Programme will require 28,000 engineers but Thailand 
is already short of engineers, the same problem exists in other areas of skilled labour. He also 
predicts that the shortage of skilled labour will lead to domination by foreign companies 
["Chatichai's son talks to Mayuri Rattanawannathip", The Nation, 29 July 1988, p. 9]. See 
also Chira Hongladarom, "New Government Faces Old Labour Problems", The Nation, 12 
August, 1988, p. 8.
Thailand has to spend money on technology costs increasing over 15 times in the past 15 
years, amounting to 2 billion baht in 1988. The heavy dependence on foreign technology 
might bring about problems in copyrights and poor technology, resulting in the relative 
uncompetitiveness of Thai products on the world market
The Thai Farmers Bank, op. cit.. p. 18.
Although Thailand enjoyed a high growth rate of about 10 per cent in 1987 and 1988, the 
fundamental problems of the common people have not yet been solved, e.g. the income 
differentials, the increase and guarantee of the common people’s real income, unemployment 
and the abuse of natural resources. See further discussion in Ch. 5.
132 Demaine, op. cit.. p. 104.
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department prefers to have "a substantial amount of independence"133 in its internal 
affairs with a top administrator who, being the highest decision-making authority, may 
reward or admonish his "entourages". However, this vertical line plays a more 
dominant role than that of the horizontal link between departments and ministries in the 
Thai bureaucratic system (the horizontal link occurs on the basis of personal contact and 
relationship rather than being part of the system). As a consequence, the independence 
of each sector creates widespread duplication and overlap of responsibilities between 
departments and sub-departments. For instance, in the area of rural development in the 
1970s, there were ten agencies involved in the construction of rural roads, six agencies 
providing rural water supply facilities, and six agencies responsible for various aspects 
of land development and settlement.134 Under these circumstance, the public service 
could only be ineffective in bringing services to the people in general.
The main directions from the First Plan (1961-1966) to the Sixth Plan (1987- 
1991) can be summarized into two categories: economic growth and human 
development - but in the form of "top-down" development. Influenced by the UN's 
"First Development Decade" of the 1960s and US foreign policy during the early "Cold 
War" period, Thai development policy seen in the First and Second Plans focused on 
economic growth, guided by ISI and led by the private sector, along with the "national 
security" policy of suppression of so called "communism". Due to the increasing social 
problems during the implementation of the two development Plans in the 1960s and the 
influence of the new strategies of the UN's "Second Development Decade" announced 
in the early 1970s, the Third Plan (1972-1976) and the Fourth Plan (1977-1981) 
maintained the same growth objectives but added a concern for human development in 
terms especially of income distribution. Human development appears more 
comprehensively in terms of "poverty alleviation" in the Fifth Plan (1982-1986) and 
"people participation" and "basic needs" in the Sixth Plan (1987-1991). At the same 
time, these two later Plans saw a move from ISI to EOI and structural adjustment 
strategies under the guidance of the World Bank and the IMF. Thus, development 
strategies in Thailand were beginning to move towards serving the people as the 
intensity of the policy of "national security" was being reduced from the Fifth Plan 
onward. "Co-operation" rather than "control" has been a widely accepted principle of 
development in the Sixth Plan.
Nevertheless, the results of nearly three decades of development plans have not 
lived up to expectation. A huge number of problems are waiting to be remedied by the
133 Ibid., p. 106. Demaine argued following the World Bank, Toward a Development Strategy.
pp. 84-87.
134 The World Bank, Toward a Development Strategy, p. 87.
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government and concerned parties. For instance, the agro-business approach in 
agriculture (as well as government's support of infrastructure) has resulted in the 
concentration of land ownership among big landowners at the expense of small farmers, 
who have had to sell their lands and become landless tenants. Their options are then 
either to move away to grow crops in the forest areas (with serious environmental 
consequences) or to go to the big towns to sell their labour.135 The failure to sustain 
people’s standard of living as an ultimate aim of development plans has been due not 
only, as Heim argues, to "the inability of the Government to organize effective 
extension work", but also to the absence of a political will to address the issue.136 
Unless development programmes address not only the increase of economic growth but 
also concrete solutions to the problems of poverty, unemployment, and inequitable 
incomes for the common people, then true development in Thailand will continue to fail.
Problems of common people and their reaction towards the government's 
implementation of development policies
The common people and their problems
It is widely recognized that the agricultural sector must be a major focus of Thai 
national economic and social development The reasons are self-evident: first, although 
the agricultural sector has gradually declined, agricultural production still plays the most 
important single role in the Thai economy and in 1983 represented 23.5 per cent or 
almost one fourth of the total GDP.137 Second, 71.4 per cent of the labour force is 
involved in the agricultural sector and amounts to about 13 million people from an
An other reason is that the smallholders cannot afford to buy fertilizer which is very expensive. 
Compared to Indonesia which has roughly a two to one ratio of fertilizer price to paddy price, 
Thailand's ratio was as high as seven to one [See Buckley, op. cit.. p. 37].
F.G. Heim, Akin Rabibhadana and Chirmsak Pinthong, How to Work with Farmers: A 
Manual For Field Workers: Khon Kaen: The Research and Development Institute (RDI), Khon 
Kaen University, 1983, p. 1.
Although the proportion of agricultural production has been reduced over 20 years as a result of 
the emphasis on the industrial development, the agricultural sector is still the most important 
sector in Thai economy. Its share of GDP declined from 39.8 per cent in 1960 to 29.8 per 
cent in 1971, 24.9 per cent in 1980 and 23.5 per cent in 1983 [Hewison, "National Interests 
and Economic Downturn", p. 54].
In addition, Suehiro argued that agricultural exports (mainly rice and rubber) supported the 
industrial development of the Thai economy in many ways. For example, first, it raised cash 
income for farmers and local merchants in order to keep and enlarge domestic markets of 
"import-substitution industries" such as textiles, automobiles and electrical goods. Second, 
the increase of agricultural exports helped these industries import capital goods for their 
purpose. Suehiro also added that "[I]f agriculture had not increased its export share after the 
1960s, it is very doubtful that the industrial sector could have enjoyed such high growth rates". 
Third, rice export taxes and rice premiums contributed about five to fifteen per cent of total 
revenue to government revenue throughout the 1960s. Fourth, although the agricultural sector 
had been gradually moved towards agro-business industry, the Thai economy still mainly 
gained benefit from agricultural products [Suehiro, op. cit.. p. 267].
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overall workforce population of some 19 million people. ^ 8 Third, due to the declining 
agricultural sector, there has been an increasingly high number of urban migrants who 
come from an agricultural background to be wage workers in big cities. This enables us 
to see a close relationship between rural peasants and urban wage workers. Surveys 
carried out by Thai and foreign researchers reveal that a high proportion of urban 
workers need to earn money to sustain rural families and relatives, as well as 
themselves and although they often want to go back to work in their home villages, this 
is not feasible.1 The mass of "small farmers" (including poor peasants) as well as the 
landless peasants, and wage workers (who retain strong links with their agricultural 
background and families), represent the very fabric of the country socially, 
economically and politically and, in this thesis, they constitute together the group that I 
refer to as the "common people".
Amidst the relative success of the Thai economy in terms of the classical 
measure of economic development, the common people have yet to enjoy the full 
benefits of economic growth, even though there has been an overall reduction in the 
incidence of poverty.140 The incidence of poverty in 1962/63 was 57 per cent of the 
population (about 16 million people). By 1975/76 that percentage was down to 31.7 
per cent (about 13 million ) and by 1981 had reached 23.9 per cent (about 11 
million).141 But, as noted by Medhi, there are interesting regional differences. In the 
Lower South poverty fell from 55 percent in 1975/76 to 19 percent in 1981; in the
138
139
140
141
Hewison, "National Interests and Economic Downturn", p. 54. By comparison there are two 
million people, or about 11 per cent, working in industrial sectors, mostly in menial jobs, and 
3.4 million people, or about 18 per cent, in the service sectors which include government 
officers, businessmen and large numbers of semi-skilled workers.
P. Limqueco, B. McFarlane and J. Odhnoff, Labour and Industry in ASEAN. Manila: Journal 
of Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1989, pp. 36, 39, 40-41. The survey was conducted from 
November 1982 to February 1983 by three teams of students from Chulalongkom University 
under the supervision of Chatthip Nartsupha of the Economics Faculty, Chulalongkom 
University. Eighty workers were sampled from three sites of industry: Rangsit, Nontha Buri 
Province; Prapadaeng, Samut Prakan Province; and Omnoi, Samut Sakhon Province. The 
ratio between male and female workers was 55:45 of the total Thai workforce.
For instance, the GDP has increased from 60,000 million baht (about US$ 2,857 million) in 
1961 to 817,000 million baht (about US$ 38,905 million) in 1981, or in other words, by a 
factor of 14 in 20 years. During this period, the yearly per capita income increased from 2,200 
baht (about US$ 105) to 17,200 baht (US$ 810), a factor of 8. Performance in the export and 
the service sectors accelerated from 9,900 million baht (about US$ 471 million) in 1961 to 
163,000 million baht (US$ 7,762 million) or 16 times in 1981 rThe Fifth Plan, p. 1]. See 
also Kroekkiat Phiphatseritham, "Khrongsang kankrachai raidai khong rabop setthakitthai", 
[The structure of the Distributive Income of Thai Economic System], Journal of Political 
Economy, [in Thai], Vol. 2, B.E. 2525 (1982), p. 9. The exchange rate used at that time was 
US$ 1 = 21 baht.
Medhi Krongkaew, "The Current State of Poverty and Income Distribution in Thailand", paper 
presented at the International Conference on Thai Studies, ANU, 3-6 July 1987, pp. 4 and 26. 
Pairoj op. cit.. p. 9. See also the detail in The World Bank, Income Growth and Poverty 
Alleviation in Thailand. The World Bank Country Study, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 
1980.
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Central regions there was only small reduction; while in the Northeast a reduction from 
about 47 percent in 1975/76 still left some 36 percent in poverty. From 1962/63 to the 
present, the poor in urban areas (with about 14 percent of the population) have 
represented around 10 per cent of the total. Within the classification of the poor, Medhi 
also found the poor in the Northeast were "more poor" than people in other regions (the 
"least poor" being in Bangkok). By occupation, farm and general labourers had the 
highest incidence of poverty followed by farm operators (i.e. those working their own 
or rented or land). Medhi's study showed that there was a worsening gap in income 
distribution regionally and "the standard of well-being between the urban and rural areas 
appeared to be drifting apart". In conclusion Medhi argued:
if Thailand continues its development path and patterns as in the last 20 years, the poverty 
level should also continue to go down, and for some time yet, the distribution will be more 
unequal. Whether this problem will receive adequate attention from the Government depends 
on the perception of the State whether this problem would become politicized or not, or 
whether the total benefits could be trickled down sufficiently to obviate the need to rectify 
income inequality. Realistically, the concern for income distribution remains the long-run 
perspective of the Government.1^
Other scholars, like Udom (1975), Kroekkiat (1982), and Islam (1984) have expressed 
the same concern that economic development has clustered around urban 
agglomerations rather than in the rural sector, and although economic growth in 
Thailand has accelerated, the distribution of growth has remained uneven and a 
tremendous gap between the urban and rural areas, especially the North and Northeast, 
has persisted.143
At the same time, the pattem of ownership and control of the productive forces 
remained very much in the hands of a minority of landowners and business groups.144 
According to Kroekkiat of Thammasat University, a survey of 50 districts in 22 
provinces revealed that about six per cent of the landowners (27,019 landowners)
Medhi, op. cit.. pp. 24-25.
Udom Koedphibun, "Distribution of Income and Wealth in Thailand", in Prateep Sondysuvan 
(ed.), op. cit.. pp. 279-316; and Kroekkiat, "Khrongsang kankrachai raidai", pp. 11-12; R. 
Islam, "Poverty, Income Distribution and Growth " in A.R. Khan and E. Lee (eds.), Poverty 
in Rural Asia. Bangkok: ILO-ARTEP, 1984, pp. 205-229.
In addition, Medhi, Islam and Pairoj were critical of Oey Meesook's study of poverty for the 
World Bank, using household expenditure surveys and concluding that "there is no trade-off 
between growth and equity during the 1960s and mid-1970s" [Pairoj, op.cit.. p. 9; and Medhi, 
op.cit.. pp. 2-3). See also Oey Astra Meesook, Income. Consumption and Poverty in 
Thailand. 1962/63 to 1975/76. The World Bank Staff Working Paper, Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank, 1979.
Kroekkiat Phiphatseritham, Wikhro laksana kanpenchaokhong thurakit khanatvai nai 
prathetthai [The Distribution of Ownership in the Thai Big Business (translation as in 
original)], Thai Khadhi Research Institute, Research Document No. 14, Bangkok: Thammasat 
University, B.E. 2525 (1982); and Paisal Sricharatchanya, "The Jewels of the Crown", Fai 
Eastern Economic Review. 30 June 1988, pp. 60-63.
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possessed 31 per cent of land (8,306,694 rai). Of these, the top one per cent of the 
landowners (5,434 landowners) possessed an average of about 641 rai each; the next 
five percent an average of 223 rai each. Of the remaining 94 per cent of landowners 
(404,725 landowners), 25 per cent (100,396 landowners) possessed from 20 to 50 rai; 
and 69 per cent (or 304,329 landowners) possessed less than 20 rai.145
Very few people would argue that the ownership of agricultural land in Thai 
rural areas is not the single most significant factor in the well-being of the common 
people. But since the Limited Land Tenure Act of B.E. 2497 (1954) was abolished by 
Sarit's Revolutionary Party Proclamation No. 49, farmers had been losing their lands 
through selling (of their own free will or by being forced), and resumption by the state 
for the construction of roads, dams, forestry schemes and "public works", with little or 
sometimes no compensation.146
It could be said that, with the support of government development policies 
during the past two decades, big landowners, domestic and foreign enterprises or the so 
called "the tripod structure of dominant capitalist groups" controlled most of the 
productive resources (e.g. land, capital and labour) in the Thai economy.147 As a 
consequence, this concentration created an unequal distribution of income which has a 
great impact upon the poor living condition of the common people and has determined 
the continuing structure of underdevelopment of the country, socially, economically and 
politically.148
Kroekkiat, "Khrongsang kankrachai raidai", pp. 7-8,13. Kroekkiat uses as his primary source 
the Office of Land Reformation for Agriculture, Statistic Document no. 4036. The 
government officers explored fifty districts within 22 provinces to study land reformation and 
found many problems in terms of land monopoly. See also A. Turton, "The Current Situation 
in the Thai Countryside", Journal of Contemporary Asia. Vol. 8, No. 1, 1978, pp. 110-112. 
Turton argues that in one district of a Northern province, the land tax records for 3,430 owners 
in 1974 revealed that only 1.4 per cent of landowners (48 landowners) possess land from 45 rai 
to 1,600 rai whereas 56.3 per cent (or 1,932 small landowners) have land 5-10 rai. According 
to Paisal, the land holding by the Crown Property Bureau (CPB) which is owned by the King, 
and which, the article claimed, was "the wealthiest institution in Thailand", was estimated at 
about 40,000 acres in up-country and at roughly 13,300 acres in Bangkok [Paisal, op. c it . pp. 
60-61].
Chai-anan and Morell argue that besides the corruption scandal in the Irrigation Department, in 
1969, "large dams produced electricity for the cities, rather than serving the needs of small 
farmers." In addition, "[R]oad building became a top priority in the development plans. While 
the government claimed that these roads were of great economic importance to the farmers, 
some critics argued that the road construction program had little effect on agricultural output" 
[D. Morell and Chai-anan Samudhavanija, Political Conflict in Thailand: Reform. Reaction. 
Revolution. Cambridge: Gunn & Hain Publishers Inc., 1981, p. 208]. According to Jacobs, 
most roads were built to serve strategic purposes in "the event of an international conflict in 
Southeast Asia" [Jacobs, op. cit.. p. 145].
147
148
See explanation in Suehiro, op. cit.. pp. 275-286. 
Ibid.. Ch. 8.
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Analysing the distribution of ownership of the Thai big business during two 
development decades (1960s and 1970s) using first-hand data and information149 from 
the Ministry of Commerce, Kroekkiat found that "the degree of concentration in all 
major business sectors are very high and the foreign companies have played an 
important role in the Thai economy, particularly in the industrial sector" and "the 
government's economic policies in the past two decades have also promoted high 
business concentration and high degree of monopoly power".*50 Kroekkiat argued that 
the financial business (e.g. banking) had more influence than others (e.g. import, 
export, manufacturing and agricultural businesses) in the use of capital, of social 
resources, the promotion and expansion of big business as well as the control of 
economic change. Although agriculture was a fundamental sector in Thai economic 
system in which most people were involved, it played only a minor role in the control 
and change of Thai economy.151 Kroekkiat also considered the increasing role of 
foreign enterprises on which the Thai economy was dependent in terms of capital 
investment, technology and trading and said that the trend towards dependency was 
advancing.152
Besides the lack of productive resources (e.g. land and capital), the small 
farmers' poverty and landlessness comes from their indebtedness and inability to pay 
rents and high interest rates on borrowing.153 They also suffer from natural conditions 
such as the fluctuation of climate and low productivity, and human exploitation through 
low market price depressed further by pre-harvest contract sales or immediate post-
149
150
151
152
153
For example, the financial statements and lists of shareholders of about one thousand limited 
companies belonging to the major business groups in 1978 and 1979.
Kroekkiat, Wikhro laksana kanpenchaokhong. p. 10.
The pattern of ownership (e.g. the shareholding in companies) was concentrated in a small 
clique of family businesses. For instance, three quarters of the financial businesses were under 
the control of five commercial banking (family) groups, namely Sophonphanich, 
Techaphaiboon, Lumsum, Rattanarak and Nanthaphiwat families. About 90 per cent of 
financial resources (altogether 500,000 million baht during 1978-1979) were in the hands of 30 
big business groups; and about 70 per cent of that amount of financial resources belonged to 
only 12 commercial banking groups and large industrial groups.
Ibid., pp. 360-364, 367-369.
Chai-anan says that in the North and Northeast regions about 20 per cent of the peasants have 
no buffalo to work in the rice field. Farmers therefore have to rent buffaloes at a costs of 50- 
100 tang of paddy rice for only one planting season, whereas they can gain by average only 28 
tangs [280 kilograms] per rai [Chai-anan Samudavanija, "The Farmers' Movement in Modem 
Thai Politics", paper presented at the Thai-European Seminar on Social Change in 
Contemporary Thailand, Anthropological-Sociological Centre, University of Amsterdam, 28- 
30 May 1980, p. 14; and Morell and Chai-anan, op. cit.. p. 211]. See also Kosit Punpiumrat, 
"Kanpatthana Chonnabot yakchon nai raya khu'ng phan patthana chabap thi ha lae thitthang 
kanpatthana nai phan patthana chabap thi hok" [The Development of Poor-Rural Areas Half- 
Way through the Fifth National Economic and Social Plan and the Direction of the Sixth 
National Economic and Social Plan], in The National Economic and Social Development 
Board (NESDB), Chonnabotthai. [Thai Rural Areas], [in Thai], Bangkok: NESDB, Office of 
the Prime Minister, B.E., 2527 (1984), p. 14.
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harvest sale, high rents and the imposition of fines for delayed payment. Even though 
the Agricultural Land Rent Control Act of 1974 fixed a maximum rent of one-third of 
the crop, it has been ignored by officials and landowners. After the "parliamentary 
period" ended in 1976, the landowners seized any opportunity to evict tenants and to re­
negotiate new tenancies with various forms of cash rent in advance. The Agricultural 
Land Reform Office has achieved very little in implementing the policies of the 1975 
Agricultural Land Reform Act for the benefit of the tenants and, according to Turton, 
from 1975 to 1981 "only 30,000 ha of land in the Reform Areas had been purchased 
from private owners ... this benefited less than 3 % of tenant households."154 At the 
same time there has been considerable land fragmentation and subdivision and also a 
shortfall in land development for agriculture.
Furthermore, illness and illiteracy are serious problems among small farmers. 
For instance, in the mid-1980s, 63 per cent of the poor in the rural areas, in particular 
the Northeast region, were subject to parasitic illnesses and 90 per cent on average had 
anaem ia.155 The causes of illness are malnutrition, poor living condition and hard 
physical labour, especially in new forest-fringe areas which present particular health 
hazards such as virulent types of malaria. In 1981, 14.5 per cent of the population of 
that region was uneducated and lacked the basic knowledge necessary to prevent 
themselves from getting diseases.156 In addition, illiterate farmers were sometimes 
simply cheated by landowners and money lenders and eventually they lost their 
lands.157
At the same time, the poverty of urban workers has been exacerbated by low 
wages and a high rate of unemployment. For example, in 1981, the government 
declared the average wage for the workers in Bangkok to be 61 baht (about US$ 2.9) 
per day. While this is appreciably higher than in 1973 when the average wage was only 
12 baht (US$ 0.57), the workers in the nearby provinces such as Samut Sakhon and 
Samut Songkhram earn even less than those who worked in Bangkok. Moreover, 
according to the NESDB's statistical data, there were 286,000 unemployed workers in 
1980 and the estimated figure for unemployed was expected to rise to 552,000 in 
1990.158
154
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157
158
Turton, Production. Power and Participation, pp. 22-23. 
Kosit, op. cit.. p. 14.
Ibid., p. 14.
Morell and Chai-anan, op. cit.. pp. 211-212.
Kroekkiat, "Khrongsang kankrachai raidai", pp. 17-19.
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It is clear that without power and any effective voice in government, the 
common people have been ignored and successive governments have supported narrow 
elites in agriculture, in business and in social development at the expense of the 
common people.
People's reaction towards the government's implementation of 
development policies
The government has achieved very little in solving social problems which have 
been growing since at least the 1930s. The people express their frustration in 
unproductive ways such as drinking, gambling and committing crime, which the 
government regards as problems of individual behaviour rather than as wider social 
problems.159 Common attitudes towards the government officials are quoted in 
Demaine and Seri:
These people who came to us, whom in general we called "town people," counted on and 
respected only educated or rich persons, or somebody of high rank; no matter how young, how 
stupid, how ignorant they were, age meant nothing to them. ... But we knew that they 
expected us to respect them because they were educated and they were government people too. 
So we did as they wanted by acting humble. But it would also [have] hurt them awfully if 
they ever knew that we counted them as what we thought they really were. ... Sometimes we 
even called some of them stupid asses.160
You are the one[s] who plans thing for us. But you never take any responsibility when the 
plans fail. We farmers have to find our way out by ourselves.161
Chai-anan, Chirmsak and Davis argue that one of the main reasons for these 
outpourings of frustration is that the poor have not been able to bring meaningful 
political pressure upon the government. Most Thai poor tend to accept their misfortune 
and poverty as their inescapable "karma" and the people's apparent passiveness may 
derive from the fact that no strong grass roots movement has been formed.162 Because 
the common people are not organized and do not present a direct threat to government 
security, the government has not made any serious effort to take their problems into 
account or attempted to really improve the economic welfare of the people.163 Where
159
160 
161
162
163
For instance, the Fifth Plan reveals that the crime rate rose from 20 cases per 100,000 person 
in 1959 to 40 cases per 100,000 persons in 1976 fThe Fifth Plan, p. 7].
Demaine, op. cit.. p. 110.
Wibun Khemchaloem, quoted by Seri Phongphit (ed.), Back to the Roots: Village and Self: 
Reliance in a Thai Context. Bangkok: Rural Development Document Centre (RUDOC), 1986, 
p. 15.
Chai-anan explains "karma" as "the degree to which the present status is determined by past 
lives" [Chai-anan, "The Farmers' Movement", p. 6].
Chirmsak makes a comment on government policies concerned with farmer organizations that 
"farmers' organizations have been much discouraged and destroyed in the past two decades while 
business and industrial interests promoted and consolidated" [Chirmsak, op. cit.. p. 20]. See 
also R. Davis, "Little Change in a Northern Thai Village", in B.J. Terwiel (ed.), Seven PrQteS
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security has been a perceived problem, however, the government has not been slow to 
bring force to bear with little concern for eliminating the economic conditions which 
produced opposition in the first place.
Wherever there were grass roots movements, the government reacted.164 
During 1973 and 1976, the peasant and worker movements became better organized 
than ever before in the Peasant Federation of Thailand (PFT) and Labour Unions of 
Thailand (FLUT), and in particular when they co-operated with the student movements. 
The so-called "Sam-pra-san" or "Tri-Co-operation" between farmers, workers and 
students, voiced the grievances of the common people and put strong political pressure 
on the government. The ruling elite felt threatened and consequently tried many ways to 
destroy the emergent co-operative organization of workers, farmers and students, 
eventually achieving this objective with the 1976 coup. Moreover, the government felt 
even more threatened when large numbers of students, workers and farmers fled to join 
the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) with the declared intention of taking up arms to 
fight against the government.165
At that time, the political-oriented people's movements wished to devise 
development strategies to attack the root causes of problems concerned mainly with land 
ownership and an unfair labour system (e.g. the minimum wage), by influencing the 
government, or if necessary, by campaigning against it. The people organizations 
stated that they aimed to achieve their struggle by peaceful means and were initially far 
from the influence of the CPT. As Srithorn Yotkantha, President of the Northern 
Region PFT said in an interview in September 1976 just before the October 1976 coup:
in Rural South East Asia. Bihar (India): The Centre for South East Asian Studies, 1979, pp. 
20- 22.
There had been peasant movements in various forms operating for many years more or less 
against state suppression and exploitation, especially in the North and Northeast regions. The 
worker movements were very recent by comparison. For the peasant movements, see further 
details from Chatthip Nartsupha, "The Ideology of Holy Men Revolts", pp. 111-134. For the 
state suppression and exploitation, see Somsamai Srisudravama (pen name of Chit Poumisak), 
Chomna sakdinathai. pp. 43-148. For the peasant movements in the 1970s, see Luther, 
Peasants and State in Contemporary Thailand: and Turton, Production. Power and 
Participation. Ch. 3. For the labour movement, see Morell and Chai-anan, op. cit., pp. 181- 
204, Chs. 6, 7, 8; and Girling, Thailand. Chs. 4 and 5.
See further details in Turton, Fast and Caldwell (eds.) op. cit.: P. de Beer, "History and Policy 
of the Communist Party of Thailand", Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1978, 
pp. 143-157; Girling, Thailand. Ch. 7; and A. Tandrup, "The CPTs Mobilization Policy at 
the Village level", paper presented at the Thai-European Seminar on Social Change in 
Contemporary Thailand, Anthropological-Sociological Centre, University of Amsterdam, 28- 
30 May 1980.
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We will fight peacefully even though the small minority against whose interests we fight may 
seek to use violence; even when a large number of our peasant leaders up and down the country 
have been beaten or killed. Any amount of beating, killing or suffering will not be able to 
break our resolve, because in the past all we have known is hardship and suffering.166
And Arom Pongpa-ngan, the President of the Labour Union of the Metropolitan 
Waterworks Authority in an interview in The Nation on 11 January 1976 expressed a 
similar position: "I don't want to reject the present government. I just want to change 
its ways to work more for the poor people".167
But the government's response to any kind of counterbalancing activities, 
criticism and presentation of alternatives, was to label such activities as "communist", 
something which it regarded to be "un-Thai". In order to control the growth and 
expansion of such activities, the governments used the "counter-insurgency" measures 
and the Anti-Communist Act to suppress the so-called "insurgency."168 Because of 
this, "national development" and "counter-insurgency" measures [political (non-violent) 
and military (violent) means] became closely linked and the outcome was to create 
additional social and political problems rather than to bring benefit to the common 
people.
With regard to the root causes of the problems, which most scholars agree are 
most serious in the state of rural development, Davis argues that only vague conceptions 
of development and democracy have been transmitted to the common people by 
government officials. The relationship between common people and officials could well 
be an indication as to whether these concepts were successfully understood and 
im plem ented .169 The 1973 uprising proves the fact that these two concepts 
(development and democracy) are inseparable, and to attempt to increase economic 
growth by suppressing people's rights and freedom is a contradiction and must fail.170
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Turton, Production. Power and Participation, p. 41.
Quoted from Girling, Thailand, pp. 201-202.
This Act was enforced on 2 April 1933 and initially used against Luang Pradit and the Draft 
Economic Plan. It was changed many times, being amended in 1935, revoked in 1946 and 
again enforced in November 1952 after the arrest of the "Peace Rebellion" group, who 
protested against the Phibun government sending soldiers to fight in the Korean War 
[Thongbai Thongpao, "Preventive Detention", UCL Newsletter. January-June, 1986, pp. 6-7]. 
For the current debate on this Act, see Far Eastern Economic Review Asia Yearbook. 1990, p. 
236.
However, since Davis’ observation in 1979, economic development programmes have not 
emphasized developing an effective official-peasant relationships. Instead, emphasis has been 
on altering the physical landscape, construction of roads, irrigation works, etc.; or on material 
development which people often misconceive as the sole aim of national development
However, the process of sorting out a consensus between classes have not yet become part of 
Thai political culture or part of the administration system in Thailand. More often than not, 
the consensus achieved by the government tends to be imposed by the elites and therefore tends 
to prevent the occurrence of open conflict between classes (it becomes a hidden agenda).
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Within the "representative" democratic society, it is necessary to have the expression of 
ideas and opinions from the majority; this is fundamental to development.
People organizations create an opportunity for the common people to have a 
more relevant role and a wider choice in Thai society, even if their condition remains far 
removed from the aims of development.171 As Heim, Akin and Chirmsak say, these 
"self-help" organizations are needed to become a formal channel not only for the two- 
way communications between the government and people (i.e., spreading new 
agricultural, industrial techniques and information as well as understanding the needs of 
common people), but also the avenue (or power base) for bargaining in the economic, 
social and political areas.172
As to whether the peasants resisted change and development, Davis confirmed 
that study after study of peasant economies had demonstrated that peasants were not 
resistant to change and would increase their productivity given the appropriate 
conditions. He defined the peasants as:
small-scale rural producers who stand in a subordinate position in their relations with the 
holders of political and economic power. ... Peasants are linked to the national community 
and to the world community in two ways: economically and politically through their role in a 
market system and through their relationship to the state; and culturally, by their subordinate 
status in relation to the Great Traditions of national religions and literatures and to the 
technological and ideological innovations of urban elites.17^
The subordinate and unstable position of the peasants in the wider society, Davis 
argued, was an important factor which made them look as if they resisted change. In 
fact, the peasants did not resist any change which would increase their productivity with 
minimum risk in the event of failure. They tended to adopt a strategy "wait and see if it 
works" before trying by themselves because they could not afford risking their limited 
resource and capital. More often, their demands were ignored by the government 
unless they became a threat to the government's status quo.174
Lessons learnt from past development failures tell us that the development 
process is too complex a phenomenon to be satisfied by a single approach that is 
applicable to all cases. The achievement of "people participation", "basic minimum 
needs", "basic human rights" and "self-reliant development" concepts will be difficult
171 However some people realized that their problems were not only personal problems (e.g. 
individualism, conservatism and the misfortune resulting from the law of karma) but also 
structural ones (the monopoly of land ownership, of productive resources, and unjust relations 
of production between the owner of the productive force and labourers).
172 Heim, Akin and Chirmsak, op. cit.. p. 2.
17  ^ Davis, op. cit.. p. 20.
174 Ibid., pp. 20-22.
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unless there is considerable re-assessment of development direction and the involvement 
of concerned parties (including government) to carry out the plans.175 Since the 
Kriangsak government (1977-1980), the former policy of suppression has been 
softened considerably as seen in the 1978 constitution and Prime Ministerial Order Nos. 
66/2523, 65/2525 and 47/2529.176 In this way, the political situation is known among 
the Thai people as the "semi-leaf democracy", which means the government allows the 
people to express political opinion to the extent that it would be able to control any 
political situation which might emerge from the people's struggle. Meanwhile the 
common people have little bargaining power and weak organizations. This could be 
improved if the non-government organizations (NGOs) become an active agency to 
bridge the gap between the people and the government. Here may be a special role for 
the Thai NGOs in development, a matter which will be discussed in the next chapter.
As Jose W. Diokno argue.s in a lecture presented to the International Council of Amnesty 
International, Cambridge, on 21 September 1978: "Development is not just providing people 
with adequate food, clothing, and shelter; many prisons do as much. Development is also 
people deciding what food, clothing and shelter are adequate, and how they are to be provided" 
[quoted from P. Alston, "Development and the Rule of Law: Prevention Versus Cure as a 
Human Rights Strategy", the Basis Working Paper in International Council of Jurists (ICJ), 
Development. Human Rights and the Rule of Law. Report of a Conference held in the Hague, 
the Netherlands on 27 April-1 May 1981, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981, p. 54].
Suchit and Kanala explain that "[T]he order no. 66/2523 was issued in 1980 to be a policy to 
suppress the communist guerilla warfare; the subsequent order no. 65/2525 was issued in 1982 
to be a detailed implementation plan of the policy appeared in the first order". In so doing, the 
orders suggest that the Army has to use "political policies leading military operations to 
suppress the CPT", meaning that, in order to beat the CPT, the political activities have to 
work "hand in hand with the military operations" [Suchit Bunbongkam and Kanala 
Sukhapanij-Khantaprab, "National Security and the Contemporary Political Role of the Thai 
Military", mimeo, Department of Government, Chulalongkom University, n.d., pp. 6-8]. The 
Prime Ministerial Order No. 47/2529, annouced in March 1986, was designed for the Army to 
deal with the "united front of the CPT" or CPT supporters [Suchit, "The Military in the 
Participant Politics of Thailand", p. 13].
CHAPTER 3
Historical Analysis of the Role of Non-Government Organizations
(NGOs) in Thailand.
A lone bamboo cannot make a fence; if people do not agree, no prosperous city can be built.
A saying in the Northeastern part of Thailand *
At the present time, most Thai people realize that any kind of regime which does not recognize 
and promote civil rights and liberty provides an opportunity for the creation of corrupt and 
ineffective government administration, leading to difficulties and misery for the people. Such 
a regime consequently undermines the stability and progress both of the people and of the 
nation.
Introduction of the Constitution of the Union for Civil Liberty (UCL), Thailand^
In the previous chapter we have seen the main concepts of government 
development policies which more or less attempt to tackle problems of the common 
people. However, there is still a gap in participatory development between the 
government and the people. This chapter aims to review the history of non-government 
organizations (NGOs) in Thailand, in particular those founded after the 1973 uprising, 
in order to analyse their role in participatory development. It also aims to analyse 
concepts and methodologies which are used by those NGOs to tackle problems of 
underdevelopment. This chapter will give examples of NGOs and their adoption of the 
concepts of "people participation", "basic needs", "basic human rights", and "self- 
reliant development", as well as focusing on the ways they can act as a counterbalancing 
power with the government sector in order to work towards a new consensus, and to 
develop rules so that there will be greater opportunity for the people to participate in 
development.
While I wish to focus on NGOs after 1973, it is important to give some 
overview of the nature and activities of NGOs in Thailand before that time. Some social
Adapted from Koson Srisang, "Cultural Heritage and Political Vision: A Northeastern Thai 
Perspective on Political Ethics", Commission on Theological Concerns (CTC) and Christian 
Conference of Asia (CCA) (eds.), Towards the Sovereignty of the People: A Search for an 
Alternative Form of Democratic Politics in Asia - A Christian Discussion, Singapore: CCA, 
1983, p. 153.
Translated from the Union for Civil Liberty (UCL), Prawat sip pi khong samakhom sitthi 
seriphap khong prachachon [The Ten-Year History of the Union for Civil Liberty], [in Thai], 
Bangkok: Prayunwong Company, n.d., p. 2. The UCL was initially founded on 24 November 
1973, forty-one days after the 14 October 1973 uprising. It was closed down following the 6 
October 1976 coup, re-organized in 1978 and registered as an association on 8 February 1983.
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activities have been performed by private institutions and individuals since the reform 
period of King Rama V (from 1873 to 1910) in the fields of charity and social welfare.3 
For example, in 1890, Kromphra Suthasininat gave her own money to build a house for 
orphans at Suan Mali Sub-District, Bamrungmuang Street, Bangkok,4 56in 1920, Queen 
Sripatcharintra founded the Red Cross Society of Thailand to help wounded soldiers 
with the assistance of volunteers, mainly ladies of rank and wives of public servants.^ 
In a general sense these were fairly straight forward voluntary, non-profit organizations 
providing social welfare based on charity. They did not enunciate development roles 
for themselves or become involved in political activities aimed at generally bettering the 
lot of their target groups.
Later, when the government began to become involved in social development 
during the 1950s and 1960s, the National Council on Social Welfare of Thailand under 
the Patronage of H.M. the King, and the National Council of Women of Thailand under 
the Royal Patronage of H.M. the Queen, were founded.6
Not until the late 1960s did NGOs begin to emerge in Thailand with broader 
perspectives of a community development role, to some extent influenced by the re­
assessment of the first UN "Development Decade". The Rural Reconstruction 
Foundation of Thailand, which was founded in 1968, played a significant role in 
advocating community development in rural areas and encouraging people to participate 
in social and economic development.7 Later, two other organizations also pioneering
3 R. Prizzia and Narong Sinsawasdi, "History of Student Activism in Thailand", in R. Prizzia 
and Narong Sinsawasdi (eds.), Thailand: Student Activism and Political Change. Bangkok: 
Samnukphim Duangkamol, 1974, p. 16. The reform involved adopting western style 
administrative institutions and education. Prizzia and Narong suggest that social welfare 
groups were based on western ideals influential at that time. For a brief outline of the reform, 
see Prudhisan Jumbala, "Political System and Nation-Building in Thailand", Research Paper 
presented to the workshop on Political System and Nation-Building in ASEAN, organized by 
the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, 23-25 January 1986.
4 Phumtham Wechayachai, "Ongkan patthana ekachon nai prathetthai: sathanaphap botbat lae 
panha" [Non-Government Organizations in Thailand: Status, Role and Problems], Patthana 
Sanpkhom [Social Development], [in Thai], Bangkok: NGO Dissemination Week Committee, 
November B.E. 2527 (1984), p. 25.
5 Uthumphon Wirawaithaya, "Praratchaprawat chiwit suanpra-ong Somdetpra Sripatcharintra 
boromrachininat: Praboromrachonni Panpiluang" [The Biography of the Queen 
Sripatcharintra], [in Thai], Bangkok: Praepitthaya, B.E. 2509 (1966), p. 113.
6 Yupa Wongchai, "The Study of a Model Non-Government Co-ordinating Organization: the 
Case Study of National Council on Social Welfare of Thailand, the National Council of 
Women of Thailand and the Thai Volunteer Service", Research Report, Bangkok: Faculty of 
Social Administration, Thammasat University, 1988, p. 1. The National Council on Social 
Welfare of Thailand under the Patronage of H.M. the King aims to be a central organization for 
co-operating among private charity and social welfare organizations.
7 The Foundation was influenced by the community approach promoted by Y.C. Yen, a 
Chinese-American scholar, through Puey Ungphakorn. Phumtham Wechayachai, "Self- 
Reliance in Thai Society: Viewpoints and Experiences from the Non-Government Sector", [in 
Thai], Research Report, Pridi Phanomyong Institute, B.E. 2530 (1987), pp. 15-17. Later on,
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community development were set up. One, the Komol Keemthong Foundation set up 
in 1971 with the help of Sulak Sivarak, was an umbrella for young idealists to promote 
social consciousness and create a moral community following the ideas of the late 
Komol.8 The other was the Catholic Council of Thailand for Development (CCTD), 
founded in 1972,9 which placed its emphasis on "conscientization" - an educational 
activity which motivates and empowers people to get together and make their own 
decisions for the betterment of the community.10
The characteristics of the early NGO activities were their involvement in social 
welfare work while preserving the status quo. Most activities were conducted by 
volunteers rather than professionals and either supported or substituted for government 
activities by "giving" something to the people in a "top-down" approach. They 
regarded their activities as charity and sacrifice, and could be seen to have been 
influenced by religion. During the 1960s however, the NGOs' stated aims began to 
shift towards more definite social and economic goals including social and economic 
change and development and by 1970, there were eleven such NGOs addressing 
development issues.* 11 They did not as yet articulate political concerns but this was to 
come largely as a result of the influence of the student movements.
Since 1933 students have been involved in protest against injustice and the 
abuse of power, albeit limited by authoritarian government controls.12 As we have
the Foundation adapted Yen's approach to make it more suitable for the Thai social context 
fibid.. pp. 22-25). The integrated program relied on the notion that any one problem is not 
isolated from but related to others. In solving the problem in a village, the Foundation 
workers therefore place an emphasize on looking at all the problems to identify the core 
problem.
8 This Foundation is named after the late Komol Keemthong, a graduate from the Faculty of 
Education, Chulalongkom University, who went to be a teacher in Surat Thani, a Southern 
province of Thailand, using his educational ideals to help create social development through 
education. Eventually, he was shot dead by an unknown person.
9 The Catholic Council of Thailand for Development (CCTD) evolved from the Social Welfare 
Committee by the Bishops' Conference of Thailand in order to reorganize and strengthen its 
activities in social development. In 1975, CCTD decentralized its administration into ten 
dioceses or regions throughout the country, acting as diocesan social action centres (DISACs). 
At the present time, CCTD is composed of 10 DISACS and 25 Catholic member 
organizations.
10 See further information in P. Freire, The Politics of Education: Culture Power and Liberation, 
transl. D. Macedo, Massachusetts: Bergin & Garvey Publishers Inc., 1985, Ch. 7.
11 Noriko Sakamoto, "Grass-roots Movement towards Social Development through 
Strengthening the Roles and Activities of Non-Government Organizations Working on the 
Promotion of Development in Thailand", paper presented at the International Conference on 
Thai Studies, ANU, 3-6 July 1987, p. 6.
12 Prizzia and Narong, op. cit.. pp. 16-44; Chaichana Ingavata, "Students as an Agent of Social 
Change: A Case of the Thai Student Movement during the Years 1973-1976: A Critical 
Political Analysis", Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Government-Comparative Politics, 
Florida State University, 1981, pp. 63-82.
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seen, during the 1970s Thai studies began to be influenced by a political economy 
approach which analysed structural links between developed and developing countries 
as well as within countries to explain the political and economic conditions, especially 
from the Bowring Treaty in 1855 to the present. Students began to use these ideas to 
rethink the causes of underdevelopment in Thailand. At the same time, books, roneo 
papers and leaflets were secretly distributed among university students; groups, clubs 
and organizations set up both inside and outside universities to analyse government 
policies and the political system, to criticize and propose alternatives for the country, 
such as a self-sufficient economy and political "non-alignment". These underground 
social and political activities had emerged gradually during the Sarit period when 
"blanket" arrests of students, MPs and others involved in political activities were 
common (between October 1958 and June 1963), and became more open after Sarit's 
death in 1963.13
In the early 1970s several independent groups with about 20-50 members were 
organized, both on and off campus, with a view to formulating ideas and methods of 
appropriate social, political and economic development. These independent groups 
included "Sapha Kafae" of Kasetsat University; "Sapha Na Dome" and "Setthatham" of 
Thammasat University; "Khum Phra Chan Sieo" [the Eclipsed Moon Group] of 
Silapakom University; "New SOTUS" and a Political Studies Group of Chulalongkom 
University; and the "Khum Nisit Naksueksa Burana Chonnabot" [the Student Group 
for Rural Reconstruction ] in which some students from different universities came 
together off campus, studying and discussing problems both inside and outside 
universities.14
Following the 14 October 1973 incident, there was a upsurge of NGO activity 
and consolidation of their aims, objectives and methods into a more coherent and united
13 For example the book Nitisat 2500. [in Thai] published by the Law Club of Thammasat 
University in 1957 was redistributed. It contained articles like "The Real Face of the Thai 
Sakdina", "The Face of Imperialism" written by Somsamai Srisudravama (Chit Poumisak); 
and "The Survival Path for Thailand" written by Pueang Wannasri who later joined the CPT. 
See also th journal Sangkhomsat Paritat [The Social Science Review] during 1963-1973, 
which was encouraged by Sulak Sivarak, a Thai social critic, and Suchat Sawasdhisri, an 
editor. Further details are contained in the interview with Suchat Sawasdhisri in the tape 
recordings collection of the Thai Studies Programme, Chulalongkom University, 1984.
14 Student groups produced social activists such as Suphap Pas-ong from "Sapha Kafae" ("coffee 
council" meeting group) of Kasetsat University, Seksan Prasoetkul from "Sapha Na Dome" 
(Council o f the Dome-shaped Building) of Thammasat University. SOTUS stands for 
"Seniority, Order, Tradition, Unity and Spirit", which is the motto of Chulalongkom  
University. The "New SOTUS" group emerged to reform the SOTUS in the University. The 
last group, the Student Group for Rural Reconstruction, played a very active role when social 
activities in the universities were prohibited. Using the Student Christian Centre (SCC) as a 
base for meeting and other activities, this group acted as a "thinktank" for student activists in 
different universities.
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strategy. Some ninety NGOs were founded by the mid 1980s.15 This chapter will look 
more closely at the NGOs from 1973 to the present. To do this it will be necessary to 
look at a number of issues: first, the definition or characteristics of NGOs promoting 
development and social and political change and their aims in the Thai development 
context; second, the Thai NGO movement after the 1973 uprising and their role in 
development; third, the discussion of concepts and methodologies which they use to 
tackle the structural problems of underdevelopment.
Definition of an "NGO"
The Vice President of the Asian Development Bank, in his keynote speech at the 
World NGO symposium in 1987, defined NGOs as:
(all) characterized by being organized on a private and non-profit basis obtaining their 
resources, by and large, from voluntary private contribution and providing socio-economic 
assistance - material, financial and technical - especially targeted towards the poor, 
underprivileged and disadvantaged groups in society and at the community level within the 
broader framework of national development goals. ^
This is similar to the definition chosen by Lissner (who elected to use the term 
"voluntary agency" rather than NGO in his study):
a "voluntary agency" is a non-governmental, autonomous, non-profit organization, supported 
mainly by voluntary contribution in cash and kind from the general public, or certain elements 
thereof, in high-income countries, specialized to carry out a number of functions related to 
development aid and emergency relief primarily but not exclusively in the low-income
countries. *7
In coming to these definitions, Lissner in particular points to the difficulties in 
defining NGOs due to their diversity in organization, mode and fields of operation. 
NGOs include organizations involved in activities such as welfare, refugee services, 
disaster relief, agricultural development, health services, community education, research 
and networking. At the same, time there are considerable differences in the way they 
approach their tasks, some operating on the basis of charity, others involving people in
15 Sakamoto, op. cit.. p. 6.
16 M. Narasimham, "Keynote Speech" in World NGO Symposium: Nagova Congress, Nagoya 
International Centre, 5-8 October 1987, p. 1. As for the term "non-government organization", 
Kuhn argues that he likes to describe an organization with an affirmative word like "voluntary 
agency" rather than with negative term like "non-government organization" [H. Kuhn, 
"Development Education and What are Effective Approaches to Motivate People's 
Participation", in World NGO Symposium: Nagova Congress, p. 9]. Lissner prefers as he 
says this term is well established and widely used in American, Canadian and British 
governmental language.
17 J. Lissner, The Politics of Altruism: A Study of the Political Behaviour of Voluntary 
Development Agencies. Geneva: Department of Studies, 1979, p. 23. He defines the 
"voluntary agency" in similar context to Narasimham as giving social welfare to the poor but 
more independent from the government sector and with wider links to other foreign NGOs.
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the programs and projects prepared for them in accordance with the NGOs view of 
development, while still others operate from a basis of the self-expressed needs of the 
people they are helping.
Compared with the above definitions, research done by the Canadian voluntary 
organizations based on the NGOs' own perceptions of their roles and characteristics, 
shows that NGOs generally see their role not only as separate from the government and 
private sectors but also co-operating with them as partners in national development 
while at the same time working essentially in the interest of the common people. The 
NGOs described themselves in terms of five characteristics as follows:
Altruism: "NGOs respond to local needs rather than imposing their own solutions"
Autonomy: "NGOs can reach needy groups which are not accessible through official channels."
Participation: "NGOs aim to increase ... [people's] awareness of development issues, by
providing factual information on the basis of which people can form their own opinions."
Efficiency: "NGOs are cost-effective, and can achieve results at much less cost than official aid
agencies."
Co-operation: "NGOs break patterns of dependency by helping people to help themselves."^
Of the definitions given, the first includes a role for NGOs in helping the 
government to achieve development on the basis of providing "assistance" to the people 
and reflects a social-welfare approach. The second is not concerned with methods but 
only the nature of the organization and its objectives while the view that NGOs have of 
themselves is very specific on the question of method, i.e. participation of the people in 
their own development.
The above definitions and characteristics are of course intended to distinguish 
NGOs in rich countries, i.e. those organizations whose activities are directed externally 
to Third World countries, nevertheless they can be applied in the Thai context to 
distinguish a similar group of organizations with a similar diversity of operations. 
However there is a fundamental difference which I wish to explore in this thesis and 
that is that in the Thai context, the organizations are largely indigenous and working 
within the the national context (rather than providing external assistance). Therefore, 
Thai NGOs are more immersed in the social and political life of the country and are 
active participants in that life - not external to it. While there are, as we have seen in the 
previous section, some welfare type organizations, I wish to focus my attention on the 
emergence of the indigenous Thai organizations which emphasize participation of the
18 T. Brodhead, B. Herbert-Copley and A. Lambert, Bridges of Hope?: Canadian Voluntary 
Agencies and the Third World. Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1988, pp. 29-30.
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target groups in their own development. This is the special relationship between the 
NGO and the people which is advocated by the Canadian study, but which is not 
usually possible for the donor NGOs from the rich countries.
The broad aims of all the Thai groups is to see Thai society adopt a more 
representative system and provide greater happiness, moral standards and justice than is 
evident at the present time. Their target is the common people, disadvantaged groups of 
the poor in rural and urban areas, such as landless peasants and unorganized workers. 
Their method is to empower the common people so that they would be able to gain self- 
confidence to solve their own problems and, moreover, develop the society in ways to 
serve their own interests. These Thai NGOs also play an important role in bridging the 
gap between classes in the society by widely disseminating information relating to 
disadvantaged groups to other groups, especially to the well-off middle class, to help 
them understand the problems of the poor on the basis of respect for the rights of 
others, and to find ways of reducing the gap between the rich and the poor in society by 
enabling the poor to participate in developing Thai society.
The Thai NGOs prefer characterizing their movement as representative 
democracy, but not binding themselves to any particular political ideology and 
encouraging people to exercise free will in selecting their own political choices.19 NGO 
workers broadly believe that human betterment would be achieved when people in all 
areas become involved, for instance, in exchanging information, opinions and 
experiences, and co-operating to search for an "alternative development" addressing not 
only the purely economic dimensions of development, but also the socio-political and 
cultural dimension, and focusing on remedying the problems of the common people. 
This democratic approach, they hope, would help people improve and develop their 
own self-consciousness and self-reliance, as well as produce political and legal reform 
appropriate to their interest. On the other hand they believe a more narrow political 
approach would mobilize the people only in relation to a specific political purpose for a 
short period of time.
In the following pages therefore, the NGOs under study are non-governmental, 
autonomous, non-profit organizations whose assistance is targeted towards the common 
people, and who conduct their activities through the participation of people, not just 
through "giving".211 To a large extent, as we shall see, this includes relatively informal
19 Jon Ungphakom, "Khabuankan ongkan patthana ekachon nai prathetthai" [The Movement of 
the Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) in Thailand], Pacharavasan, [in Thai], Vol.13, 
No. 5, November-December B.E. 2529 (1986), p. 15.
20 By the word "giving", I mean to give not only material resources - money, technical resources 
- but also ideas or ready-made solutions as forms of domination of the people. In this case, the
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groups which have been involved in experimentation with participation in the Thai 
context throughout the 1970s as well as the more formal organizations which have 
emerged from these (often very political) activities.
The Thai NGO movement after 1973
The October 1973 uprising had a great impact on the Thai NGO movement. For 
example, in 1974, through the support of the interim civilian government under Prime 
Minister Sanya Thammasak, groups of students (about 3,500 students) and scholars 
went out to discover the problems of the common people in rural and urban areas. The 
Government supported the student activities with a budget of three million baht as part 
of a "Propagation of Democracy Programme". Some students, however, brought with 
them an analysis of the causes of underdevelopment problems born out of their 
experience of military oppression during the events of 1973 and their involvement in 
mobilizations and demonstrations against the "influence groups" [klum itthiphon] in 
rural areas.21 At the same time the concept of development in terms of social welfare 
and service approaches were intensively reviewed and factors that created the 
dependency of the people identified.22 Most of these activities relied on "trial and error" 
in the people participation approach in the area of development.
In the rural areas there were two general approaches: socio-economic 
programmes and political mobilization. Socio-economic oriented groups aimed to 
increase villagers’ income and productivity through organization of the people in forms 
of co-operatives or farmers' organizations, while political-oriented groups considered 
that the reasons why the poor stayed poor was because they were exploited, they 
therefore concentrated on political mobilization and on the development of people's
NGO workers regard the people as followers to achieve the determined projects, not as the 
owners of the projects to serve their own interests.
Before the 1973 incidents, some students went as volunteers to the countryside to help analyse 
the problems being faced by the farmers. See further information in Morell and Chai-nan, qjl. 
cit.. pp. 153-154; and Turton, Production. Power and Participation, pp. 36-37. The "influence 
groups” are referred to the groups whose exclusive circles of socialization dominate other 
groups in terms of decision-making, and the encouragement of other groups to follow the rule 
made by the dominating groups [See details in A. Turton, "Limits of Ideological Domination 
and the Formation of Social Consciousness", in Turton and Tanabe (eds.), History and Peasant 
Consciousness in South East Asia, p. 31].
Phumtham Wechayachai, "Ongkan pattana ekachon: adit, patchubun, anakhot: raw cha pai 
thang nai kan" [The Non-Government Organizations: Past, Present, Future: Which way to 
go?], Pacharavasan. [in Thai], Vol. 13, No. 5, November-December B.E. 2529 (1986), p. 22; 
and Phra Phisal Wisalo, "Ngan patthana ekachon thai chak 14 tulakhom 2516 thueng 6 
tulakhom 2519" [Thai Non-Government Work: From 14 October 1973 to 6 October 1976], 
Patthana Sangkhom [Social Development], [in Thai], Bangkok: NGO Dissemination Week 
Committee, November B.E. 2527 (1984), p. 13.
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consciousness at the same time as they undertook the more conventional economic 
project activities.2^
In addition there grew up in the 1973-76 period a great deal of activity in terms 
of protest and demonstration on a wide range of issues such as wages, unemployment, 
the constitution, land, produce prices, rural debt, corruption and the abuse of power. 
To a large degree these protests and demonstrations were influenced by the involvement 
of students and the NGOs, especially in the rural areas. Some were moderate in their 
approach and saw the possibility for reform; others were (or became) more radical in the 
face of violent repression by the authorities and were moved to advocate violent means 
to achieve better conditions for the workers and farmers. The CPT, which had 
overlooked the urban uprising and was caught napping during the 1973 uprising, then 
became an attractive proposition for many of the more radical elements and indeed was 
later able to lead the "violent" approach.
Examples of groups which took the socio-economic approach were the Co­
operative Village Development Project in Mae Taman village (Git Chang Sub-District, 
Mae Taeng District, Chiang Mai Province) run by a youth group with the co-operation 
of the Komol Keemthong Foundation (between 1974 and 1976): the Mae Klong Rural 
Development Project (between 1974 and 1976); the Health Care Projects of Dr. Wichai 
Chokwiwat (between 1973-1976) in Phayakkhaphum Phisai District, Maha Sarakham 
Province and of Dr. Apichet Naklekha (between 1974 and 1975) in Phrao District, 
Chiang Mai. These activities were conducted as small integrated projects involving 
health care, agriculture and education projects, integrated into one programme.
Examples of political-oriented groups were Somkhit Singsong's rural 
development work (with his friend, Prasoet Chundum) in Sap Daeng, Mancha Khiri 
District, Khon Kaen Province (between 1973 and 1976). Their idea was to encourage 
organized groups of people to achieve a "self-reliant" development not only through an 
increase in productivity but also by the mobilization of people's political consciousness 
to fight against the abuse of power by local authorities through "influence groups" in 
rural areas.24 In addition, the Peasant Federation of Thailand (PFT) was founded in
One may see socio-economic and political activities are inseparable. But in the case of Thai 
NGOs, the socio-economic oriented groups tried to limit their activities not to be concerned 
with politics. This could happen too in other places where some NGOs avoided facing a 
political conflict with the state. However, for the difference between co-operatives organized 
by the NGOs and co-operatives organized by the kings (under the Absolute Monarchy) as well 
as by the government. See Prudhisan, "Interest and Pressure Groups", in Somsakdi Xuto (ed.), 
op. cit.. (1987), pp.123-132.
Somkhit Singsong was bom in Sap Daeng Village. He discontinued his course at the Faculty 
of Mass Communications, Thammasat University following the 14 October 1973 uprising, 
and went back to develop his home village. He had no formal linkage to any institution. At
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1974 to protect peasant interests, to examine all forms of hardship and to inform the 
peasants of their rights under the law, especially the Agricultural Land Rent Control Act 
and the Agricultural Land Reform Act of 1974.
While these were clearly NGO type activities, they were not all formally 
established NGOs in terms of the definitions above, but rather small groups of 
individuals who came together in a common cause and went together to the countryside 
and set up a development operations in contact with the common people. In a sense 
they represented an organization (or NGO) only in the context of the actual projects or 
programmes they were involved in. This early stage of NGO development was 
basically experimental in nature, many had a short life of two or three years as 
indicated, due in particular to the political turmoil of the 1976 coup.
The groups which began operating in urban areas targeted workers and slum 
dwellers through education and group organizing. These programmes focused on 
increasing the literacy of slum dwellers and workers. Examples of educational groups 
were the Community School of Khru Prathip Ungsongtham, in Klongtoei slum, 
Bangkok,25 and the voluntary group from the Student Group for Rural Reconstruction 
which helped teach the workers in Prapadaeng site (Samut Prakhan Province) how to 
read and write. Another group was the legal training group of Suphap Pas-ong helping 
organize worker groups at the Omnoi industrial site, Samut Sakhon Province, so that 
they would be able to protect their rights.26 Seeing that most of the people had migrated 
from rural areas and were having difficulties adjusting to an urban setting, other groups 
organized training to help the people to be able to maintain their own cultural virtue of 
helping one another as occurred in the traditional community. As in the rural areas, 
these urban groups were often autonomous, experimental in nature and short-lived.
At the same time organizations were formed to protect the rights and freedom of 
workers and people in general. For example, an interest group like the Federation of
the present time, he believes that national development processes should include the 
government and private sectors as well as the communities [Phumtham, "Self-Reliance in Thai 
Society", p. 66].
Prathip Ungsongtham was born in Klongtoei slum, Bangkok. Around 1973, she started a 
project called "Rongrian wanlabaht" [one baht per day school] to teach slum children how to 
read and write. In 1978, she received the Magsaysay Award for Public Service for her 
initiatives and development service in the slum and then founded the Duang Prathip 
Foundation to conduct further social development activities for the slum community.
Suphap Pas-ong, an active member of "Sapha Kafae", graduated from Kasetsat University. 
While working as a news reporter, he assisted workers by giving legal advice. On 30 March 
1976, he was arrested with five colleagues on the charge of involvement in communist 
activities. See further details in the Co-ordinating Group for Religion in Society (CGRS), 
Khammakhon omnoi lae panha sitthi manutsavachon [The Omnoi Workers and Problems of 
Human Rights], [in Thai], Bangkok: Ammarin Kanphim, B.E. 2521 (1978).
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Labour Unions of Thailand (FLUT) was founded in early 1976, representing the 
majority of workers at that time in negotiating the minimum wage and other social 
welfare issues.27 Other pressure group attempting to protect the rights and freedom of 
people in general were, for instance, the Union for Civil Liberty (UCL) founded by a 
group of [upper] middle-class intellectuals (Saneh Chamarik, Gothom Arya and 
Prudhisan Jumbala and others),28 and the People for Democracy Group (PDG), led by 
Thirayut Bunmi, the former President of the National Student Centre of Thailand 
(NSCT). While FLUT is more correctly a trade union rather than an NGO it was 
closely associated with the NGO activities.
NGO activities from 1973 to 1976 were primarily devoted to integrated socio­
economic programmes and political mobilization with the most important characteristic 
being their attempt to develop their work from the bottom-up on "trial and error" basis. 
While many of the NGOs and their workers learned a great deal from their activities, 
and while some achieved a lot in terms of their objectives and received strong 
inspiration and support from the people, many also experienced difficulties and were 
ineffective. However, most were forced to close down in 1976.
The causes for closing down organizations can be brought back to several 
factors. First, most students, some government officials and NGO workers who 
wished to see social development, lacked experience in understanding the nature of 
village and community situations in which they chose to work. While in principle they 
respected the concept of people's participation, in practice many of them made decisions 
and carried out all kinds of activity in ways which represented forms of "domination" 
over the common people who acted as followers. These activities sometimes created 
conflicts rather than solve problems and eventually saw the altruistic NGO workers 
rejected by the people who began to regard them as outsiders. While such 
shortcomings could have been overcome in time, more critical to the future of the NGOs 
was that the authorities began increasingly to see them as agitators and communist 
suspects. Because of this, workers, farmers and student leaders and others began to be 
harassed to the extent that threats were made to their lives. For example, "authorities" 
and the "Right" gangs attempted to assassinate Somkit Singsong, a leader of Muban 
Subdaeng and Dr. Apichet Naklekha's life was threatened because of his Health Care
The other leading labour organization was the Labour Co-ordination Centre of Thailand 
(LCCT), led by Prasit Chaiyo and Thoedphum Chaidi, linking closely with radical elements of 
the National Student Centre of Thailand (NSCT) and the Federation of Independent Students of 
Thailand (FIST). Morell and Chai-anan argue that the LCCT radicals represented about two to 
five per cent of the overall labour movement and the leaders did not believe that the labour 
movement would achieve any effective bargaining power if it continued working solely within 
the framework of labour laws [Morell and Chai-anan, op. c i t . pp. 187-193].
28 The Union for Civil Liberty (UCL), op. cit.. pp. 2-15.
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activities, with the result that he had to flee from the village to save his life. This was 
part of a changing political climate and after the 6 October 1976 coup was staged, most 
political oriented organizations were closed down and only educational and children’s 
organizations which were not directly involved with political movements, could 
continue their activities without harassment from the authorities.
The NGO movement from 1976 to 1979: Re-orientation
The re-orientation of NGO activities was necessary in the climate of political 
polarization from 1976-1979 during the right-wing government of Thanin Kraivixian 
(1976-1977) and the preparation for democracy during the period of Kriangsak 
Chamanand (1977-1980). Under Thanin's government, the political climate was 
repressive. For instance, Article 21 of the National Administrative Reform Council 
(NARC) replicated Sarit's Article 17, giving the Prime Minister wide-ranging powers of 
suppression.29 Moreover, the Anti-communist Act was re-enforced and its power 
expanded by NARC Order No. 22, giving authorities the rights to detain "whoever is 
regarded to be dangerous to society" for up to six months without trial.30 The result 
was that under Thanin's regime:
Thousands were arrested ... Such purges drove some 3,000 students into the hands of the
Communist Party of Thailand, pushed many intellectuals into exile abroad, and silenced most
other liberals."31
Inevitably, most political-oriented NGOs were banned or had their activities 
prohibited. Some students, officials and NGO workers were arrested, while others 
were among those who fled to join the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) in the 
jungle. At the same time the NGOs working in the countryside and in the cities began 
to lose popular support for a number of other reasons. In particular, most common 
people did not understand the overall picture of political antagonism between the Right 
and Left forces which saw the Right (such as "Nawaphon") attempt to use technical 
students, "Red Gaur" [wild buffalos] movement and Village Scouts [luksu'a 
chaoban]32 to harass the (generally) university student led NGOs. Seeing the fighting
The Prime Minister has autonomous power to give a sentence of death to any prisoner whom 
he considers undermined the "security within the kingdom of Thailand". There is no clear-cut 
definition and scope of the "security" and this power could be easily abused.
The Government used the military tribunal, as in war time, to replace the civil courts. Under 
the sentence of the military tribunal, the accused has no rights of appeal to a higher tribunal. 
Up to the present time, the military tribunal is still used for trials involving communist 
suspects.
Prudhisan, op. cit.. p. 51.
They can be categorized as a kind of pseudo-NGO used by the government as an offensive 
against the NGOs which worked for the interest of the people. The "Red Gaur" [Krathing 
daeng] were paramilitary units directly used for repression. They were initially mobilized and
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which sometimes resulted, the common people were reluctant to become involved in 
NGO activities, even in straight forward NGO economic development activities. In 
effect the NGO movement was paralysed.
After overthrowing the Thanin government by coup in 1977, General Kriangsak 
Chomanand neutralized the political climate, allegedly to prepare for political stability 
and democracy.33 However, the common people still received little benefit from 
economic policies and there was little government attention given to the farmers or to 
land reform in particular. The farmers no longer had any organization of their own to 
defend their interests, and solidarity within labour movements had been severely 
weakened through government manipulation, trade union disputes and personal 
rivalries.34 Compared with the period prior to 6 October 1976, when students served 
as a link between farmers and the government and had frequently voiced farmers' 
grievances and some NGO workers and human rights lawyers had helped organize 
worker groups as well as provide legal assistance, contact between students, farmers 
and workers continued to be viewed with suspicion by the government.
Kriangsak did however reduce tension with the communists and broadened his 
political support through overtures to the Centre and the Left, and finally, in 1979, 
granted an amnesty to those involved in the October 1976 coup, both Left and Right 
factions. Students and others who had been arrested and were awaiting military 
tribunals were released in swarms. "The olive branch was also extended to those who
politically used by the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) after the 1973 uprising. 
Their duty was to fight against communist suspects in both towns and villages.
The Village Scouts were loosely-organized groups of the paramilitary type organized by the 
military and officials at the community levels both in villages and in towns. These groups 
were founded in 1971 by the Border Patrol Police and were administered by them in co­
operation with the Ministries of Interior and of Education. They have the slogan: "nation, 
religion, monarchy" [chat, satsana, phramahakasat]. Since 1972 they have been under royal 
patronage and are funded by royal grant, private organizations and local administrative and rural 
development funds. They are supported by of all kinds of government officials, local 
landowners, traders, bankers and politicians; or in a word, the support from "local power 
structure". The number of Village Scouts for the first five years was about 500,000 and then 
in 1976, increasing to be over 1,000,000 in a single year. The Village Scout aims were to 
fight communist insurgency and gather information about people who "intend harm to the 
country". During the 6 October 1976 coup, the Village Scouts were mobilized by the Border 
Patrol Police, to join with the "Red Gaur" units to attack students within and outside 
Thammasat University [Turton, op. c it . pp. 53-54, 56].
In June 1977, a group of colonels, later known as the "Young Turks", pressured Army Chief 
Soem Na Nakhon to overthrow the Thanin government which they argued was leading the 
country towards disaster. See Chai-anan Samudavanija, The Thai Young Turks, Singapore: 
The Institute of South East Asian Studies, 1982, pp. 30-38. The coup group appointed the 
Supreme Commander Gen. Kriangsak Chomanand to be a leader of the new government. For 
further details see Girling, Thailand, pp. 206-228.
34 Girling, Thailand., pp. 221-222.
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had gone to the hills and allied themselves with the CPT..."35 As a consequence of the 
political climate after 1977, the NGO workers needed to rethink their strategies to gain 
popular support and to receive those who came back from the hills. This involved 
much soul-searching and there were new developments in student and NGO movements 
during this period of reconciliation, as NGOs re-oriented their strategy to a non-violent 
approach and continued their pursuit of economic and social development.
The re-orientation was based largely on the work of a few "moderate" NGOs 
which had been able to maintain a role for themselves through the period of turmoil, 
avoiding government suppression and at the same time retaining popular support for 
their activities. These organizations had been largely ignored by the more radical NGOs 
in the period of protest and demonstration, but came to be recognized for the work they 
were doing in economic development and for the approaches they had adopted to solve 
the social problems they had discovered about them. To some extent the period of 
political turmoil had opened their eyes to the real issues and forced them to find more 
appropriate responses.
The NGO movement into the 1980s - the consolidation of NGOs.
In the late 1970s, a variety of NGOs found a common objective in promoting 
local self-help organizations which were representative of the community and the 
country moved into the 1980s, there was a firm basis for the growth and strengthening 
of the NGO movement for a number of reasons.
First, the concept of people's participation had become widely accepted among 
NGOs in Thailand since the ILO launched the concepts of "basic minimum needs" and 
"people participation" in 1969. These approaches had been endorsed by the UN and the 
World Bank and, during the 1970s, there had been significant movements of 
international NGOs and donor agencies engaging in intensive discussion of 
underdevelopment in Third World countries and adopting the ILO strategies in their 
work. These had in turn influenced the Thai NGOs. The impact of the international 
NGOs, and in particular the World Bank influence on Thai development context during 
the late 1970s, encouraged a wide acceptance of the people's participation concept not 
only in non-government circles but also in government sectors. This led to a change in 
direction of development to emphasize more human aspects rather than solely economic 
measure and to a recognition of the important role of non-government agencies.
35 Prudhisan, "Political System", p. 54.
109
Second, the co-operative role of NGOs received wider general acceptance in the 
development context. As we saw in Chapter 2, past development policies of the 
government had created economic and social problems such as the inequitable 
distribution of resources, problems of urbanization and lack of rural development. As 
these problems became more serious, the bureaucratic system was too slow to react and 
the gap between officials and people became more evident despite the fact that the 
concept of people participation was emphasized in the national development Plans. The 
bureaucracy itself began to look to the NGOs as a means of support and co-operation in 
some activities.
Third, the NGOs realized their catalytic role in promoting the people's 
participation concept. They organized meetings, seminars, and discussions to exchange 
ideas, experiences to promote a new direction of people's participation using a structural 
analysis for Thai development organizations, and to persuade NGO colleague not to 
work only in a charity role. For example, in November 1978, NGOs working in slums 
and rural areas held a meeting called "The Charity Agencies and Foundations in 
Development: Problems and Obstacles" involving 33 participants from 20 
organizations. In May 1979, a meeting on "The Role of Charity Agencies and 
Foundations in Social Welfare and Development" attracted 26 participants from 15 
organizations. In April 1980, a meeting on "The Role of the NGO Workers in Solving 
Problems of Rural Development" was held in Chainat Province and was attended by 34 
participants from 19 organizations. In addition, representatives of 19 NGOs held 
regular meetings to consider the directions of NGO co-operation in improving the 
effectiveness of the NGOs in the field of development.36
Fourth, there was in this period strong support available from a variety of 
overseas funding agencies. Over the years of political turmoil and suppression of 
student activities there had developed considerable solidarity with Western NGOs and, 
in the period of redevelopment of the NGOs in Thailand, there was interest from the 
outside agencies which brought some of the ideas and experiences of other countries to 
the attention of the Thai NGOs. At the same time, Western NGOs were beginning to 
receive larger and larger amounts of funding from their governments and were seeking 
new programmes to support.37
36 Phumtham, "Ongkan patthana ekachon: adit, patchubun, anakhot", p. 27.
37 The flow of official aid funds to the NGOs was based on the belief that they were more 
efficient and cost effective in small scale development programmes, and in particular in their 
ability to bring real help to those most in need. The flow of AIDAB money to Australian 
NGOs has grown from less than $A 1 million in 1976-77 to over $ 20 million in 1986-1987 
[Australian International Development A ssistance Bureau (AIDAB), AIDAB/NGO CO: 
operation Program Annual Report [1986/87). Canberra: AIDAB, 1987, p. 11].
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Over the decade the NGO movement has grown in Thailand so that there are 
today some 150 NGOs in Thailand which are involved in participatory development 
activities. They are involved in a range of overlapping activities and it is difficult to 
classify them simply into particular types. Nevertheless, the Thai Volunteer Service 
(TVS) has attempted to group the NGOs according to their areas of involvement such as 
rural and urban development; their target groups, such as children and youth groups; 
their activity, such as public health service, appropriate technology, networking and 
promotion; and following concepts, such as human rights.38 Here I will simply 
summarize the NGOs into three categories: those involved in rural community 
development activities, urban community development activities and networking and 
promotion.
Consistent with the fact that the major problems of underdevelopment in 
Thailand are in the countryside, TVS reported that there were 103 NGOs active in rural 
community development. Apart from the NGOs previously mentioned, there were, for 
instance, the Thai NGO Committee on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, the 
Appropriate Technology Association (ATA), Primary Health Care Groups (very active 
in Korat and in Khon Kaen), the Northeast Human Rights Group of the UCL, and the 
Towards Self-Reliance in Northeast Thailand Project (NET).39
About thirty NGOs were active in urban community development for the urban 
poor (slum dwellers and workers) and urban middle class. For the poor, NGO 
activities were directed towards finding ways to encourage self-development in their 
own community and helping rural migrants to adjust to life in the big cities. With the 
middle class, NGO activities were designed to encourage an awareness of the plight of 
the poor and to gain their support. The NGOs involved included the Union for Civil 
Liberty (UCL), the Foundation for Slum Child Care, the Foundation for Children 
Development, and the Health Development Foundation.
Another group of about ten NGOs provided co-ordination and promotion 
activities among NGOs both in rural and urban areas. These were the "nurse maids" of 
the small participatory NGOs in Thailand and provide all sorts of assistance. Their 
activities included the dissemination of information about funding agencies, networks 
both inside and outside the country, personnel resources, and the promotion of co­
operation among NGOs. Examples of this category were the Thai Volunteer Service
Thai Volunteer Service (TVS), The Directory of Thai Non-Government Organizations. 
Bangkok: Samakkhisan Co. Ltd., B.E. 2529 (1986).
The NET Project, supported by the Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO) and 
Canadian International Development Agencies (CIDA), is helping reconstruct the Northeast 
villages severely disrupted by natural disaster and by war along Thai-Kampuchean border.
39
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(TVS), the Thai Development Support Committee (TDSC), and the Rural Development 
Documentation Centre (RUDOC). On a more casual basis one could include 
"committees" which worked to exchange ideas and to bring together NGOs working in 
the same areas such as the NET Project; co-operation with fieldwork such as occured 
with the Northeast Development Worker Group; the Working Committee for Children, 
and the Co-ordinating Committee of Human Rights Organizations in Thailand 
(CCHROT).
The catalytic role of NGOs: a concerned party and a countervailing 
power.
In creating development "from the bottom up", the NGOs work closely and 
widely with the common people and concerned academics to develop their 
understanding of situations and to consider appropriate responses. To counteract the 
often inhumane results of official programmes emphasizing macro-level industrialized 
development, the NGOs insist on the need for self-reliant development and a people 
participation approach. Together with some academics, their activities include reviews, 
publications, commentaries, and discussions covering, for instance, the works of 
Phraya Suriyanuwat, the Economic Draft of Pridi Phanomyong and many practical 
NGO reports. They address in particular the economic, social and political problems of 
the poor such as the low price for paddy and uncertain prices for other cash crops, the 
condition of slums dwellers, the exploitation of child labour and child prostitution as 
well as the political and legal disadvantages suffered by the poor. The ultimate aims of 
the NGOs are not only to combat suffering but also to raise peoples' consciousness and 
to propose political and legal reform through social-welfare and structural-analysis 
approaches. Their activities include the distribution of goods and income to the poor, 
assistance in the control of productivity, and help for the people to gain power to 
determine their own destiny.
From their practical grass roots awareness of the predicaments and development 
needs of the common people, the NGOs are well placed to play an important 
representational role on behalf of the poor. This they do on three main fronts which I 
will consider below: first, they publicize the grievances of the poor, second, they lobby 
government to review development policies and to reduce dependency on the West; and 
thirdly, they urge the government to guarantee participation for all in a law-based 
society.
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1. Publicizing the predicament and grievances of the poor.
The NGOs' aim of publicizing the predicament and grievances of the poor is 
mainly to make the urban middle class understand and realize the problems of the 
common people so that they will urge the government to adequately address the 
problems. There are many reports and studies produced by academics and NGO 
workers which reveal the extent of social problems.
For example, Sayamol Kraiyurawong, a Thai NGO worker with the Union for 
Civil Liberty (UCL) and Jenny Marshall, a former British volunteer working with the 
Thai Development Supporting Committee (TDSC) staff, reported the problems of land 
ownership in the Northern part of Thailand.40 Sayamol shows that according to Sarit's 
Revolution Decree No. 49 dated 1 January 1954, people who possessed over 50 rai of 
land had to release land to the government and investors. The reasons for the transfer 
of land was to implement infrastructure development such as roads and dams to fuel 
economic growth as proposed in the national economic plan.41 Since the First Plan 
(1961-1966), the government had begun surveying and granting land titles. Out of a 
total cultivated area of 152 million rai, only 23.7 million had full title deeds, another 
70.9 million had certificates of utilization, and the rest was unregistered. This poor 
achievement had resulted from limited experience in land registration as well as pressure 
from interest groups. At the same time, with fourteen government agencies involved in 
one way or another with land allocation reform, Marshall said that it was not surprising 
that farmers had found the rules and regulations confusing and had not been encouraged 
to complete their land registration42
Inaction had led to other problems. Chak Patcharaphatanachai of Community 
Action Research on Development (CARD) noted that in the North, as in other places, 
there had been an increase in land speculation both by large companies and wealthy 
individuals who bought land when farmers were under threat of eviction. The rich 
exploited the predicament of the poor to get lands at a cheap price when the farmers 
desperately needed instant cash. As a result, farmers often had to move off their land
J. Marshall, "Shelter under Pressure: A View from the North", Thai Development Newsletter. 
No. 13, 1987, pp. 20-23; and Sayamol Kraiyurawong, "Land Problems in the Highlands in the 
Far North", UCL Newsletter. July-September 1987, pp. 16-19.
Sayamol says that the Decree was dated in 1959. Sayamol, op. cit., p. 17.
Marshall, op.cit.. p. 21. Moreover, The World Bank had noted this problem as early as 1978 
and observed that the Agricultural Land Reform Office (ALRO), which was responsible for 
land development for agricultural use, had no previous experience with broad programmes to 
plan the use of land, develop technical packages for sustained cultivation, provide infrastructure 
and supporting services as well as surveying and registering [The World Bank, Toward. A  
Development Strategy, p. 92],
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receiving only a small amount of compensation.43 There was also the "invasion" by 
villagers into national forest reserves to grow food crops because the rich had taken 
their traditional land through loopholes in legal interpretation, and abuse of power by 
the authorities.44
As for community development activities in the slums, Pitthaya Vongkule, a 
TDSC staff member, and Somchai Chuaiklieng, the co-ordinator of the Co-ordinating 
Committee on Slum Development, reported on the difficult conditions in Bangkok. For 
instance, the slum dwellers were facing problems including a lack of land ownership, a 
difficult economic situation, poor health care, insufficient education, drug abuse and the 
threat of eviction 45 Yuli Ismartono, in the UNICEF News Quarterly, argued that "[I]n 
Bangkok’s slums, it is not the absence of health facilities, medicines or even food that 
causes sickness and malnutrition. It is a combination of poverty and poor 
understanding" 46
In the industrial arena, Songsak Bunkawinapanon, Karawik Marmichai, 
Somyot Prueksakasemsuk, Phichet Phichairat, and Chalit Misit, all UCL staff 
members, reported regularly on the problems faced by workers and covered issues such 
as unemployment, the effect of the minimum wage, lay-offs and legal loopholes 
affecting workers' legal cases.47
There has been a great deal of experience gained from these approaches and 
articles such as those of Bamrung Bunpanya and Aphichat Thongyu present the
Marshall, "Shelter under Pressure", p. 22.
Banlue Kongchan, "Panha kophiphat ru'ang sitthi phonprayot nai khet pa sa-nguanhaengchat 
kap naewthang kaekhaipanha lae kanhaikhwamchuailue prachachon phuprasop khwamdu'atron" 
[Problems of Disputes Concerning Rights and Interest in National Reserved Forest and the 
Direction to Solve Problems and the Help for Suffering People], in Raingan kanwichai; 
Kanhai khwamchuailu’a prachachon thang kotmai kap ngansongsoem sitthi manutsavachon nai 
prathetthai [Report of the Seminar on Legal Assistance for People and the Promotion of 
Human Rights in Thailand], [in Thai], Bangkok: the Law Centre, Thammasat University, B.E. 
2529 (1986), p .ll.
Pitthaya Vongkule, "Face-Lifting of the Slums", Thai Development Newsletter. No. 13, 
1987, pp. 26-29; Somchai Chuaiklieng, "Background of the Bangkok Slums", ibid., pp. 6-9; 
and Jamnong Jitniratana, "Violence in Slum Eviction", ibid., pp. 12-15.
Quoted from ibid , p. 19.
Songsak Bunkawinaphanon, "Thailand's Labour Problems", Thai Development Newsletter. 
No. 12, 1986, pp. 35-6; Karawik Marmichai, "The State of Human Rights in Thailand", UCL 
Newsletter. July-December 1986, pp. 24-9; Somyot Pru’ksakasemsuk, "Labour Problem in 
Thailand 1987", UCL Newsletter. January-June 1987, pp. 14-20; Wichet Phichairat, "Panha 
raengngan kap botbat kanhai khwamchuailu'a thang kotmai khong rat lae ekachon" [Labour 
Problems and the Role of Government and Private Organizations in Legal Assistance], in 
Raingan kanwichai: Kanhai khwamchuailu'a. pp.166-175; and Chalit Misit, "Kotmai 
raengngan kap kankhumkhrong sitthi khong phuchai raengngan" [The Labour Law and the 
Protection of the Workers’ Rights],in ibid., pp. 146-65.
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experiences of NGO workers in approaching the people to participate in development.48 
Bamrung reflected that the people's ways of thinking differ from Western-educated 
town people and concludes that the villagers have their own norms and autonomous 
society. Apichat analysed past village and community activities which used the people's 
participation concept and concludes that:
Development workers have to work hard and seriously in order to make their analysis 
conclusion [sic] more effective, practicable, and responsive to further actions of development 
within the village for the better [sic] by people’s co-operative effort and full participation.
and that:
From analysis conclusion [sic], development workers will understand in detail the village 
structure, functional relations among people and the valuable socio-cultural values existing 
there. Such understanding will be useful to be presented to the people for mutual learning and 
planning their development strategies for the community.49
2. Encouraging the government to review development directions 
and implementation to reduce dependence upon the West.
Many concerned academics and NGO workers have analysed government plans 
and attitudes as well as the bureaucratic system and as a result urged the government to 
reassess its plans in terms of self-reliant development. For example, Rangsan 
Thanaponpan of Thammasat University claims that the Thai government has made a 
mistake in opening its economy too widely to the outside world in attempting to follow 
the path of the industrializing "Gang of Four" - Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore - at an inappropriate period in Thai history. This mistake, he argued, has 
been exacerbated by a neglect of the agricultural sector.50
From an NGO perspective, the relative failure of government economic 
development to reach the Thai farmers is emphasized by the low selling price of 
agricultural products combined with a high cost of investment which has forced them 
into debt, to lose their lands and to migrate into towns where they fall into illegal 
employment relations and are exploited as cheap labour. Most Thai NGOs consider that 
a major cause of this lies in the fact that farmers depend on external facilities outside 
their control, in particular on modem technology with its emphasis on commercial 
profits which are guided by the government's plans.
Bamrung Bunpanya, "Two Ways of Thinking", in Seri Phongphit (ed.), Back to the Roots, 
pp. 89-99; and Apichat Thongyu, "Village: Autonomous Society", in ibid., pp. 45-88.
Apichat, op. cit.. p. 69.
Reported by Larry Lohmann, a Thai Volunteer Service staff member, in "Alternative Thai 
Ways to National Development", Thai Development Newsletter. No. 12, December, 1986, p. 
12.
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Decha Siriphat a senior NGO worker, criticizes the development plans and 
attitudes of officials towards development.51 He says that the Master Plan for Solutions 
to Poverty Problems, consisting of four principal projects: 1) the Rural Employment 
Creation Project, 2) the Village Activities Promotion Project, 3) the Basic Service 
Provision Project and 4) the Production Project, which were implemented in 1986, and 
that these did not lead to improve living conditions for the farmers. On the contrary, he 
found that the farmers have been getting more into debt than ever before, to the extent 
that it is becoming a major economic and social crisis. This crisis has not yet been taken 
into consideration by the government.52
Government officials appear to work under the unofficial assumption, widely 
held among officials responsible for the elimination of rural poverty, namely that all the 
problems come from the farmers themselves who, they assume, lack skills in 
production, planning and marketing, in addition to being lazy and having bad habits 
such as drinking and gambling. Decha argues that many government projects which 
aim to eradicate rural poverty reflect this "shallow opinion" of officials which induces 
them to think of training courses and campaign activities that would lead people out of 
bad habits. Some examples are the "Land of Dhamma, the Land of Prosperity" 
Projects, set up to encourage people to make a prosperous living by following religious 
principles in their lives; and the Family, Temple and School Project, set up to urge these 
three institutions to join hands in getting rid of the so-called bad habits among 
villagers.52
NGOs claim that the failure of economic development has been caused by 
inefficient management by the government both in terms of the production process and 
the discontinuous marketing strategy. To tackle these, the government has proposed in 
the Sixth Plan (1987-1991) a "complete cycle of agriculture" [Kasetkham khop 
wongchon], designed to integrate both the production and the marketing techniques into
Decha Siriphat, who graduated from the Faculty of Agricultural Science, Kasetsat University, 
worked as a government official in the Agricultural Centre, Chainat province for four years. 
After resigning from government work, he became a farmer for ten years. He has suffered a 
great loss from being a farmer in the "complete cycle of agriculture" introduced by government 
officials because the benefit is mostly gained by middlemen. He now works as a technical 
adviser with the NGO, "Appropriate Technology Association (ATA)" [Decha Siriphat, "Rural 
Poverty: Blame it on the Farmers", Thai Development Newsletter. No. 15, 1987, p. 9].
Ibid., p. 9.
Ibid., p. 9. Decha argues that the government's figure of farmers' total debt throughout the 
country merely amounts to 20,000 million baht (about $US 740,000) is inaccurate, while the 
figures obtained from reliable academics working closely with farmers confirm that the real 
amount is more likely to be some 100,000 million baht (about $US 3,700,000).
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the same system (an agro-business approach).54 The principle of this system is that the 
government will support and promote the private sector to take up the role of managing 
the production process and production facilities as well as marketing the products.55 
The NGOs argue that an example of the "complete cycle of agriculture" can be seen in 
the case of Charoen Phokapan Company (CPC) an agro-business company in 
Kanchanaburi province. In this cycle, the CPC acts as a manager; the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operatives (BAAC) becomes a financial resource; the 
Department of Royal Irrigation operates the water supply; while the farmers are land 
owners, labourers in the production process, and debtors of the Bank (with Company 
help to guarantee financial loans).
The complete cycle, from the government's point of view, is conducted as 
follows. The Company, as a marketing manager, takes a loan from the Bank in order to 
support farmers in raising rice productivity or to pay for production facilities such as 
machines, fertilizer, insecticide and seeds. The Company is urged (by the government) 
to play an important role because most farmers themselves do not have the security to 
take a loan from the Bank. Eventually, farmers gain their income from selling rice to 
the Company after the deduction of the cost of the Company's inputs and Bank interest. 
In fact, the real income which the farmer gains is small and in this system, the NGOs 
argue, the Company and the Bank make the major profits and the farmers are exploited, 
being only the debtors and labourers.56
Taking the case of Wibun Khemchaloem of Huay Hin Village, Chachoengsao 
province as an example, the "reward" gained from his hard work of producing and 
selling produce in the "complete cycle of agriculture" according to the government's 
policies, was a 300,000 baht debt (about $US 12,000). Most farmers have got into 
debt in this way because they have to borrow money from the money lenders or the 
banks to buy fertilizers or hire tractors, or to utilize other technical facilities to raise 
productivity. However, the farmers get less than they invest due to the low price for 
paddy and uncertain prices for other cash crops. Wibun's problem is a case in point. 
He has, therefore, turned away from producing for the market, as had been promoted 
by officials, towards production for consumption through a "self-reliance" 
development. The term "self-reliance" for him does not mean doing everything by 
himself, but rather it means trying to reduce dependence on unnecessary external input 
as much as possible.
Thai Development Support Committee (TDSC), "Alternatives to Farmers' Problems: from the 
NGO's Perspective" Hbid.. p. 15].
Ibid., pp. 15-16.
Ibid., p. 16. See further information in Suehiro, op. c i t . pp. 265-272.
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In his book Chiwit Plian or "Changing Life", Wibun makes a sharp criticism of 
the government's agricultural policies:
Talking about the complete cycle of agriculture in practice, I would propose that the issue 
must be discussed by farmers themselves especially on the point of how to operate it. But 
what we have heard now is from the mouths of either academics or merchants or even the 
government So I conclude that whenever somebody is talking about the 'complete cycle' one 
should make an enquiry as to who it is for; i.e., if it is proposed by merchants, it must be 
called the complete cycle of business.5^
and:
It is obvious that these business enterprises made every attempt to push the idea for the Sixth 
National Economic and Social Development Plan commencing in 1987 especially in the areas 
where good irrigation system have already been established. Even more frightening is that the 
idea has been launched for rice farming as well. The farmers are supposed to sell rice to the 
rice mill, being a branch office of the Company. This is not a complete agricultural cycle but 
a complete industrial cycle. ... 5^
Another survey of the integrated farming in terms of self-reliant development 
refers to the methods of Maha Yoo Sunthomthai, a former monk of Surin Province who 
claims to base his method on self-reliant farming which he defines as "producing for 
self-consumption as much as possible and buying as little as possible thereby reducing 
dependence on external factors as much as possible". Maha Yoo criticizes the models 
of rice production in Thailand guided by the government plan at the present time in that, 
if farmers engage in rice farming for marketing, they are forced to do it in a commercial 
way which traps them into large amounts of debt. However, the alternative way of 
production, he argues, is for the farmers to produce rice for their own consumption as 
the first priority and, if there is any left, to sell it themselves; or in short to counteract 
the government plan by using self-reliant development concept.59
In reviewing development implementation by officials, Kanchana and Kanoksak 
claimed that the local people had benefited little from government projects in many 
respects. First, the officials had often not worked as they had said, for instance, when 
they promised to give training activities to the people but they did not come; or when 
they built a rice bam for the people but it was not the right size as promised. Second, 
most projects were determined by the officials and not by the local people's needs and 
emphasized only economic development or welfare projects rather than people-
Wibun Khemchaloem, "A Complete Agricultural Cycle: A System Set for Whom?", Thai 
Development Newsletter. No. 15, 1987, pp. 16-17.
Ibid., p. 17.
TDSC, "The Case Study: Integrated Farming in the Style of Maha Yoo Sunthomthai", Thai 
Development Newsletter. No. 16, 1988/89, pp. 25-29. Maha Yoo encouraged the farmers to 
negotiate their own price and thereby assume control over their own lives.
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participation projects. Third, the officials often lacked approaches to systematic 
evaluation and depended only on the local mechanism such as village leaders 
(Phuyaiban and Kamnan). Fourth, the bureaucratic rules and regulations were 
restrictive and made the local people afraid of joining government activities.60
However, there are a number of academics both Thai and foreign who support, 
by their writing, the possibility of creating a self-reliant economy independent of 
external factors. Girling concludes in his study of small-holder cultivation that it is 
"viable" to preserve the small-holder cultivation from being centralized by capitalism 
and collectivized by the state. He argues that there are three prerequisites. They are 1) 
the development of pluralist institutions; 2) the leadership and organization of the people 
in the cities and villages, in particular, the poor and landless; and 3) the strengthening of 
the political will to carry out agreed-upon programmes against the opposition of vested 
interests.61
3. Encouraging the government to guarantee the participation of
concerned parties by reforms respecting the law-based society.
Although Prime Ministerial Order No. 66/B.E. 2523 (1980) was reputedly 
designed to encourage and develop democracy, a number of old revolutionary orders 
dating from the Sarit regime are still in effect. In particular there are the Revolutionary 
Order of 1952; the Anti-Communist Act; and the Revolutionary Order No. 12 of 1957 
which says that any prosecution for political crimes and offences under the Anti- 
Communist Act must be brought into a military court under the administration of the 
Defence Ministry (not the Justice Ministry). These old revolutionary decrees are 
directly contradictory to the Prime Ministerial Orders and provide the basis for the abuse 
of power by the authorities.
In a regime where the political climate is not favourable for the people's 
participation in the state's affairs, the people are deprived of their political rights, their 
freedom of expression, their rights to information and their rights to development. 
Without the people's rights to information and development, government officials can 
easily slip into corrupt practices by receiving bribes and joining hands with interest 
groups, both local and multi-national, in destroying the environment and natural
Kanchana and Kanoksak Kaeothep, "The Promotion of Economic Activities in Rural Areas 
Through Self-Help Organizations", paper presented at the National Seminar on Self-Reliant 
Development organized by the CCTD, Sawangkaniwat, Samut Prakan Province, 3-4 March 
B.E. 2529 (1986), pp. 47-49.
J.L.S. Girling, "Is Small-Holder Cultivation Viable? A Question of Political Economy with 
Reference to Thailand", Pacific Affairs. Vol. 59, No. 2, Summer 1986, pp. 189-213.
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resources.62 In addition, the legal system is prejudiced in favour of the rich against the 
poor.
The human rights NGOs, along with academics and some government (legal) 
sections, play an important role in the legal training programmes of organizations such 
as the UCL, CGRS and the Friends of Women. In legal training processes the NGOs 
try to understand the people's way of thought and inform them about the government 
system.63 In addition, the human rights organizations try to co-operate with the "like- 
minded" organizations, both regional and international, in encouraging the government 
to guarantee the people's rights to development by reforming and respecting the law- 
based society -  meaning a society which every citizen performs activity following the 
rules of game.64
NGO concept and methodology: the contribution to a development model 
of structural analysis.
The concepts of self-reliant development and basic minimum needs have now 
been widely accepted by government sectors and most NGOs. Development activities 
emphasize assistance to people's self-help organizations to satisfy basic minimum needs 
through an increase in rural income and productivity, promoting agricultural technology 
and improving marketing skills as well as attending to health and education. This 
direction was already evident in the projects of NGOs such as the Foundation for Rural 
Reconstruction Movement (1968-76) and the Mae Klong Rural Development Project 
(1974-76) but, according to Anake Nakhabutr, an NGO worker who has been involved 
in rural development activities for over ten years, NGOs have only learnt to understand 
self-reliant development (production) methods from rural community leaders in the past 
few years. Previously, they either concentrated on abstract terms and ideas and the 
promotion of ideological awareness through organizing the people. Changes have 
occurred too in that NGOs have more understanding of the integrated farming approach
Karawik Mamichai and Songporn Isrowuthakul, "Human Rights and Environment", UCL 
Newsletter. July-September 1987, p. 12.
Chatchawal, an NGO worker of the Northern Development Workers' Association, Chieng Mai, 
explains that the villagers do not understand the government's legal system as they have their 
own form of culture and family law which is sometimes at odds with the government system 
[J. Marshall, "Legal Training for Village and Slum Communities", Thai Development 
Newsletter. No. 12, 1986, p. 38].
See details in Anuraj Manibhandu, "A Beacon of Hope for Human Rights", UCL Newsletter, 
October-December 1987, pp. 14-17. This article was also published in Bangkok Post, 2 
October 1987.
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which liberates rural people from the market system and brings them out of 
dependency.65
Anake argues that two factors brought about the changes. Firstly, NGO 
workers have learned from local-village intellectuals such as Wibun Khemchaloem of 
Huay Hin Village in Chachoengsao province, [Maha] Yoo Sunthornthai of Trabaek 
Village in Surin province, and Chalee Marasaeng of Kudsuay-Noanmuang Village in 
Ubon Ratchathani, whose local wisdom led them to find practical solutions for many 
village problems and who provide proof that concrete answers to difficulties can be 
found in the villages by the villagers themselves. Second, the NGOs have constantly 
reviewed their activities and set new roles for themselves throughout the periods of 
political change in Thailand. The Mae Klong project mentioned above was a case where 
an NGO studied rural development through the interdisciplinary studies in co-operation 
with three universities: Kasetsat University (agricultural issues), Mahidol University 
(primary health care) and Thammasat University (social development) to continually 
review its work.66
Although the self-reliant development and basic minimum needs concepts have 
been accepted, problems have always occurred at the stage of implementation (which I 
will discuss further under the methodology section). In the following sections I will go 
beyond these concepts to consider what I believe to be two even more fundamental 
aspects of development - human rights and participation - without which economic 
development alone cannot bring betterment to the common people.
Human rights and people participation concepts
Human rights and people participation are inseparable concepts. To justify the 
use of a human rights concept in development, I begin by asking why the common 
people have so far participated little in the development process and in achieving the 
advancement of their own interests. The answer appears to be found as much in 
people's attitudes and values as in the realities of the legal and political structure which 
have effectively stifled their efforts toward participation.67 I will argue that if in the 
process of development people are to overcome their poverty and apathy, it is
Thai Development Support Committee (TDSC), "Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
Involved in Rural Development", Thai Development Newsletter. No. 15,1987, pp. 26-29.
Puey Ungphakom was the Director of the Project with three Deputy-Directors from the three 
universities.
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and Consumers' Association of Penang (CAP), 
"Conclusions and Recommendations of the Seminar on Human Rights and Development in 
the Rural Areas of Southeast Asia", Rural Development and Human Rights in Southeast Asia. 
Report of a Seminar: CAP, 1981, p. 21.
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necessary, firstly, that they overcome their lack of self-confidence and their feeling of 
being underrated, and become consciousness of their own rights to development. For 
this to happen, there is a need to establish strong independent and self-reliant 
organizations which encourage conscientization and protect the people from the 
authorities' abuse of power, thereby enabling the practice of people's participation to 
take root in society. Secondly, the political structure needs to be improved to facilitate 
people's participation. A representative regime is not only the goal but also the means 
for the people to achieve a better and peaceful society; or in other words, to achieve 
development. Thirdly, the legal structure needs to be amended to provide a guarantee 
that all citizens can participate through the government in setting fair rules of the political 
game to give all people bargaining power and full rights thereby limiting the authorities' 
misuse of power. In Thai society, those three conditions are unlikely to occur easily 
and therefore there are formidable obstacles to the implementation of people's 
participation.
1. The recognition of human rights concept and implementation in 
the Thai development context.
The concept of human rights embraces the principle that human beings have the 
potential for free action and self-development, but for this to occur there must be an 
environment which is conducive to the exercise of that potential. At the same time, as 
citizens of states, people have rights as well as a duty to express themselves and assist 
in making decisions for the benefit of society as a whole.68 The 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights states in Article 2 that:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set out in this Declaration without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other s ta tu s .^
Nonetheless, the concept of human rights is not always fully recognized by 
states. To clarify this statement one should examine a couple of points relating to, first, 
the development of human rights concept; and second, the relationship between 
concepts of human rights and state.
A. Linklater, "Men and Citizens in International Relations", Review of International Studies. 
Vol. 7, 1981, p. 34.
United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Wellington: Department of 
External Affairs, 1951, p. 7. It seems to me that the Declaration of 1948 does not separate 
any kind of belief or political opinion and therefore endorses a fundamental issue of human 
rights much clearer than the two covenants, namely the International Covenant of Political 
Rights and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which separate 
political rights and economic rights from each other. They are, in my opinion, contradictory 
to the Declaration o f 1948. If there is agreement with the argument that political and 
economic rights are inseparable, I think the two UN covenants should be reviewed.
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First, the development of the human rights concept is, in itself, a problem. The 
definition and guarantee of human rights may be approached via the basic disciplines of 
philosophy, law and political science. In terms of philosophy, it is argued that human 
rights is a "natural right" to which a person is entitled from birth. A legal framework is 
then formulated to enforce the natural rights and political forces are organized to protect 
human rights from being violated.70 The term "natural rights" is understood to include 
all those rights enjoyed by individuals to which they are morally entitled, whether or not 
they are accorded such rights by positive legal instruments. Citizens have argued that 
"natural rights" morally entitled them to resist oppression by fighting against the state 
and demanding that the state establish a legal system and political institutions to endorse 
their rights and to preserve their interests. In arguing, thus human rights activists rely 
on philosophy (natural rights), law (legal system) and political science (political 
institutions and/or structures). However, most people recognize human rights only in 
terms of political science and this has meant that the human rights concept has not been 
treated in its full sense.71
Second, there is a conflict between concepts of human rights and the state. 
While the concept of human rights expresses a concern for the self-development of 
individuals, the concept of the state inevitably involves the implementation of 
sovereignty through political institutions (e.g., governmental organizations). In the 
relations between states, the state also enjoys its own "autonomy" (e.g. domestic laws, 
decrees, rules and even regulations) which is "immune from the scrutiny and 
intervention of other states in its internal affairs".72 The concept of state can therefore
For example, the American Declaration of 1776 and the French Declaration of 1789 were 
drawn up to endorse the "natural rights" of the citizens.
H. Bull, "Human Rights and World Politics", in R. Pettman (ed.), Moral Claims in World 
Affairs. Canberra: ANU Press, 1979, pp. 82-85. Human rights is a much more controversial 
issue, in particular, when it is used as a moral claim in the competition between the West and 
the East. This is due to the fact that there is a great gap between the proclaimed standards of 
actual human rights in various parts of the world. There is a tendency in the West to put civil 
and political rights in the first priority, economic and social rights in the second, and 
"collective rights" in the third. (The collective rights means the right to organize to fight for 
the common interest as, for instance, some Third World countries claimed the rights to 
independence against imperialism). On the same ground, economic and social rights are put on 
the top of the socialist bloc list; and the the Third World prefers the collective rights as its top 
priority. Human rights become a politically controversial issue when one tries to use its 
influence to bring others into line with its interpretation of human rights. Yet, in this regard, 
it should not be a question of lumping sets of rights together and announcing that one set is 
superior to another according to a stand-point which is entirely arbitrary. I agree with Vincent 
when he argues that "there should rather be a recognition that there are rights of varying 
importance within each of the divisions", and that "therefore the problem of priority in human 
rights cannot be construed as one of deciding between groups of rights" [R.J., Vincent, 
"Human Rights and Foreign Policy", Australian Outlook. Vol. 36, No. 3, December 1982, p. 
2] .
T. Nardin, Law. Morality and the Relations of States. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1983, p. 53.
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come into conflict with the concept of human rights because states pursue national 
affairs according to policies established and implemented by dominant groups which 
may find it profitable to violate the rights of individuals.
Since the interests of the state and those of individuals may be contradictory, 
especially with non-democratic regimes, a state's legal system is often inadequate to 
correct violations and even less able to protect against human rights violations in the 
first place. Human rights issues are often seen as a measure of a state's treatment of its 
people and of the adequacies or otherwise of its legal and political systems. Too often 
state bureaucracies see human rights issues as a nuisance rather than as a challenge to 
which solutions may be found.73 Often human rights organizations are seen as trouble­
makers which want to control human rights activities in areas which deal directly with 
the state's interest and reputation. The ways in which states can threaten or control such 
organization inevitably depends on political circumstances and on the degree of popular 
support each group can command. The measures can range from simple warnings, to 
the banning of organizations and even arresting human rights workers, through to more 
violent suppression depending on the countries involved. Although it can be argued 
that the human rights concept can be equated with the Buddhist philosophy of self­
development,74 the state bureaucrats in Thailand, nevertheless, seem to tolerate what 
they call "trouble-makers" promoting human rights activities only because in the first 
place they feel that they can control the situation, and secondly, they can gain a good 
reputation internationally for being a democratic regime by permitting such activities. 
This sort of official attitude is criticised by political opponents as window dressing.
By comparison with the situation in Western societies, Thai human rights 
activists are often accused, as Turton says, of "threatening the government". Besides 
the general conflicts between the state and human rights concepts as discussed above, 
there is a particular nature and historical development of Thai society and the Thai state. 
This has led to a situation where, apart from the state, the "civil society"75 (composed 
of the common people organizations and other interest and pressure groups) is relatively 
weak, meanwhile the military play a dominant role, and the state ideology (e.g., state, 
religion and monarchy) is very active. Also, the "separation of power" between 
legislative, executive, and judicial institutions is not well developed. It is difficult to
R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations. London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986, p. 137.
Saneh Chamarik, Buddhism and Human Rights. Thai Khadi Research Institution, Paper No. 
12, Bangkok: Thammasat University, 1982.
J. Urry, The Autonomy of Capitalist Societies: The Economy. Civil Society and the State, 
London: The Macmillan Press, 1981, p. 72.
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implement people participation in these circumstances because, in the participatory 
process, there will certainly be a conflict of interests between different groups.76
In summary, the basis of the human rights concept is the recognition of the 
value of the individual, each of whom has the potential and capability for self­
development, to promote and preserve separate individual ends, as well as the capacity 
for making decisions in the development process. There are conflicts between the 
concepts of human rights and of the state. The development of the human rights 
concept is still debated in terms of political and civil rights on one hand, and of 
economic, social and cultural rights on the other. The concept of human rights is 
generally used from the perspective of political science rather than the perspectives of 
law and philosophy. This means that the human rights concept is complex and its 
implementation very difficult. However, the fundamental issue remains that human 
rights, in practice, require the acknowledgment and the respect of the state to be 
effective and, as the people participation concept has been announced in the Thai 
development plans, the human rights concept must also form part of the development 
process as I mention in the following sub-section.
2. The recognition of people's participation concept in political 
development.
There are at least two fashionable justifications for the maintenance of 
authoritarian regimes in Asian developing countries.
One is that Asian societies are authoritarian and paternalistic and so need governments that are 
also authoritarian and paternalistic; that Asia’s hungry masses are too concerned with providing 
their families with food, clothing, and shelter, to concern themselves with civil liberties and 
political freedom; that the Asian conception of freedom differs from that of the West; that, in 
short, Asians are not fit for democracy. Another is that developing countries must sacrifice 
freedom temporarily to achieve the rapid economic development that their exploding 
populations and rising expectations demand; that, in short, government must be authoritarian 
to promote development.77
Both these arguments are used by authoritarian regimes to legitimize their 
existence. In the case of Thailand the government also argues that the political rights are 
a luxury that the Thais cannot afford while attention is focused on eradicating poverty. 
According to a simplistic view of traditional Thai values, the rulers argue that the people 
should simply carry on their livelihood and leave the affairs of the state to them.7**
Turton, Production. Power and Participation, pp. 14-15.
These views are expressed by a former Philippines Senator. Quoted from Alston, "The Basis 
Working Paper: Development and the Rule of Law", p. 53.
Likhit Dhiravegin, "Social Change and Contemporary Thai Politics: An Analysis of the Inter- 
Relationship between the Society and the Polity", paper presented at the Thai-European
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If, however, development is being provided for the people and, the chosen 
method involves people's participation, this must go hand in hand with the concept of 
democracy (i.e., the recognition of ideas and opinions of the majority). In Thailand, 
since 1932, there have been attempts to found a representative system by many groups, 
both within and outside the parliament, such as the People's Party led by Phraya 
Phahon and Luang Pradit and, after the 14 October 1973 uprising, groups of students 
and common people. However, the representative system largely failed because of 
resistance from the royalist and military as well as the strong influence from 
monopolistic business groups.79 The interference of these groups in the political 
development process has obstructed the development of representative systems in 
Thailand and leads to the common prejudice that the Thais are not ready for democracy.
In fact, it is not a question of whether Thai people are ready for democracy or 
not. It is rather a question of whether the ruling groups are competent to establish the 
rules of a representative political process which allows for everyone to participate.80 
When governments fails to provide for participation, the so-called democratic system is 
merely a system which the minority elite uses to govern the majority of the people by 
arguing that it is for the benefit of people generally. When the people have no rights to 
express their opinion and to help make decisions on what and how their own future will 
be, development for the people's interest becomes merely empty rhetoric. Thus, where 
there is no democracy, there is no development in terms of people's interest, and in 
particular, in terms of the people's participation concept.
Second, there is no economic development without the guarantee of political 
rights. Economic development deals not only with the increase in GNP or per capita 
income, but also with the distribution of wealth - with questions such as who gains? 
who loses? how? and why? Therefore, it is vitally concerned with justice and 
politics.81 Meanwhile the power of decision making is dominated by the oligarchy and 
the distribution of wealth is also in the hand of that minority ruling group, not of the
Seminar on Social Change in Contemporary Thailand, Anthropological-Sociological Centre, 
University of Amsterdam, 28-30 May 1980, p. 24.
Suehiro, op. cit.. p. 275. The business groups included State owned public enterprises, 
private firms (ethnic Chinese owned) and foreign owned firms.
Saneh Chamarik, "Patthanakan sitthi manutsayachon nai prathetthai" [The Development of 
Human Rights in Thailand], paper presented at the National Seminar on the Teaching of 
Human Rights, Faculty of Law and Thai Khadi Research Institute, Thammasat University, 20 
March 1987, p. 5. See also Vithit Muntrabhorn, "Human Rights", paper presented at the 
National Seminar on the Teaching of Human Rights, Faculty of Law and Thai Khadi Research 
Institute, Thammasat University, 20 March 1987, p. 9.
Saneh, "Patthanakan sitthi manutsayachon", p. 9.
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people. An increase in GNP does not indicate the development of the country while the 
majority remains in want and misery.
Economic and political factors are, therefore, related to each other like two sides 
of one and the same coin. When people have no rights to organize, to have bargaining 
power and to argue their interests, substantial sections of the population may not be able 
to improve their conditions. There may be an argument in the short term requiring the 
people to "sacrifice freedom" and to allow the government to "promote development"; 
but in the longer term, the mass of the people will not be satisfied with the loss of 
freedom. Indeed, it would appear that the recognition of people's participation in 
political development requires a good measure of decentralization of power to local 
areas.
3. The recognition of people's participation concept in legal 
development.
To combat absolute poverty by the implementation of the people's participation, 
the common people need concrete definitions which describe the goals of the state, 
development policies and the levels of participation. Participation is the manner in 
which people express or act out their own will and help create their appropriate society. 
It will also involve a continually changing process in eradicating absolute poverty. 
Through participation, people assert their rights to production resources, their rights to 
information and education, their rights to organization and, above all, "their right to 
know their own rights".**2 All this seems to be essential for combating poverty.
The law can function both to define legitimate areas of conflict and its resolution 
and to provide a more general structure within which people and groups can attempt to 
find ways of expressing their own problems, and seeking solutions. Participation and 
law are complementary factors in the context of development. Emrich gives two 
reasons in support of this statement. First, participation is inevitably associated with 
conflicts because it involves changes in the distribution of political and economic 
power. The promotion of participation is the promotion of new kinds of conflicts 
which the common people need to confront to achieve not only the increase of 
productivity but also the control of their livelihood, security and dignity (or 
development values). Some kinds of conflicts may be reduced or eliminated whereas 
new kinds may occasionally emerge which will need to be resolved through new forms
82 H. Yamane, "Approaches to Rural Development and their Implications for Human Rights", in 
ICJ & CAP, Rural Development and Human Rights, p. 167.
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of co-operation and concrete standards of law to interpret those conflicts.83 Second, 
both participation and law, in the context of general change, seem to demand "situation- 
specific case-by-case approaches".84 That means there is no single legal provision to 
cover all problems. Participation is, therefore, necessary in relation to problems where 
the administrative system cannot cope in deciding appropriate solutions. In this case, 
the law may help guarantee not only participation in the formulation and implementation 
of developmental programmes, but also evaluation and determination of the 
accountability of those who administer them.85
Commonly, in most Third World countries, "legal systems are structured in 
favour of the powerful and wealthy".86 In the case of Thailand, the achievement of 
economic growth within the past two decades, as the government argues, also involved 
a skewing of the legal system enabling the state to abuse power in denying the people's 
rights to organization. For example, in order to invite foreign investment, the Sarit 
Proclamation No. 19 of 30 December B.E. 2501 forbade the people to organize in any 
form. When the concepts of people participation, self-reliant development and basic 
minimum needs have been included in the development plans, it is also necessary for 
the government to enshrine, for the people, the legal freedom to participate in 
development.
NGO methodology: co-operating and counterbalancing with the
concerned parties.
As argued in Chapter 2, the common people need to have their own interest 
groups so that they would be able to achieve a better standard of living and development 
of human values. We can propose participants in the development process, namely 
local organizations, governmental and domestic non-governmental organizations, as 
well as regional and international governmental and non-governmental organizations. 
At the infant stage of people's organization, the help and support from both government 
and non-government sectors is required. An analysis using a political-economy 
approach at both community level (micro level) and national level (macro level) should 
be taken into account.
E.R. Emrich, "Law, Participation and Development: An ESCAP Programme", in ibid-. P- 
250. See also Turton. Production. Power and Participation. P. 14.
Emrich, op. cit.. p. 250.
C.J. Dias, " Realizing the Right To Development: the Importance of Legal Resources", in 
ICJ, Development. Human Rights and the Rule of Law, p. 191.
86 Cited from ibid., p. 193.
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In practice, the catalytic role of NGOs is defined in two areas. One is in co­
operation with the government in helping common people increase economic 
productivity - which the government favours while seeing the role for the NGOs as 
operating within the framework of national development. The other is as a 
counterbalancing power with the government in sorting out a new consensus and setting 
the rules of the development game politically and legally - a role the government does 
not favour and regards as "threatening the government" or challenging the government 
system.
With regard to the current situation of co-operation between the government and 
NGOs, the NESDB proposed a meeting with NGOs working directly in rural 
development in 1984. The aim of the meeting, it said, was to collect ideas and opinions 
for drafting the Sixth Plan (1987-1991) and to ask NGOs to present suitable ways of 
co-operation with the government. When the NGOs proposed co-operation with the 
NESDB on the grounds of co-partnership, in which the NGOs would have autonomous 
power in working as equal partner with government, the NESDB faltered and, as 
Phumtham noted, the NESDB therefore delayed the meeting until 1985.
Phumtham went on to argue that the NESDB wanted to have NGO co-operation 
in rural development for the following reasons.87 First, the economic reason, in 
particular, was to support the "rural development fund" for which the NESDB expected 
to get foreign aid under the name of government - NGO co-operation.88 The other was 
the human development reason whereby the NESDB expected the NGOs to help 
improve people's capabilities through vocational training.
Phumtham criticizes the co-operation between the government and non­
government organizations. First, although the government tends to recognize the 
importance of NGOs in development, the government still maintains its centralized 
decision making whereas the NGOs need to have decentralized decision making. In 
fact, the decision to co-operate with the NGOs is an initiative of the NESDB only, and it 
is not clear that other government organizations will agree with this decision. Second, 
the concept of development itself differs for government and non-government
Chulalongkom University Social Research Institute (CUSRI), "Wipak ... thitthang phan 
patthana chabapthi 6" [Critique ... the Direction of the Sixth Plans (1987-1991)], in Thitthang 
phan maebot kanpatthana sangkhom phu'a kanpu'nptoneng kap ngan patthana phak ekachon 
[The Main Direction of Social Development for Self-Reliance and the Development Work of 
the Private Sectors], Report of an academic assembly, 27-28 December 1985, Bangkok: 
CUSRI, B.E. 2528 (1985), p. 49.
Phumtham argues that the NESDB wants to withdraw the budget from the local organization 
K.S.C. to put it in the "rural development fund" because of its weak administration, ibid., p. 
49.
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organizations. The government emphasizes the macro-economic, industrialized 
development and regards the common people as a pool of cheap labour, whereas the 
NGOs put human development at the centre of development and try to develop people’s 
organizations, to distribute wealth and benefits to the disadvantaged poor. Third, there 
is a major problem of co-operation in that government wants the NGOs to participate in 
development to support the government's work, while the NGOs for their part want to 
co-operate with the government as equal partner in national development. The 
government seems to expect the NGOs to follow the system laid down by the 
government. At the same time, the NGOs do not want to become a part of government 
bureaucratic system and under government control. They would prefer to receive a 
clear statement of government policies in relation to NGOs and their independent role in 
social development.89 At present, co-operation between government and non­
government organizations is still discussed seriously but as yet without conclusion.
In summary, the Thai NGO movement is an outcome of Thai development 
history. The depolarization of ideology gave more room for them to evaluate the 
mistake in the past and mobilize development resources to achieve the goal of 
development with various approaches. Governments [from 1973 to the present, except 
the Thanin government (1976-1977)] seemed to have encouraged people's endeavours 
to search for ideas and trends to serve their interests in development. Some government 
officials, like Dr. Apichet, Dr. Wichai and other government officials tried to prove that 
the officials did not obstruct social development but created good conditions for 
working with local people through sacrifice and hard work. Although the government 
now accepts the concepts of self-reliant development, basic minimum needs and people 
participation, these concepts are inseparable from the recognition of human rights 
concept and the catalytic role of NGOs in the co-operation with government will be 
incomplete unless the counterbalancing role is fully recognized by the government. The 
case studies in Chapter 4 will show the Thai structural problems and NGO use of 
concepts and methodologies in tackling the problems of underdevelopment.
89 Jon Ungphakom, "A View: The Co-operation between the Government and NGOs in 
Development", Thai Development Newsletter. Vol. 3, No. 4, 1986, p. 24.
CHAPTER 4
People's Rights to Development: Case Studies
True development must place the development of the human being as the first priority. * Only 
in the growth of the human attributes will further appropriate development take place in the 
economy and society.... Rural development [for example] will be best achieved by developing 
the capacity of the rural poor to be able to set up their own organizations, to analyse their own 
concerns, to plan, to make their own decision and to solve their own problems. Not only will 
this approach create change but will make people more responsive to future change. ... The 
government must promote people's autonomous organizations and make them legally 
independent [my translation].
Prawet Wasi"
This chapter aims to illustrate the structural problems in the Thai development 
context and to show how the NGOs use concepts and methodologies to tackle the 
problems of underdevelopment. It also emphasizes a counterbalancing role of NGOs 
between government and people as they seek a consensus on rules of operation. At the 
same time it indicates some limitations in both government and non-govemment sectors. 
These limitations would be reduced if there were better co-operation between the 
sectors. The issues involved will be addressed through the consideration of case 
studies. First, an outline of the considerations in selecting the case studies is given; 
second, a case study of "the Phichit Experience" in rural development is detailed; third, 
a case study of the land dispute case of the Non Lan Peasants is provided; fourth, a case 
study of women workers of the Srikao Company strike in their demand for the 
minimum wage is presented. These case studies will illustrate the limitations of both 
government and non-government organizations in Thai development process. 
However, this process would be facilitated where there is co-operation between both 
sectors.
Some considerations for selecting case studies
To approach the root causes of problems in Thai development, Strong's 
argument from development experience in Africa is relevant:
The development of the "human being" here includes the individual elements of dignity, 
awareness of society and of nature, and of man's capacity to change his environment.
Quoted from "Nu'ng pi ratthaban Chatchai nai saita khong mo Magsaysay" [One Year of the 
Chatchai Government from the Point of View of a Magsaysay-award Doctor], Siamrat [Thai 
State Weekly Magazine], [in Thai], Vol. 10, 20 August B.E. 2532 (1989), pp.19-20.
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the root causes of the crisis are essentially systemic in nature. That is to say the cause and 
effect relationships take place within a complex system of interactions in which no single 
element can be isolated from the whole. Ignoring this simple truth is, in my view, one of the 
principal root causes of the failures of past development that have produced the current crisis.^
The structural problems of Thai development are systematically concerned with 
distribution of economic growth, decentralization of decision-making, and the political 
and legal recognition of people's rights to development. When the government 
introduced development concepts of "basic minimum needs", "self-reliance" and 
"people participation", these concepts were inseparable from the human rights concept 
(regarded as a fundamental issue of basic human rights in achieving the standard of 
living of common people). Ignoring the people's basic rights to development had 
created social and political problems as experienced in past Thai development. 
However, these four concepts, in particular the human rights and people's participation 
concepts, require the recognition and protection of a law-based society.4
Considering the creation of the law-based society, the rules of the game are still 
more or less enforced by the Thai government in favour of the "haves" rather than of the 
"have-nots", because the common people have weak bargaining power in the political 
process. In order to achieve an improvement in the standard of living of the common 
people, it is better to solve problems at the starting point rather than attempt to cure the 
symptoms of the disease by social welfare handouts.
There is much discussion in Thailand about the problems of the legal system. 
For example, most government officials seem to expect every Thai citizen to understand 
the laws. However, the common people find the laws, legal terms and processes to be 
very complex and difficult to understand and therefore need lawyers to interpret the 
details for them; but they cannot afford lawyer's fees and so simply avoid dealing with 
legal issues. Sometimes too, the people can break the laws through ignorance, 
misunderstanding, or bias if they consider that the laws favour the well-off people more 
than themselves. When the laws are no longer respected by the people, both 
government and people have to waste time and money to correct the problems. The 
failure of a legal system can be seen as a major detriment to any country.
M. Strong, "Increase in Government Reliance on Voluntary Action: Crisis or Challenge?", 
address to the INTERPHIL II Conference, Venice, Italy, 26 September 1985, quoted in 
Brodhead, Herbert-Copley and Lambert, op. cit.. p. 147.
The idea that the human rights concept is totally a Western import to Third World countries is, 
in my opinion, not totally correct because any representative society, customary or otherwise, 
has a basis for individual rights such as the expression of idea and opinion or "participation" 
and must express the concept in its own historical context. In any case it is my view that 
human rights must be recognized as a fundamental concept of development.
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At the same time, some NGO workers argue that Thai society is characterized as 
a customary society, whereas the present legal system is heavily influenced by western 
ideas which may not be appropriate to Thai society.5 While this argument is partly 
correct, it does not mean that the laws should be abolished. Instead, they have to be 
improved, to be made more suitable to the Thais and to facilitate the participation of the 
people in codifying the rules of society. Some human rights and development NGOs 
such as UCL, CGRS, Friends of Women and the Centre for the Protection of 
Children's Rights, have attempted to work against unjust laws and enforcement which 
undermine the legitimacy of the legal system. At the same time, these organizations try 
to convince the government to correct legal problems in a way appropriate to the 
interests of the common people.
The case studies have been selected to demonstrate a number of issues and 
situations. First, they reflect that problems are linked together economically and 
politically, at the community and at the national levels; second, they show an NGO 
contribution to a development model in terms of both concepts and methodology; and 
third, they show some limitations of both the government and non-government sectors 
which require their mutual co-operation if development problems are to be solved.
Case Study I: ’’The Phichit Experience" in rural development
This case study explores the role of a local Thai NGO working as an important 
project component, as intermediary between local communities, the Thai government 
officials and Australian funding agencies.6 The case study refers to the Community 
Self-Reliance Sub-project which is a part of the Phichit Land Reform Area Development 
Support Project - a five-year (1984-1989) bilateral development assistance project 
funded by the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) to the 
Thai government. The bilateral project area is a former forest reserve area (Bang 
Narang Forest), settled by people who migrated from the Central and Northeastern 
regions where there had been insufficient farmland. The new settlers cleared the forest 
and established their own farms, paddy fields, upland fields and village settlements. 
This area was proclaimed a land reform area in 1978 under the responsibility of the 
Agricultural Land Reform Office (ALRO), Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives.
Marshall, "Legal Training", p. 38.
The funding agencies were both the Australian government and an Australian NGO, however, I 
have adopted the convention in this thesis of using NGO to refer only to the Thai 
organizations and not to western funding non-government agencies such as Community Aid 
Abroad (CAA). CAA is an Australian funding NGO which has close links with Oxfam (UK) 
and gives strong support to the principles of participation in development.
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The bilateral assistance project between AIDAB and the Thai government to 
develop this area includes activities such as, groundwater research and development, 
farming system research, agricultural extension, flood control, health, education and 
community water supply. Besides the village communities, the parties concerned in the 
development project were the NGOs [the Phichit NGO Volunteer Group, Thai 
Volunteer Service (TVS)], the Thai government [Agricultural Land Reform Office 
(ALRO) and the Research Development Institute/Khon Kaen University (RDI/KKU)] 
and funding agencies (AIDAB and CAA).7
Initially in 1984, the Community Self-Reliant Sub-project was an NGO 
community development activity funded by CAA and had a positive working 
relationship with the ALRO. In 1986, the AIDAB Project Review Team which made 
follow-up investigations on the Project Feasibility Study of 1983, saw many positive 
aspects in the local NGO operation with village-based community development workers 
assisting the implementation of small-scale development activities based on villager 
needs identified by the villagers. The Review Team therefore formalized and elevated 
the status of these activities to an NGO sub-project under the umbrella of the five-year 
bilateral project. The sub-project was given the task of providing two-way 
communication, of giving up-to-date information on the current socio-economic 
situation in the villages relevant to the decision making process of the Project, and 
acting as a linkage mechanism between the villagers from target communities and the 
sub-projects within the bilateral project; or in short, acting "as the eyes and ears for the 
project at the village level".8
The role of the NGO team in the Phichit Land Reform Areas
Project
The Phichit NGO Volunteer Group, composed of one Project Co-ordinator and 
six volunteers, undertook a six month process of community study and preparation for 
the project. In the first place, they generally built relationships with villagers by living 
in the target areas and participating in village activities. At the same time, they studied 
the economic, social and cultural conditions in the targeted areas. They identified 
conflicts between the pioneer generations and recent settlers (notably land disputes and 
ethnic division), the high crime rate caused by theft, high levels of alcoholism and drug 
addiction, in particular among the youth, all of which contributed to the lack of co-
Community Aid Abroad (CAA), Case Study: Strategies in Government and Non-Government 
Co-operation: The Phichit Experience. Report to the Development Committee members of 
CAA, AIDAB, the Australian Consultant Team, and ACFOA, Canberra: CAA, 1988, pp. ix, 
23 and Appendix 3, p. 4.
Ibid., p. ix and 26.
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operative problem solving. They also helped the villagers understand the aim of the 
main project and the responsibility of the fieldworkers, building mutual trust and 
encouraging the leaders as well as the villagers to participate in development activities.9
The NGO sub-project team then formulated criteria for selecting target villages 
for people participation development work. Briefly, the villages were to be of a 
moderate size (about 100-200 households); the economic conditions of the village were 
to be relatively poor with limited assistance from government sectors; village leaders 
and groups were to agree to actively facilitate the sub-project activities; and the villages 
were to be centres from which the activities would be easily communicated and 
expanded in the future. The NGO team expected that after the sub-project period 
finished by the end of 1989 and the NGO team had completely withdrawn from the 
target areas, the leaders of target community groups would be able to take over the 
community development activities by themselves.10 Finally, eight villages in three 
districts were selected.11
The NGO team found that the rural poor in target areas were facing a number of 
problems in achieving basic minimum needs in terms of productivity and income. For 
example, among the agricultural problems it was found that there was insufficient 
natural supply of water in the upland rice farming areas and there was flooding in the 
lowland areas. There were also problems relating to the change to new production 
processes using modem technology such as large and small tractors, chemical fertilizers 
and pesticides to increase yields, and the fact that these new methods required 
borrowing to meet the increasing investment needed, which in turn led to debt problems 
in many farming households.
Lacking access to soft loans in the formal sector, e.g. the Bank for Agriculture 
and Agricultural Co-operatives (BAAC), the poor peasants inevitably borrowed money 
in the informal sector from merchants and well-off villagers to whom the peasants paid 
higher than the Bank interest rates. At the same time, they were bound to sell their 
product to the money lenders who typically gave a lower price for their produce after the 
deduction of interest and transportation costs. In such circumstances, since the 
bargaining power of peasants was relatively weak, they were often forced into a
Ibid., p. 4, 18.
Ibid., pp. 14-15.
They were four villages in Sam Ngam District: Map Fang (village 13 of Ban Na Sub-District), 
Phetchalukan (village 17 of Ban Na Sub-District), Laem Chedi cluster (village 5 of Nong Pho 
Sub-District), Nong Chik cluster (village 5 of Nong Son Sub-District); three villages in Pho 
Thale District: Thung Fak (village 12 of Bung Narang Sub-District), Nong Wai and Bang 
Pling (village 7 and 8 of Pho Sai Ngam Sub-District); and one village in Pho Prathap Chang 
District: Ko Kaeo (village 11 of Phai Rop Sub-District).
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situation of exploitation. The target areas in which a high level of indebtedness 
appeared were Nong Wai, Leam Chedi, Nong Chik and Phetchalukan.
The use of intensive modem technology also led to debt as the peasants, who 
could not afford the high-cost investment, rented their land cheaply to rich individuals 
outside the village. The villagers of Bang Pling and Nong Wai, for example, rented 
their lands to the owner of a sugar company for three years. As a result, the fertile 
lands for rice farming were adapted for sugar production and the owners of the lands 
became employed as cane-cutters on their own lands for minimal wages. This situation 
did not provide a bright future for the small-scale farmers.
In addition, the NGO team discovered a number of social and cultural problems 
which retarded development activities. For example, conflicts among villagers arose 
from land disputes between the former inhabitants and later migrants; basic cultural 
differences between Thai and Lao people in Thung Fak and Petchalukan; and between 
the Lao Song and Lao Wiang ethnic groups. Problems also arose from the lack of trust 
and respect for "formal" leaders who bought votes in elections in Nong Wai, Bang 
Pling and Petchalukan;12 drug addiction of the village headman of Petchalukan and 
some official leaders as well as among the young; high crime rates (in particular thefts).
After attempting to understand local conditions and to win the confidence of 
villagers through the six-month process of community study and preparation, the NGO 
team conducted activities to help address the people's problems and to help them relate 
to the bilateral project as well as addressing the lack of collective power in solving 
community problems. For instance, activities were arranged to improve the quality of 
leadership, to reduce economic problems, and to promote community self-reliant 
organizations. The NGO team started analysing the different types of village leadership 
such as religious leaders, economic leaders, elders whose roles and experience were 
respected by villagers, as well'as the formal leaders mentioned above. The NGO team 
was relatively successful in helping village leaders who were willing to participate in 
development through various forms of activities such as informal group discussions and 
meetings, talks by resource persons and observation tours of participatory development 
work in other provinces (Chainat, Uthai Thani, Khon Kaen, Roi Et, and Surin). 
Eventually, the leaders were able to analyse local conditions and problems and to lead 
villagers in solving their current community problems.13
Most of them hold official positions appointed by government, not by the villagers, such as 
"Kamnan" (Sub-District headman), "Phuyaiban" (Village headman), village committee 
members.
Community Aid Abroad (CAA), op. cit.. pp. 18-20.
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Considering long-term economic development problem like indebtedness and 
food shortages, the NGO team helped reduce some burden through the increase of 
productivity and skill training with the participation of most villagers. Examples of 
project activities included rice banks in five villages, namely Nong Wai, Map Fang, 
Laem Chedi, Ko Kaeo, Petchalukan; co-operative stores in Nong Chik and Thung Fak; 
and a medicine fund in Bang Pling.14 In addition, community resources such as the 
housewives' and youth groups were mobilized by the NGO team to participate in 
development activities.
In relation to the bilateral project, there was a positive impact from the NGO 
activities. The NGO team were effective in providing up-to-date information of the 
socio-economic situation in the village which guided the Project to select specific inputs 
suitable for the local needs and to plan the timing of the inputs. For example, an 
irrigation component in the bilateral project was designed to increase groundwater 
utilization. The NGO team alerted the Project about the villagers' concerns with the 
initial proposal and consequently the Project was able to determine better how 
technologies could be allocated in a way which ensure sustainable utilization by the 
villagers and at the same time reduce the cost of technology. Likewise, the proposal to 
construct secondary canals was criticized by many of villagers on the grounds that 
benefits would go to an influential minority whereas serious disadvantages would fall 
on the villagers along the line of the planned secondary canals. Thus, the Project team 
re-assessed the technical and social aspects and changed the placement of drainage 
canals. As a result, the NGO team helped reduce high cost areas of the Project, such as 
groundwater and drainage components, which accounted for approximately half of the 
Project expenditure. The NGO team itself absorbed only 0.5 per cent of the Project 
budget.15
Generally speaking, the NGO team had a good working relationship with 
official development partners as well as with the Australian consultants and funding 
agency staff members. For instance, with the officials from the Ministry of Public 
Health (MOPH), the NGO workers assisted the rehabilitation of village medicine funds 
in six communities as well as providing training in the management of the funds, while
14 The rice bank activity aims to solve problems of rice shortage and then alleviate the debt cycle 
that arises from food shortage. The co-operative store seeks to provide cheap goods for 
villagers and develop bargaining awareness.
^  Community Aid Abroad (CAA), op. cit.. pp. x-xi. The Australian government gives 
economic assistance to the Thai government for the five-year bilateral project (1985-1989), 
including approximately $A 2.5 million for the Groundwater Investment and Groundwater 
Development component; and $A 1.8 million for the Drainage component which involved 
construction of 44 km. of main drains and 66 km. of secondary drains as well as culverts, 
weirs and control gates. The Drainage component would reduce flooding problems over 
22,000 rai of agricultural land fibid.. pp. 9 ,11].
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the officials helped broaden NGO work by inviting the team to participate in MOPH 
sponsored workshops with local government officials. With the co-operation of the 
Non-Formal Education Department of the Ministry of Education and the Phichit 
Agricultural College, NGO workers helped develop occupational skills suitable for local 
community work and informally assisted villagers with literacy programmes, while the 
two government sectors provided resource persons and technical assistance to the 
NGOs. The NGO team worked hand in hand with the ALRO officials in both the 
bilateral project and other sub-projects such as road construction, while the ALRO 
provided an umbrella to protect the team from suspicions of being connected with 
government security officers (Internal Security Operation Command - ISOC). The 
NGO team helped create a community self-reliance development model of the "bottom 
up" development, while the funding agencies gave to the NGO team not only a financial 
support but also facilitated a close co-operation between government officials and 
NGOs who had, since 1976, generally viewed each other with antagonism, suspicion 
and mistrust.
The evaluation of NGO work: perspectives from concerned parties
From the villagers' perspective, the NGO team was the de facto representative 
of the poor. As some villagers explained:
NGOs are like our equals. They live with us. When we ask a question, we know we ll get an 
immediate response. Extension agents, project or other government personnel come and go. 
They do experiments on our land, but don't know when or if it will come. The NGO took us 
to look at things, they never told us what to do. In some cases they even tried to discourage 
us from rushing into new activities without thinking about the consequence.^
NGO activities were well recognized and participated in by most villagers in the target 
areas. For example, in Nong Wai village where the total number of registered 
households was 86 (about 200 adults), there were 72 villagers involved in the rice bank 
activity; 50 in co-operative dry season rice planting; and 42 in fuel co-operative funds. 
Some farmers expressed the following opinion about NGO work:
There is a difference in style. Government puts in more resources, but doesn't always get at 
the problem. The NGO investment is small, but they always get at the problem.^
From the government perspective, five of the twenty government officials (three 
from ALRO, one from a provincial public health section, and one from the Department 
of Agricultural Extension) who had direct experience working with NGOs, were of the 
view that:
16
17
Ibid., p. 29. 
Ibid., p. 30.
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NGOs are flexible, and can respond to local circumstances. The examples of drilling 
technology and irrigation canals were cited. Government officials recognized that rigid 
bureaucratic regulations and obstacles to communication between villagers and government 
made it difficult for government agencies to be this flexible. NGOs can provide important 
micro-level analysis, to enable appropriate project planning and implementation. 
Sustainability at the village level is enhanced because NGOs encourage local leadership to 
emerge. ... NGOs can draw in external resources (other than government) to support village- 
based development activities. In the PLRA Project, the NGO team co-operated with the 
Agricultural Development Foundation, another NGO working in the area and also the Pichit 
[sic] Agricultural College.^
Some criticism of NGO work and attitude was however also drawn from some 
officials. For the government security officials (ISOC), the NGOs were generally 
regarded to be "a fifth column front movement of the Communist Party of Thailand 
(CPT)" .19 For some officers of the Development Office of Agricultural Extension 
(DOAE), the NGO work with ALRO was claimed to overlap their own extension 
activities. For others, the NGO workers "were young and lacked experience necessary 
to be effective in the highly complex environment of a bilateral project".20 This 
inexperience, they said, reflected in a tendency to use a "dogmatic" approach to 
development, an example of which was that some workers took ideas from a brief pre­
service training course and tried to impose them and make them work directly in the 
local area.
From the Australian Consultant Team's perspective, the role of NGO team in the 
PLRA Project was summarized as follows:
What we learned is that in future we should set some broad objectives, and let the NGOs take 
the lead, with the technicians following behind. First we have to listen to what the fanners 
want. We took six months to let the NGOs work in the village. People kept saying: 'Well, 
when are you going to do something?' After six months the NGOs came up with ten times 
the number of ideas we'd anticipated initially, and it grew exponentially. For the same amount 
of financial input, we achieved five times what we'd been averaging before the NGO came 2 ^
From the funding agencies' (AIDAB and CAA) perspectives, there was uneven 
understanding about the NGO role in development among funding agency staff 
members. CAA seems to have understood quite well about the NGO contribution and 
the report suggested that:
Ibid., p. 24.
Ibid., p. 23.
Ibid., p. 25. The NGO and ALRO teams solved these problems with DOAE by pointing out 
that the interest of the people were the main principle for government activities and there was 
room for co-operation.
Ibid., pp. 14,27.21
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the future collaboration would be well-advised to allow for a much longer initial period of 
social preparation; i.e., extended community consultation (as an operational phase of the 
Project) where NGOs could assist in design and planning, in order to ensure a studied and 
appropriate response to actual rather than perceived community needs.22
However, due to the fact that the NGO sub-project was created upon the 
Australian Consultant Team's advice, and was not in the original project design 
document, most AIDAB representatives somehow understood the role of NGOs in 
different terms. Some said that they "... never really understood the role of the NGO". 
They knew what "it was supposed to be on paper, but not in practice".23 Some 
proposed that in future projects:
If AIDAB maintains a social development perspective, there will be a role for NGOs to fill in 
for deficits in the [host] government system for the community development aspect.2^
As for the NGO team, they evaluated their role in the PLRA Project in the 
following terms:
The NGO is a neutral body which, together with villagers, is involved in the process of group 
formation, co-operative problem solving, communicating and co-ordinating with external 
agencies which strengthen the capacity and knowledge of villagers to solve their own problems 
using both their own and appropriate external resources. Because the fieldworkers are village 
based, they can engage in a dialogue with villagers, and undertake activities using approaches 
and achieving outcomes which may be impossible for government (i.e. because of 
bureaucratic, time or resource constraints).23
However, the NGO team concluded that problems still remained for future 
development. For example, many economic problems demanded long-term problem 
solving and while the NGO team helped reduce some economic burdens, many 
problems were beyond the realistic capability of the NGO team to solve within the 
timeframe of the sub-project. Second, the majority of leaders came from the middle- 
income group who had time for community development, whereas the poor peasants 
were more bound by immediate economic problems and could not participate fully in 
some development work such as group meetings and discussion. Third, the promotion 
of village organizations was still incomplete. Among target leader groups, Map Fang 
group was the only one which proved capable of running community activities. In
Ibid., p. 32.
Ibid., p. 30.
Ibid., p. 31. It seems to me that some AIDAB officers still regard the NGOs in the framework 
of national development as more or less part of official structures, whereas the Australian 
Consultant Team recognized an independent status for the NGOs to work equally with other 
concerned parties.
Ibid., p. 28. It is inaccurate for the NGO team to describe itself as "neutral" when what 
follows is a possitive activist role in economic, social and political development -  especially 
in terms of relations between the villagers and the government agencies.
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other places, the leaders were not sufficiently independent or creative to carry on the 
community development work.
In summary, the Community Self-Reliance sub-project explores the catalytic 
role of the Phichit Volunteer Group in many aspects. First, the NGO team helped create 
a model of community self-reliant development. They reduced some of the problems 
occurring at the community level such as some economic burdens, drug addiction 
among the youth and some leaders, and conflicts between leaders. At the same time, 
they improved the quality of leadership, promoted the village organization and 
encouraged people to participate in community self-reliant development within the 
timeframe of the Sub-project. Second, the NGO team co-operated with the government 
and Australian funding agencies as an equally independent partner. For example, the 
NGOs assisted in implementing small-scale development activities based on the needs 
identified by the local poor. The government provided infrastructure and technical 
assistance through its bureaucratic system and an umbrella of protection which 
minimized misunderstanding and suspicion about the NGO activities. The funding 
agencies helped not only to provide resources for the community development project, 
but also to improve the relationships between the government and NGOs.
Nonetheless, one questions to arise from the sub-project is whether or not the 
Phichit experience in rural development can be a model for future development work. 
According to the report, the NGOs are characterized as being flexible, using micro-level 
analysis, stimulating local partnership, and co-ordinating with external agencies. They 
also used a "bottom up" approach involving "empowerment" and "participation".26 In 
practice these characteristics and approaches of NGOs, such as the giving of power to 
the poor, may "give a direct challenge to not only the top-down decision making 
structure of the bureaucracy but also to a number of the concepts which legitimize those 
structure".27 Thus the model requires three equal independent partnerships and it may 
be very difficult, especially for1 the government, to adopt a general policy which would 
elevate the NGO status to equal partnership in development.
Another question concerns what will happen when the NGOs leave the target 
areas and the people propose new ideas and solutions to their problems to the 
government. This may require the government to recognize people’s rights to 
development in a much more definite way than at present by providing, for example, a 
political and legal framework within which the people have the right to participate in 
their own development. The two following case studies will explore in more detail the
26
27
Ibid., pp. 24, 28. 
Ibid., p. xiii.
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role of law as the basis of people's rights and the manner in which people can be 
exploited by inappropriate or unenforced legal and political structures. In both cases 
conflict arises and it is the involvement of NGOs, acting as the counterbalancing power 
between the government and the people in helping to resolve conflicts.
Case Study II: the land dispute case of the Non Lan peasants
This case study illustrates a land dispute case between the Non Lan peasants and 
the private Charoensap Uthumphon Borikan Company. The land dispute was caused 
by government officials permitting the company to conduct forestry activities in areas 
which were used by peasants for household cultivation. The area of the land in dispute 
was in the Non Lan National Park, Uthumphonphisai District, Si Sa Ket Province.
Non Lan National Park is about 16,000 rai (7,263 acres) and although some 
parts of the area had already been destroyed, an area of about 1,400 rai, in Sieo Sub- 
District, was still fertile forest from which the local people from several surrounding 
villages had helped sustain their lives for a long time.28 For example, they gathered 
firewood, vegetables, herbs, sweet potatoes and taros not only for consumption but 
also barter or sale for rice. About 2,000 cattle were also fed there, particularly in the 
rainy season when surrounding land was all taken up with rice fields and only the Non 
Lan forest had pastures. In addition, the villagers from Ban Talat and Ban Nong Rua 
did not have their own lands and their total sustenance was gained by using the natural 
resources of the forest.
The Non Lan peasants had protected the forest lands from being destroyed. For 
example, between 1947 and 1953 periods of severe drought occurred because some 
villagers had destroyed part of the forest for growing cotton and sugar cane in response 
to the government policy and advice to grow cash crops. In order to solve the drought 
problem, the peasants called a meeting among villages and decided to give up growing 
cash crops in the Non Lan area so that the fertility of this forest would be maintained for 
future generations. Since then, the Non Lan villagers claimed that the forest areas had
The soil condition is fertile and humid, suitable for valuable woods such as red wood, timber 
and mixed forest. Several marshes run around the forest; e.g., "Nong Ma", "Nong Yai", Nong 
Ku" ("Nong" in Thai means a swamp). In addition, a stream, "Huai Tup Kan", waters an area 
in the West of the forest [UCL Human Rights Promotion Project (Northeastern Branch), 
"Korani pipat kan anuyat hai ekachon pluk sang suan pa thi pa Non Lan Amphoe 
Uthumphonphisai, Chagwat Si Sa Ket" [Land Dispute Case Concerning the Granting of 
Permission for Afforestation in the Non Lan Forest Area, Uthumphonphisai District, Si Sa 
Ket Province, to a Private Company], in Raingan kanwichai: Kanhai khwamchuailu'a, pp. 27- 
28].
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not suffered drought condition because of the maintenance of the forest and decided to 
protect the remainder of the forest from further destruction.29
Although the villagers had settled in the Non Lan area for over a hundred years, 
they had no land title deeds to declare their rights over the lands. Some villagers had 
"S.K. 1" documents (Sithi Krop Krong Thi Din, Form No. 1) giving the rights to own 
the land which they have received from the local government since 1954; others had 
"P.T.B. 5” (Phasi Bamrung Thongthi, Form No. 5) which was a land tax receipt. 
Even though these documents were not allowed as evidence of land ownership or be 
used to argue for land rights, they were official documents showing the long term claim 
to the land along with continual use for subsistence before the declaration of the Non 
Lan National Park was enforced in 1971 by the rule of the Ministry of Interior, Vol. 
436 B.E. 2524 (1971).
The Forestry Department generally reserving lands by declaring the ministerial 
rule in the royal gazette and through local officials.30 The central Forestry officials need 
not even assess the number of people and families living in the area, or find out the 
prior occupancy and the use of land before the laws are issued. They leave it up to the 
people to argue for their rights over the land by presenting their land title deeds to local 
officials after the ministerial rule has been issued. If there is nobody who lays suitable 
claim to the rights over the land within the timeframe of the declaration, the officials 
automatically assume that the ministerial rule will be fully enforced. The process of 
declaration of National Parks often causes land dispute problem between the 
government and people.31
The Non Lan declaration was a case in point. The peasants insisted that they did 
not know when the declaration of the Non Lan National Park was made until the local 
authorities started placing marking stones which overlapped their cultivated lands. As a 
consequence, the peasants ignored the rule of the Ministry of Interior that declared the
Ibid., pp. 27-29.
Banlue Kongchan, "Panha khophiphat ru'ang sitthi phonprayot nai khet pa sa-nguanhaengchat 
kap naeothang kaekhaipanha lae kanhai khwamchuailu'a prachachon phuprasop 
khwamdu'atron" [Problems of Disputes Concerning Rights and Interest in National Reserved 
Forest and the Direction for Solving the Problems and Helping the Affected People], in 
Raingan kanwichai: Kanhai khwamchuailu'a. p. 2.
Ibid., pp. 1-13. See also Banlue Kongchan, "Khophipat kieo kap sitthi nai thi din pai nai 
anakhet su’ng thang ratchakan sa-nguan huang ham phu'a chai pen tamle liangsat satharana 
prayot ruam kan khong ratsadon kap thang lu'ak nai kan kaekhai panha lae kanhai 
khwamchuailu'a prachachon phu dai rap khwamdu’atron" [Land Dispute Case in the Area 
Reserved by the Government for Official Purposes and for Public Pastures and the Direction 
for Solving the Problems and Helping the Affected People], in Raingan kanwichai: Kanhai 
khwamchuailu'a. pp. 60-86.
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Non Lan forest as a reserved National Park and continued to use the land for cultivation 
and for cattle pasture.32
The cause of the Non Lan land dispute
Citing Article No. 16 of the National Reserved Forest Act, B.E. 2507 (1964), 
the Charoensap Uthumphon Borikan Company tendered a proposal to the local 
authorities of Uthumphonphisai District for an afforestation project covering 500 rai of 
the 1,400 rai in the fertile Non Lan forest area. The Si Sa Ket provincial Forestry 
Office consequently presented the proposal to the central Forestry Department in 
Bangkok.
The central Forestry Department gave permission to the Company on the basis 
of a report that the Non Lan Forest was "ruined forest" according to the rule for 
Permission for Afforestation in Reserved National Park, (Vol. 1), B.E. 2522 (1979), of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives. "Ruined forest" was defined as a forest 
where there were old destroyed fields, or grass fields, valueless forest, or valuable 
forest in which most trees had been destroyed and which would be difficult to restore to 
natural forest.33 The decision of the central Forestry Department was based on the 
regulations of the Forestry Department Vol. 3, B.E. 2524 (1981), allowing people 
temporary access and urging the private sector to grow forest in "ruined" areas.
A decision even higher up was taken by the Minister of Agriculture and Co­
operative following Article 16 of the National Reserved Forest B.E. 2507 (1964) and 
the Ministerial Rule Vol. 983, B.E. 2525 (1983), allowing the Company to grow 500- 
rai of forest (eucalyptus and acacia) within fifteen years and paying 10 baht per rai per 
annum compensation. The final authorization passed down from the Minister (through 
the central Department) to the provincial forestry authorities of Si Sa Ket Province 
authorizing the Company to grow 500-rai forest of eucalyptus and acacia for 15 years 
via the letter vol. 1/07, dated 1 March B.E. 2528 (1985).
The Non Lan peasants had protested against the forest concession before the 
Project was approved by the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives. The Sieo Sub- 
District Council submitted a letter of protest, through Piyanat Watcharaphon, the Si Sa 
Ket MP ("Chat Thai" Party), to the Ministry dated 9 November 1984 (about four
The forest marking stones were put down on the village lands of Ban Talat, Ban Ma Chok, 
Ban Nong Hu, Ban Nong No, Ban Pae, Ban Nong Nuk, Ban I Sei and Ban Phra. In addition 
the forest marking stones intruded upon the area of a temple, a school, a graveyard, and even 
the government's own Ratanaburi [District]- Si Sa Ket road. The villagers insisted that they 
had lived on and owned the land for more than a hundred years.
UCL Human Rights Promotion Project (Northeastern Branch), op. cit., p. 35.
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months before the Minister's decision was made) and signed by 1,000 villagers. The 
letter of protest argued that the concession area was not "ruined" forest but was instead 
full of very valuable natural resources and that the Non Lan people would suffer from a 
concession because the permit area would overlap land used for household cultivation. 
The letter of protest requested the Minister not to give permission to the private 
company. From February to September 1985, the Non Lan peasants kept explaining 
their troubles to government officials but instead of taking this into account, the 
government officials insisted on upholding their decision to grant the concession to the 
private company.
The antagonism between the Company and Non Lan peasants began when the 
Company encroached on lands used by the peasants. For instance, it used a tractor to 
dig up peasant gardens without giving any compensation and forbade the peasants to 
enter the concession area. It also used guns to harass any villager who took cattle to 
feed in that area. At the same time, the villagers themselves started responding with 
violence. For example, on 13 September 1985, hundreds of peasants from villages 
nearby invaded the concession area, pulled up small eucalyptus plants and burnt and 
destroyed shelters of the Company workers. As a consequence, on 21 September 
1985, four village leaders were arrested. These were later bailed out by the Si Sa Ket 
MP, Piyanat Watcharaphon.
The co-operation between government and NGOs to solve the
problem of Non Lan peasants
Government officials and NGOs worked together to help solve the land dispute 
problem of the Non Lan peasants. On 26 September 1985, the four villagers who had 
been arrested went to Ubon Ratchathani Province to ask the Union for Civil Liberty 
(UCL) for a lawyer to help conduct their case in the court. In co-operation with 
Piyanat, the UCL lawyer defended the villagers. The case ran from September 1985 to 
March 1987 and became a focal point in the land dispute with the Company and the 
villagers protest against the concession.
From December 1985, students from the Forestry Club, Kasetsart University, 
and representatives from the Conservation and Environmental Committee (composed of 
15 institutions) and the Appropriate Technology Association (ATA) explored the Non 
Lan Forest with the peasants. They prepared a report in December 1986 showing that 
66 per cent of Non Lan was completely natural forest, 15 per cent was ruined forest and 
the rest was agricultural land, and proposed that the government should withdraw the 
area of natural forest from the concession. Therefore, in March 1987, peasant 
representatives, NGO workers, students from the above organizations and Piyanat
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agreed to submit a second letter of protest including the report to the Minister of 
Agriculture and Co-operative as well as to the mass media which reported the case 
nationally.
The court procedures against the four villagers highlighted issues in the land 
dispute and the Company tried many ways to put an end to the dispute. It proposed 
hiring villagers worker in forest planting on the one hand, and threatened anyone who 
protested against the concession with death on the other. The peasants refused the 
offers and ignored the threats deciding to continue to pursue the protest against the 
concession granted to the Company.
Due to the prolonged struggle of the Non Lan peasants, the government officials 
eventually accepted that the Non Lan Forest was natural forest and in accordance with a 
letter from the Minister of Agriculture and Co-operatives dated 9 April 1987, the newly 
appointed Assistant Forestry Officer of Si Sa Ket Province called a meeting among 
villagers and informed them that the Provincial Forestry Department had decided to end 
the land dispute by moving the concession areas from the Non Lan Forest to another 
place in the same district within two months. Furthermore, in mid-May 1987 the case 
of the four villagers was quashed by the Primary Court.
In summary, the case study of Non Lan peasants illustrated the structural 
problems in Thai development context in which problems are linked to one another 
economically, politically and legally at both community and national levels. In order to 
achieve the basic minimum needs and self-reliant development, the Non Lan peasants 
needed to have state recognition of their rights to subsistence and development; i.e., the 
recognition of their rights over their lands and their control over the use of it. This land 
dispute arose between the Non Lan peasants and the private company primarily because 
of the official assumption that every Thai citizen knows the laws, regulations and 
decrees which govern the right's and processes which affect their everyday lives. In fact 
this was a wrong assumption, and the villagers only became aware of the concession 
after the company began to work in the area. Other contributing factors were the 
centralization of power and the implementation of laws and rules without consultation 
with affected parties and regardless of the facts. Such a process was also biased in 
favour of the private company. This case study showed that when there was co­
operation between government and non-government organizations with the participation 
of the people a solution to the problem could be found. Had such co-operation existed 
before the granting of the concession the problem would have been averted. From a 
development point of view, the company too has lost money and resources, as well as 
the nation which is trying to implement effectively rural development.
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Case Study III: the women workers of Srikao Company strike for 
minimum wage
In order to better understand the problems of the Thai workers presented by the 
case study in this section, I will commence by giving a general background to the 
industrial conditions and problems the workers face, the loopholes in labour laws and 
the negligence of officials. The case study itself will consider the issues in a strike by 
women for the minimum wage.
Industrial conditions and problems facing the workers.
According to Suehiro, most Thai businesses dealing with labour employment 
are in the small-scale sector and are generally family businesses owned by Sino-Thai 
families. The relationship between employers and employees can be characterized to 
some extent as a patron-client relationship which means that an owner will have a strong 
feeling of superiority vis-a-vis his workers and behave like a father in a traditional Thai 
family who holds absolute power in his family. This paternalism demands workers' 
obeisance, and protests or strikes would be viewed as acts of disobedience and, thus, 
unacceptable because such conduct would cause the patron to lose face. Although the 
enforcement of labour laws and the expansion of modem industry structures are 
becoming more wide-spread, and labour relationship are beginning to change, the 
paternalistic attitudes still persist.34
Raising the minimum wage and improving working conditions through 
collective bargaining power is regarded as a strategy for achieving improved standards 
of living for the workers. According to Narong Phetprasoet of Chulalongkom 
University however, the Thai workers who are becoming involved in labour 
movements are primarily those who are in the large formal sectors such as state and 
private enterprises, and the more the formal sector has grown, the more the labour 
movement has been strengthened within it. This finding is confirmed by research on 
the "Industrialization and the Labour Process in Thailand" by Jan Odnoff and colleagues 
which reveals that:
[T]he degree of unionization is relatively lowest at the small-scale Thai-Chinese owned Omnoi
site [Samut Sakhon Province] and highest at Rangsit site [Pathum Thani Province, near
Bangkok] with its modem technology and joint Thai-multinational ownership.35
Narong Phetprasoet, "The Effects of Japanese TNCs on Thai Labour Movement and Industrial 
Relations", in Report of the Conference on Transnational Corporations (TNCs) in Economic 
Development: A Comparative Study of Experiences between Japan and Thailand. Pattaya, 2-4 
December 1983, p. 235.
Quoted from ibid., p. 238.
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It takes a great effort to organize workers from the informal sector and 
encourage them to take action in the labour movement. Some of the reasons are to be 
found in the following considerations. Firstly, each group is composed of a small 
number of workers (30-60 workers) and scattered over various factories without easy 
communication between groups. Secondly, most are uneducated and unskilled workers 
who lack information and general knowledge about labour movements and 
organization. Thirdly, most businesses are small-family businesses in which employers 
have strong patron-client attitudes and consequently try to keep workers in isolation, 
sometimes using the threat of dismissal and censorship of information, to prevent them 
from contacting organized workers.
The Omnoi-Omyai industrial site is a case in point. This area is located between 
Samut Sakhon and Nakhon Prathom Provinces, to the Southwest of Bangkok. It 
consists mainly of small and medium-sized industries producing garments and metal, 
rubber and ceramic goods. There are a few foreign investment companies in the area 
but for the most part, most industries are Sino-Thai, having been built up from small, 
low budget enterprises, originally handled and operated by family groups. The workers 
in this area are composed of migrants from the North and Northeastern regions and 
some provinces adjacent to Bangkok. Eighty per cent of the workers had poor 
schooling and completed only primary education. This situation often results in 
widespread exploitation by employers.
Receiving wages equal to or, sometimes, below the minimum wage declared by 
the Labour Protection Law (about 70 baht per day in Bangkok area but about 65 baht in 
other provinces), most workers have to look for extra income to survive. For instance, 
some workers have to work two eight-hour shifts in order to earn enough money for the 
family. Some of them take out loans from supervisory staff, who earn fixed salaries, 
and have to pay back a very high interest rate of 15 to 20 baht per day. Some use "chit 
funds" in which individual workers purchase "shares" and take turns at borrowing 
amounts from the fund, depending on the capital sum and the interest accrued. Low 
wages also result in workers adopting other means to gain access to their needs such as 
purchasing goods in credit or playing illegal lotteries and gambling.36
In addition, many workers suffer from bad health directly related to poor 
working conditions. For instance, they often suffer from gastric problems and 
weakness due to infrequent meals and the inconvenience of the shift system. Some 
female workers have become sterile as a result of using laser techniques in the
36 Wichet Pichairatana, "Problems Facing Workers at the Omnoi-Omyai Industrial Area", U£L 
Newsletter. January-June 1987, p. 22.
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production of rubber teats. There are cases of workers having convulsions as a result 
of working closely with glues and thinners. Most factories have poor working 
environments with insufficient lighting, loud noise, crowded dormitories, and high dust 
levels -  some originating from chemical sources.37
A high rate of dismissal is another problem. Due to weak bargaining power of 
workers, most factory owners disregard the Labour Laws. For example, in 1986, most 
workers were employed on a fixed contract system of three to six months period at a 
time. When the contract was finished, the workers had to re-apply for their jobs. The 
owners then have an option to pay less than the minimum wage indicated by the Law or 
to refuse to re-employ workers if they disobeyed or dissatisfied the owners. Workers 
are clearly left open to abuse in this system.
Loopholes in labour laws and negligence of officials
Labour Laws have only existed on a permanent basis in Thailand for the past 
sixteen years and have been regarded to be public laws aiming to keep peace and order 
within society rather than protecting workers' rights.38 The Labour Laws began with 
the Ministry of Interior declaration of Labour Protection dated 16 April 2515 (1972), 
followed by the Labour Relations Act B.E. 2518 (1975), and finally by the Act of 
Establishment of Labour Courts and the Proceedings of Labour Case Considerations 
B.E. 2522 (1979).
The government enacted the Labour Protection Law to set the minimum wage 
for workers as well as indicate punishment for those who break the law. In addition, 
the Labour Relations Act aims to establish an equilibrium in negotiation between 
employers and employees. It determines the condition whereby the state can intervene 
in labour disputes and sets up standards of labour protection. The Establishment of 
Labour Courts and the Proceedings of Labour Case Consideration Acts are examples of 
government attempts to form an official administrative machinery to achieve the 
protection of worker rights. Furthermore, some official institutions set up for this 
purpose are the Labour Inspector Bureau, the Labour Protection Bureau, the Bureau of 
Labour Protection for Women and Children, the Provincial Labour Office under the 
auspices of the Labour Department (Ministry of Interior), the Labour Relations
37 Ml., p. 22.
38 Prudhisan, "Interest and Pressure Groups", pp. 129-132; see also B.D. Mabry, Xll£ 
Development of Labour Institutions in Thailand. Data Paper No. 112, Southeast Asia 
Programme, Department of Asian Studies, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, April 1979, Chs. 
4-5.
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Committee, the Compensation Fund Committee, the Labour Primary Court and the 
Labour Supreme Court.39
Notwithstanding these state institutions, the workers' rights have been 
ineffectively protected in Thai society. While the country is expanding in the industrial 
and commercial sectors, the workers are often undereducated, unhealthy, insecure and 
living miserable lives without any social security system. The ineffectiveness of the 
government bureaus can be shown in the widespread illegal practices used by 
employers and, when labour disputes between employers and employees do occur, the 
failure of the state machinery to achieve equitable solutions.
The following sections illustrate examples where the Labour Laws are ignored. 
These examples were collected by the staff of both the Legal Aid and Workers' Rights 
Projects of the Union for Civil Liberty (UCL). After working with unorganized 
workers in the Omnoi-Omyai area for over five years, UCL staff have examined many 
problems confronted by workers; for instance, problems resulting from employers 
avoiding the Labour Protection Law in terms of the payment of the minimum wage and 
the termination of employment without compensation. They have also examined the 
implementation of Labour Relations Law by government officials. Besides indicating 
loopholes in the Labour Laws, the UCL staff have on occasion prompted the 
government to intervene in some non-negotiable labour disputes and re-assess the 
implementation of Labour Laws.
Most small and middle-scale companies fail to comply with the Declaration of 
the Minimum Wage by the Minister of Interior. Employers often claim that they cannot 
afford to pay employees their legal entitlement because of general economic hardship 
and use many schemes to avoid paying the minimum wage, for instance, putting the 
workers on the contract system as mentioned above, or sometimes keeping the workers 
on "probation" rather than employing them as permanent workers because temporary 
workers have no right to receive the minimum wage. A labour survey in Bangkok and 
nearby provinces revealed that in mid-1985, of 11,244 factories with 459,716
UCL Legal Aid Project, "Botraingan ru'ang panha kanbangkhap chai kotmai dan raengngan" 
[Report on the Problems of Enforcing Labour Laws], Paper presented at the seminar: 
"Lakprakan khong sitthi ratsadon nai krabuankan kanbangkhap chai kotmai", [The Guarantee 
of Civil Rights in Legal Enforcement Procedures], [in Thai], Thammasat University, 7 
December B.E. 2528 (1985), p. K 1; see also Nikhom Chantarawitun, Ragngngan las 
kotmaithai [Thai Labour and Laws], [in Thai], Bangkok: Thaiwatthanaphanich B.E. 2526 
(1983).
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employees, there were 5,349 factories or 47.6 per cent failing to pay the indicated 
minimum wage [about 70 baht per day].40
At the same time, the government did not have either the political will or 
practical and efficient means to enforce its labour laws and decrees. For example, 
according to the data from Labour Department, for 42,887 factories with 835,581 
employees in Bangkok in 1983, there were only 82 labour inspectors (i.e. one person 
per 523 factories or per 10,190 employees), reflecting the inadequacy of labour 
inspection. This was also recognized by the Head of the Labour Department who 
attempted to improve the labour-inspection mechanism and to clarify the policies in 
1985.41
The avoidance of paying the minimum wage, by whatever means, has gradually 
become widely accepted in practice which makes this problem difficult to correct. 
Although the Revolutionary Announcement No. 103 authorised officials to punish 
employers who fail to comply with the rules of minimum wage, there is no record of 
any penalty being imposed on any employer.42 In addition, labour administration 
procedure is cumbersome and ineffective. For example, if a labour inspector discovers 
a case where workers are underpaid, he has to file a report through a long administrative 
process in which a company will be advised, warned and then formally charged by the 
Head of Labour Department before the fine can be imposed. At the same time, 
employees have no legal guarantee whether or not their situation will be positively 
addressed. The other difficulty is that if employees file a complaint against their 
employers to the Labour Department via the Provincial Labour Office, it is most likely 
that the employers would find various ways to terminate their employment as soon as 
the case was finished (usually one to two months). The chance of employees being 
protected by the Labour Protection Law is therefore very slim while the authorities do 
not have effective means and standards to penalize employers who break the law.
With regard to the problem of the termination of employment without 
compensation, the Labour Protection Law defines some legal terms used as a standard 
for implementation. For instance, termination of employment means a forced 
resignation, removal, or dismissal from the job. This may be done by employers by a 
formal or informal declaration (i.e. either written or verbal). It also covers conditions 
that permanent employees not be required to work for seven days consecutively.
4^ UCL Legal Aid Project, op. cit.. pp. K 2-3. See further details in Chalit Misit, "Kotmai
raengngan kap kanklumkrong sitthi khong phuchiraengngan" [Labout Laws and Protection of
the Rights of the Workers], in Raingan kanwichai: Kanhai khwamchuailu'a. pp. 146-165.
41
42
UCL Legal Aid Project, op. cit.. p. K 3. 
Chalit, op. cit.. p. 163.
151
Relating to the termination of employment, the employer has the right not to pay 
compensation in various circumstances such as when an employer is proved to be 
dishonest in work, intentionally committing an offence against an employer, intending 
to make a loss against an employer, breaking rules and regulations of the company, 
leaving the job for three days without an appropriate reason, being careless in work so 
that an employer's property is seriously damaged, and being sentenced to 
imprisonment.4  ^ Termination of employment without compensation frequently occurs. 
According to statistical data of the Central Labour Court, in 1982, 1983 and 1984, 
respectively there were 2,222, 1,871 and 2,765 complaints from employees seeking 
compensation.44
The Labour Court is ineffective in satisfying complaints often because 
employers used deliberate tactics to avoid the Labour Protection Law. For example, the 
employers used the tactic of, firstly, asking employees to fill in a form of resignation on 
the same day that they fill in an application form. If the employees do not meet the 
employers' demand, they can be fired at any time. Secondly, they use a loophole in the 
law, e.g. giving notices to any employee without giving the required amount of time or 
pre-dating the notices. The employee has no chance to argue against this claim because 
they are not asked to attach his signature to accept such a notice. Thirdly they used a 
tactic of asking an unauthorized person to terminate any employee, e.g. the head of a 
section or the manager ordering the employee not to work for three days continuously. 
Then the employer claims that the employee has left the job without a proper reason.
The legal procedure also discourages workers from launching any claims in the 
Labour Court. First, most employees have a great deal of difficulties in presenting 
either documentary or verbal evidence to the Court. When a labour dispute occurs, few 
workers would volunteer to be a witness because they would be afraid of their own 
employment being terminated. Second, the Labour Court procedure usually takes a 
long time to finalize, up to a year or two, and in the meanwhile the employee would be 
struggling for his daily upkeep. Therefore, when the employer proposes to pay 
compensation to the employee less than that of the rate indicated by the Law, the 
employee tends to give up presenting the case in the Court.
43 Considering the rates of compensation prescribed by law, a permanent employee who has 
worked for more than 120 days but not exceeding one year, has rights to receive compensation 
equal to the latest rate of wage for 30 days; a permanent employee, who has worked for over 
one year but not exceeding three years, has the right to receive compensation equal to the latest 
rate of wage for 90 days; a permanent employee, who has worked for more than three years, 
has the right to receive compensation equal to the latest rate of wage for 180 days. An 
exception is made for an employee for whom a trade union submits his/her complaint or 
makes an agreement with the employer on his or her behalf. In this case, the employee might 
receive a higher rate of wage than the law suggests.
44 The UCL Legal Aid Project, op. cit.. p. K 5.
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During 1980 and 1981, many workers were disadvantaged in cases of 
dismissal. Often they received only half of the compensation entitlement only because 
the Court can not find evidence to refute the employer's arguments. In addition, the 
employers find ways to pay the least compensation possible such as one-half or one- 
third or even one-quarter of the legal compensation depending on how much the 
employee understands the legal provisions. The employee has to accept the amount of 
money offered because he is unsure whether or not he would get the full amount, or 
indeed any, compensation according to the Law if he launched a complaint. 
Furthermore, the workers generally have few representatives or organizations working 
on their behalf.
Third there seems to be a large gap between legal standards and reality in the 
interpretation of disputes by the Labour Court. For example, the Court interprets that, 
based on the assumption that everybody knows the Law, an authorized person who has 
the right to sack an employee is the only one whom the Law recognizes. In fact, small 
and medium-size factories have an informal management or family structure with an 
unclear administrative system and management responsibility. Often an authorized 
person's relatives such as an employer's wife or brother can become involved in the 
family business and issue an instruction to a worker. If such persons actually ask the 
worker to give up working in the factory, when the dismissal case is presented to the 
Court, the judge will follow the Law. In such a case, the Court will interpret that the 
relatives are not authorized by the Law to terminate anybody's employment but that the 
employee himself makes a mistake if he takes the unauthorized person's order into 
account. As a consequence, when the employee leaves the job for three days upon the 
instruction of an unauthorized person, he will not be legally allowed to receive 
compensation.45
Fourth, there is very little chance of having evidence or proof against the will of 
a factory owner. For example, by arguing economic hardship, the factory owner stands 
down employees without stating the duration of time or severance payment. Nobody 
knows whether or not the owner intends to sack the employee. When the employee 
argues to the court that he was dismissed, the Court can rule that the employer 
temporarily stands down the workers because of economic hardship, and that there was 
no dismissal.46 According to the Labour Law, the employer can present various kinds 
of documents concerning economic and production problems but for the worker, on the 
contrary, it is quite difficult to collect evidence against an employer.
45
46
Ibid., p. K 7. 
Ibid., pp. K 7-8.
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The Labour Relations Law is the other important labour law. It is drawn up to 
be a legal standard for negotiation in labour dispute cases and guarantees the rights of 
workers to organize, to choose representatives and to affiliate with trade unions. It also 
protects the rights of trade union members and organization when they protest legally 
against an employer. When a case occurs, workers are able to submit a complaint to a 
Labour Relations Committee within sixty days (but not directly to the Labour Court).
There are often problems for workers in following the strict requirements of the 
bureaucratic procedures associated with the Labour Relations Law which can act against 
the spirit of Law. For example, workers sometimes submit a complaint to the wrong 
administrative body or direct to the Labour Court and waste the sixty day period, 
without being advised of the correct procedure by bureaucrats who care only about the 
legal procedure, rather than the spirit of the Law which ought to help to protect the 
rights of workers. There are many difficulties of evidence for the workers in attempting 
to use the Law and it is difficult to refute the claims of an employer who argues 
economic hardship, the factories' indebtedness or bankruptcy which are accepted by the 
Committee. Statistical data of the Committee work in 1985 and 1986 showed that the 
Committee dismissed 35 and 40 workers' complaints respectively, while only two cases 
were upheld.47 As a consequence, workers are discouraged from using the Law to 
seek their rights and feel that the Law favours the interests of employers.
Although the Labour Relations Law provides rights for workers to organize, in 
practice the workers have great difficulties in getting organized, let alone being effective 
in the protection of their rights. When workers demand their rights and attempt to form 
a union, they are dismissed on a pretext. Poor social and economic conditions have 
created an opportunity for employers to ignore the Labour Laws because of a large pool 
of cheap labour as more and more poor farmers are leaving their farms to work in urban 
factories. This situation will exist as long as the responsible parties get away with 
neglecting their legal obligations.
The women workers of Srikao Company strike for minimum wage
This case study is drawn up to show a typical example of workers' problems 
relating to industrial conditions, loopholes of the Labour Law and the negligence of 
officials as discussed above. It also shows the counterbalancing role of NGOs between 
the government and people to help sort out a new consensus for ending a strike; the 
relationship between legal implementation by the state and the people participation 
concept; and the co-operation between the government and NGOs in settling the strike.
47 Ibid., p. K 14.
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Srikao Textile factory is a middle-size factory, located in the Omnoi industrial 
area (where there are about 700 factories with over 30,000 workers). UCL staff from 
the Workers' Rights Section have been working in this areas for over five years. They 
find that most workers in this factory are women receiving less than the minimum 
wage, working in poor condition, and having no organization to protect their interest. 
The Srikao strike lasted 110 days from the end of March until the beginning of August, 
1987 and about 4,000 workers from the industrial zones around Bangkok became 
involved.
The cause of the strike was that when a large number of women workers 
demanded higher wages and fringe benefits from the factory, they were instead 
dismissed in groups of 117 and 36 workers respectively in March and July 1987. 
During the long dispute that followed, a total of 153 workers were laid off on various 
charges such as instigating a strike, submitting false certificates of sickness, terminating 
contracts and even for refusing to speak to the manager.48
After the failure of their demands in their own factory for over two months, the 
Srikao workers extended the strike and moved to demonstrate in front of Government 
House on 8 July 1987. Living without work and pay for more than two months, they 
hoped desperately for the government to hear their grievance and to intervene in this 
dispute. They submitted a letter of complaint to Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda, 
urging his government to exercise the power granted by the Article 35 of the Labour 
Relations Act B.E. 2528 (1985), to force the factory owner to re-open the factory and to 
re-instate the laid-off workers. However, the government did not consider their 
demands and on 18 July 1987, a group of riot police chased the women workers away 
from Government House.
When the authorities used violent means to suppress the women workers, the 
women gained a great deal of sympathy and support from concerned parties including 
the Student Federation of Thailand, Union for Civil Liberty, some labour leaders from 
the Thai Trade Union Congress, and from workers federations such as the Textile and 
Paper Products, Food and Beverage, as well as the mass media. These NGOs helped 
support the worker strike by putting pressure on the government to intervene in the non- 
negotiable dispute in many ways such as helping them clarify legal issues to protect 
their rights, writing letters of petition, co-operating with the MPs in the Commission of 
Labour Affairs (in the parliament), dissemminating facts and information to the MPs 
and public through mass media.
48 Somyot Pru'ksakasemsuk, "The Lessons of the 110-Day Srikao Workers Struggle", UCL 
Newsletter. July-September 1987, p. 20.
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The intensification of the protest became more tense when the last batch of 36 
workers were dismissed on 29 July 1987. For example, on 4 August 1987, the 
protesting workers along with a number of unionists and student activists marched to 
Government House and submitted a petition (the second one) to the Prime Minister. On 
7 August, eight workers - six of them female - and a student activist had their heads 
shaved and dressed up in white to draw attention to the plight of the workers. This 
action produced a great deal of emotion among young women workers and on the 
following day about 4,000 workers from industrial zones around Bangkok rallied to the 
"Sanam Luang" (Pramen ground) in the heart of Bangkok to protest against the 
government's failure to settle the labour dispute. On 9 August, the protest became more 
tense when four female workers declared they would write their next petition to the 
Prime Minister in blood. Eventually, they were stopped by a policeman and a couple of 
the MPs who were on the Committee of Labour Affairs in the parliament.49
Belatedly, the government intervened in the labour dispute between the owner of 
Srikao Textile Factory and the women workers. On 10 August, the Minister of Interior 
ordered the company to re-instate 65 of the laid-off workers on the following day or 
else face the penalty according to the Article 35 of the Labour Relations Law whereby 
the Minister had the power to make decisions when any labour dispute jeopardized 
economic and political stability or public peace and order. Under the Law, the Minister 
could also order the Committee on Labour Relations to make a decision concerning 
labour disputes and because the Deputy Minister of Interior considered that Article 35 
did not cover the rest of the laid-off workers, the Committee on Labour Relations 
promised to consider their cases as soon as possible after receiving a letter of complaint 
from the workers.50
In summary, the case study of the women workers of Srikao Textile Factory 
strike for the payment of the minimum wage represented a typical example of Thai 
workers' problem in maintaining their basic standard of living. It showed that the 
achievement of the basic minimum needs are closely related to the state's political and 
legal system and how important it is to encourage people to seek their rights through 
these systems if they are to achieve development While the government officials were 
reluctant to settle the labour dispute, the NGOs played an active role as a mediating 
power to help clarify the dispute, to give support to the workers and at the same time to 
encourage the government to exercise its power in upholding the Law. The Srikao
49
50
Ibid., p. 21. 
Ibid., p. 21.
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dispute was ended peacefully primarily by the co-operation between the government and 
NGOs in helping to solve the dispute.
Government and NGOs have much to learn from each other through co­
operation in solving problems on the basis of the political and legal systems and 
promoting development education for the common people. Both have limitations in 
making a diagnosis of the people's problems and in reaching consensus and it is 
important how they compromise with respect to each other's role and autonomy. There 
might not be any general solution to the compromise but one practical solution would be 
to work on a case-by-case basis through democratic means. If the government has the 
political will to create a law-based society, there would be a possible solution in the co­
operation between the government and NGOs in addressing the root causes of the 
problem, enhancing the role of the people in the day-to-day affairs which affect them, 
and at the same time improving the economic situation of the people. The other 
important task for both sectors is development education for common people. In order 
to enhance the participation of people in development, the people need to learn, not only 
the development aims and principles, but also from various experiences as a result of 
action in development. Therefore, the co-operation between two sectors to enhance the 
people's better standard of living through the development education is an important 
point which I emphasize in this thesis.
*
CHAPTER 5
The Role of Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) as a Catalyst 
in the Thai Development Process
To be effective in its [sic] catalytic role, NGOs must formulate and implement programmes 
that strategically promote and support long-term changes that have large scale development 
multiplier efforts.
L.D. Brown, "Organizational Barriers to NGO Strategic Action"*
NGOs ought to improve themselves too. ... Or else their community work won't achieve its 
goals, aiming to train community leaders and disseminate their activities and ideas. To be able 
to do so, NGOs have to co-ordinate more closely in sharing their primary information and 
spreading it out to their various target groups. ... Otherwise they'll wind up being another 
group of bureaucrats!
Saneh Chamarik^
As discussed in the previous chapters, we have seen a number of useful 
practical approaches drawn up in area of development. For example, amidst the influx 
of development plans and ideas influenced by both domestic and international politics 
and processes, some development concepts such as "basic minimum needs", "people 
participation", "self-reliant development" and "basic human rights" have emerged since 
the 1970s, to provide a place for the common people to participate in development.3 A 
part of the whole complex problem is pointed to by Davis and Demaine who argue that 
whether the development concepts are well implemented or not, depends largly on the 
relationship between people and the officials who are carrying those concepts to the 
people.4 The Phichit case study shows that both government officials and NGO 
workers can work to create self-reliant development, particularly in terms of providing 
the infrastructure, for enhancing overall economic development. However, as shown in 
the land dispute case of the Non Lan Peasants and the strike by the women workers of 
the Srikao Company, both officials and NGO workers found themselves having
L.D. Brown, "Organizational Barriers to NGO Strategic Action", Lok Niti; The Journal of the 
Asian NGO Coalition. Vol. 5, No. 4, n.d., p. 12. This paper was prepared for the Regional 
Workshop on NGO Strategic Management in Asia, Bangkok, Thailand, 18-23 March 1988.
Quoted by a staff member in Thai Development Newsletter. No. 15, 1987. pp. 26-27.
My recognition is also given to the "unofficial plans" of Phraya Suriyanuwat and Luang Pradit 
as attempts to create a place for the common people to participate in development.
Davis, op. cit.. p. 20; and Demaine, op. cit.. p. 104. Their arguments, in my opinion, are 
practical rather than reductionist approaches.
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difficulties in the areas of political and legal concern. Eventually, these difficulties were 
relieved by the effective co-operation between government officials, NGO workers and 
the people.
Although Thai NGOs have been playing an important role in promoting national 
development since the mid 1970s, they have faced considerable difficulties. For 
example, from the points of view of some officials, in the "highly complex 
environment" of the Australian-Thai bilateral project in the Phichit land reform areas, the 
NGOs lacked the experience necessary to be effective and tended to use a "dogmatic" 
approach to development. The NGOs also see themselves facing many immediate 
problems such as a shortage of experienced man-power with adequate self-development 
and learning through experience, irregular financial support and a difficult domestic 
political climate.5 Some NGO workers feel too that they lack a long-term strategy for 
development, an intimate understanding of social structure, and they cannot play an 
effective role in correcting the state's machinery. For instance, many NGO workers, 
other than the few who have a personal contact with politicians or government officials, 
who get involved in the child-care areas are often unable to find the means to attempt to 
correct existing laws and policies to better favour the children.6 Some NGO workers 
say that although the NGOs have direct experiences working with people, they are not 
able to find strong theoretical support.7 Some NGOs attempt to limit their activities to 
avoid involvement in political areas. Human rights NGOs, for example, may 
underestimate and limit their role (not wishing to be seen simply as agitators, and out of 
fear of the authorities) and as a result can underestimate their role and are unable to see 
the impact of their work and whether they contribute to the society as a whole.
This chapter aims to discuss the important role of NGOs as a catalyst in the Thai 
development process. The discussion will be drawn from the arguments and examples 
of previous chapters and include relevant experience from government and non­
government sectors. In doing this, a number of issues will be addressed as follows: 
first, the limitation of government officials in implementing national development plans
Jon Ungphakhon, "A Summary of the Situation and Problems of Thai Development NGOs", 
Culture and Religion. November-December, 1984, p. 11.
Sapphasit Khumpraphan, interviewed by Niphatphon Phengkaeo, "Maruchak bang ngaemum 
khong khon chue Sapphasit Kumpraphan" [Getting to Know Some Points of View of 
Sapphasit Kumpraphan], Pacharavasan. Vol. 5, November-December B.E. 2529 (1986), p. 98.
The Pacharayasan editorial staff, "Interview: Anake Nakhabutr", ib id ., p. 63; Witun 
Phoemphongsacharoen, "Senthang patthanakan naeokhwamkhit kanpatthana chonnabot khong 
ongkan patthana ekachonthai naithotsawat B.E. 2520" [The Direction of Formulation of the 
Rural Development Concepts by Thai NGOs in the late 1970s], ibid., pp. 34-35; and Barnmng 
Bunpunya, "Laoru'ang prasopkan nganpatthana choengwatthanatham" [Telling about an 
Experience in Cultural Development], ibid., p. 41.
159
in the interests of the common people; second, the positive aspects of NGOs which 
enhances their capability to fill the gap in the relationship between government officials 
and the people; third, the limitation of the NGOs which reduces their effectiveness in 
bringing development to the common people; and fourth, the assessment of NGO 
efficiency.
Limitation of government officials in national development
Following Riggs's model of "bureaucratic polity", Prudhisan argues that the 
bureaucracy has played a dominant role over Thai politics and developed itself without 
the interuption of domestic politics since 1932 because it has consolidated power 
through its administration of laws and regulations.8 Bureaucratic decision-making does 
not take account of any external forces such as political parties, interest and pressure 
groups. Most of their decisions reflect blind implementation of national policies 
following rules and regulations rather than reviewing them in operation and proposing 
amendment to those which are inappropriate and fail to benefit the people. The 
adminstration is vertically centralized through traditional authority rather than through 
groups based on similar attributes, e.g. class and occupation. At the same time, its 
isolation from the society prevents it from achieving long-term commitment and 
participation from the people.9 Although the bureaucratic power is still strong, there is 
an increasing challenge from non-bureaucratic groups such as commercial interest 
groups, political parties and even pressure groups like NGOs.
The implementation of national policies is still clouded by domestic-power 
struggles among elite groups and the constraints imposed by international economic and 
political considerations. Domestic politics, in particular after the 1973 uprising, was 
characterized by Girling as a "bureaucratic-parliamentary compromise" model, and by 
Suchit as an "open politics system".1^  This was because both local and urban business 
groups, which used to attach themselves to and enhance their benefit under military 
patronage, had begun separately to seek to participate in political activities and to gain 
political positions through the formalization of political parties and the extension of local 
politics in order to protect their own interest. However, most business groups still 
maintain a good relation with the military. During 1973 and 1976, several political 
parties based on business groups were formed and included the Social Action Party
The military may be regarded as a part of the bureaucracy ("kharatchakan pracham" or 
permanent officials). In most Third World countries, they seek power not only through the 
hierarchical line of administration but also through military means such as coup d'6tat.
Prudhisan, "Interest and Pressure Groups", p. 116.
J.L.S. Girling, "Development and Democracy in Southeast Asia", The Pacific Review, Vol. 1, 
No. 4, 1988, p. 335; and Suchit, "The Military in the Participant Politics", p. 1.
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(SAP) (banking and beverage-company groups) and Chat Thai Party (textile industry 
groups). Suchit argues that the number of MPs associated with business groups is 
increasing and shows that while 93 businessmen (34.6 per cent of total MPs) were 
elected in January 1975 and 122 (37.2 per cent) were successful in the election of 1979, 
at the same time, there were others elected who did not declare their occupations as 
businessmen. H Many local businessmen in regional areas are also seeking political 
positions in local areas so that they will have an opportunity to either form links with 
politicians at the national level or become elected to the national parliament. 
Furthermore, business associations, which were formerly prohibited from involvement 
in politics, have been increasingly accepted by the government. The government now 
allows the banking association to play a role in planning national economic and trading 
policies. The Prem government had also formulated a system, in the form of the Joint 
Public-Private Consultative Committee (JPPCC), through which the private commercial 
sectors and business association were able to present ideas to the Government for 
solving economic problems independent of the political parties. The traditional 
bureaucratic groups, namely military and public servants, are however apprehensive of 
the growing role of business groups in domestic politics and are afraid that the business 
groups might increase their power and political influence.12
Among bureaucratic groups, the military is taking a more active role than others 
in political areas. One example of this is the establishment of a political party, the 
"Rasadon Party" (People Party), by former military leaders including Generals 
Thienchai Sirisamphan and Mana Ratanakoset, which shows that some military leaders 
want to play the political game by the rules as well.13 On the other hand, some military 
argue that their direct participation in political activities is endorsed by the Prime 
Ministerial Order Nos. 66/2523, 65/2525 and 47/2529.14 In particular, the Prime 
Ministerial Order No. 47/2529, announced in March 1986, was designed for the army 
to deal with the "united fronts of the CPT". While the CPT's armed forces were 
defeated and disintegrated some years ago and the CPT is no longer a threat to national 
security, the army argued that the "front organizations" remain in the form of "capitalist, 
undemocratic" groups and people who create and aggrevate social problems.15 Acting
Suchit Bunbongkam, "Kanpatthana thang kanmu'ang khongthai: patisampan rawang tahan 
sathaban thang kanmu'ang lae kanmisuanruam thang kanmu'ang khong prachachon" [The Thai 
Political Developmant: The Interaction between Military, Political Institutions and Political 
Participation of the People], [in Thai], Bangkok: Chulalongkom University Publishing, B.E. 
2531,(1988), p. 209.
Ibid., p. 212, 214, 215.
Suchit, "The Military in the Participant Politics", p. 6.
Ibid, pp. 3-6. The anti-communist orders referred to previously.
Ibid., pp. 13-14.
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under this Order, the army proposes mobilizing mass participation to confront the "front 
people whether they are in business, national politics or in local government."16 In this 
way, the military consider it necessary to become involved in politics, development and 
even a psychological campaign aimed at defending "national security".17 According to 
Suchit, the mass mobilization by the military is mainly set up to organize villagers to be 
para-military troops in organizations such as the Military Reservists for National 
Security, "santi-nimit" unit ("Dream of Peace unit").1** The activities are focused on 
military training, information seeking methods, and reinforcing the perceived threat of 
communism, but is in no way concerned with the concept of representative democratic 
systems. The military seek to extend their mass-mobilization base to support them 
rather than to encourage popular political participation which would enhance the political 
legitimacy and power of civilian politicians and, therefore, threaten the political status of 
the military.19 Recently the Commander-in-Chief, General Chavalit Yongchaiyut, 
proposed a new wider-scope "security law" to replace the Anti-Communist Act of B.E. 
2495. Academics, politicians and NGO workers alike have opposed this proposal for 
fear that the proposed law would nullify the gradual increase in pluralism seen 
especially in the activities of interest and pressure groups in Thai society.20
However, "power politics" among elite (mainly between business and military) 
groups do not give much direct benefit to the common people. Although the rate of 
growth of GDP reached 11 per cent in 1988 and was 10 per cent in 1989, problems 
carrying over from previous years include reducing natural resources; growing 
unemployment; stagnant public administration and social welfare systems; and an 
income distribution pattern which is still very uneven and resulting in a wider and 
wider gap between the rich and the poor.21
Ibid., p. 14.
Ibid., p. 15.
Ibid., pp. 15-16. The "Dream of Peace unit" was established in 1982 under the auspices of 
Prime Ministerial Order No. 66/2523. The unit aimed to operate political campaigns against 
communist insurgents by being organized in a small mobile group, spending some times in a 
village before moving to another villages. The unit also performed political activities such as 
mass psychology and entertainment such as music and shows. Several MPs complained that 
the army used the unit to campaign against them during election campaigns.
Suchit and Kanala argue that while the military accept political participation in principle, 
"political freedom, voluntary popular participation in the political process, and the necessity of 
participatory institutions are not given much attention by the military leaders" who "prefer 
mass mobilization to voluntary participation" arguing that Army-directed "mass mobilization 
is essential for political stability" and that popular participation destabilizes the status quo and 
lessens the economic, social and political status of the Army [Suchit and Kanala, op. cit., pp. 
10- 11].
20
21
Far Eastern Economic Review: Asia Year Book 1990. p. 236.
Ibid., p. 238; and N.C. Bruce, "Benefits of Boom not Being Spread Around", Canberra Times, 
7 January 1990.
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In addition to domestic politics, official planners feel constrained with the 
uncertainty of the international environment. As suggested by the World Bank for the 
Sixth Plan, because of the decline of real incomes of the common people, the increase 
of poverty and external dependency, the immediate problem facing Thailand was to 
raise domestic saving in both the public and private sectors while sustaining economic 
growth. To solve the problem, the World Bank wanted the government to stimulate 
domestic saving by reforming the tax structure (e.g. rationalizing direct tax exemptions, 
broadening the indirect tax base, improving tax administration, and increasing tax 
revenue to 15.5 - 16 per cent of GDP); cutting back government public expenditure; 
controlling foreign borrowing; and finally by promoting an export-led growth 
strategy.22 The difficulties confronting Thai development planners in achieving the 
Bank’s suggestion, included predicting the consequences of decisions and actions in the 
increasingly complex international environment, especially in key areas of global 
financial systems, trade and marketing (which can change rapidly and alter the nature of 
competition), and the need to control the increasing debt problem. Moreover, a cutback 
in public expenditure would certainly affect social issues particularly public health and 
education for the common people. To cope with these difficulties and the turbulance 
which could result if they are not solved, the government requires multiple perspectives 
and wide participation in the planning and implementation process.
With regard to the bureaucratic system itself, we can see some factors which 
constrain national development. In the first instance there are the official perspectives 
and attitudes towards development issues and people whereby some technocrats express 
their profesional capacity by emphasizing the methodology of drawing up development 
plans and yet overlook the essential theme of whom the development is for. While 
some officials express a good understanding of the people’s problems, their solutions 
often do not go directly at the problems. We have seen this in the Phichit study where 
the people's views were initially ignored. Also, as Wichet, a UCL staff member who 
works in Omnoi-Omyai areas points out, some government lawyers find difficulties in 
understand problems from the worker's or other perspectives and often misinterpret the 
facts in cases involving workers and farmers. This makes them unable to provide 
effective and precise legal representation for the workers and farmers in the court.23
The World Bank, Growth with Stability, pp. iii, 8, 9, 10; see also Abonyi and Bunyaraks, Qß* 
cit.. p. 39.
Wichet Pichairatana, "Panha raengngan kap botbat khongrat lae ongkhon patthana ekachon nai 
kanchuailu'a thang kotmai" [Labour Problems and the Role of the Governmental and Non- 
Governmental Sectors in Legal Assistance], in Raingan kanwichai: Kanhai khwamchuailu'a, p. 
170.
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The different perspectives between officials and the common people may be analysed 
via socio-economic and educational backgrounds.
Secondly, government officials are bound by rules, regulations and the 
centralized bureaucratic system which do not allow them the flexibility to respond to 
particular circumstances. The Phichit experience is obviously a case in point that the 
NGO workers, after spending at least six months with the people in the targeted areas, 
could indentify the people's immediate needs and help adapt the development projects to 
suit the people's interest. The land dispute of the Non Lan peasants also shows the 
result of insensitive centralized decision-making which aggravated the local response. 
Working for almost two years in the Omnoi-Omyai areas, Wichet also discovers that 
government lawyers are unable to argue any legal case against the government because 
they are themselves government officials.24
Thirdly, some officials are not in a place which enable them to help correct the 
people's problems. Government Law Faculties as well as groups and clubs within 
universities are relatively impartial in considering the common people's problems. They 
do not necessarily accept totally the government's point of view but try to approach the 
facts on their merits. They often help the people to handle the basic procedures 
necessary to bring grievances to the courts. Nonetheless, the limitation is that they are 
not in a position to legally represent the people.
The positive aspects of NGOs in development
NGOs have a positive contribution to make in correcting government 
inefficiency to benefit the common people. First, the NGOs use a people's problem 
approach. As shown in the Phichit case study, the NGOs initiate new, small pilot 
projects such as rice banks, buffalo banks, co-operative store and medicine funds which 
concentrate on the main problems of a targeted community which are identified by the 
community itself. NGO projects rely on the capability of people to make decision and 
solve problems by themselves. Their objectives are broadly to expand economic 
opportunity and productivity; to increase equitable distribution of resources; to enhance 
local authority and self-reliance in community development; or in short, to "promote 
wider choices for poor and powerless populations".25
24 M i . ,  p. 170.
25 Brown, op. cit.. p. 12. This is supported by the research of Werachai and Tips who examined 
project identification, formulation and start up by the Thai NGOs working in the rural 
development areas and found that most NGOs under investigation used a people-centered 
approach. Important factors in the NGO methods were that 95.5 per cent of NGOs initiated a 
project by collecting social, economic, demographic information on sites, resources and 
people; 85.1 per cent set objectives and targets before collecting information; and 77.6 per cent
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Second, the NGOs are much better situated in working with the common people 
due to their independence. As shown in the cases of the land dispute and the women 
worker's strike, the NGOs are not obliged to the government sector and more likely to 
be impartial in considering the facts on their own merits and in considering a dispute 
from the standpoint of the workers and farmers as well as recognising the rights of 
employers and businesses. They are also able to present the legal cases of farmers and 
workers in court, to protest against unjust laws and against the behaviour of 
government bureaucrats and to campaign for public support to change laws 
inappropriate to the people's interest. Brodhead supports this independent role of 
NGOs saying that:
Their freedom to function (institutional interests) implies that NGOs can do what governments 
cannot, ought not, or will not do - supporting human rights for example, or working in 
politically 'difficult' areas, or asking questions about the impact of large-scale projects on the 
environment, and so on. [T]he will to do so derives from a vision of development rooted in 
values and choices. It is this willingness to explore alternatives and to experiment with new 
initiatives which makes NGO autonomy [independence] valuable and worth protecting.2^
Third, the NGOs have flexibility which is shown in their ability to adapt 
development projects appropriate to local needs, to operate with limited resources and to 
respond to the changing economic and political situation in target areas which may arise 
during and after the implementation of development projects Their flexibily enables 
them to solve problems beyond organizational boundaries. The NGO flexibility derives 
from their relatively small, loose and informal stucture which allows the participatory 
concept to be implemented with equity and all staff members are, for instance, generally 
in a position to know the whole working process and participate in determining the 
organizational strategies.27 Flexibility is also evident in the NGO's having a clear 
understanding of different development contexts and of long-term strategies which they 
can apply to identify the people's needs, to choose well-timed intervention and to
use an organizational ideology as a guideline. Both small and large NGOs rank the expected 
outcomes, firstly, as fostering people's self-reliance; secondly, as developing human resources, 
leadership and people's organizations; and thirdly, as developing the people's quality of life 
[Werachai Narkwiboonwong and W.E J. Tips, "Project Indentification, Formulation and Start­
up by Voluntary Organizations (NGOs) in Thailand's Rural Development", Public 
Administration and Development. Vol. 9, 1989, pp. 205, 208]. In addition, some NGOs are 
more familiar with local circumstance than are the officials and have more experiences in 
micro-level planning of development activities. For instance, Werachai and Tips' analysis 
shows that 82 per cent of small NGOs use personal ideas and experiences whereas 76 percent 
use an organizational ideology to plan the activities while in the case of larger NGOs 94 per 
cent use an organizational ideology and 76 per cent use personal ideas and experience to guide 
their activities ribid.. p. 206].
26 Brodhead, Herbert-Copley and Lambert, op. cit.. p. 70
27 Even then, the small NGOs are likely to be less bureaucratized and more responsive to 
development problems than the large NGOs.
165
support their staff or an institution or group in the field or even soften rigid values and 
ideologies.2**
Fourth, the NGOs have a wide range of co-operation with common people,29 
government officials and both domestic and international NGOs. To enhance the local 
people's interest, the NGOs offer rich experiences in micro-level development planning. 
At the national level, the NGOs can not only promote the people's self-identified needs 
but also lobby the government in favour of the common people; and in some cases 
convince the government to take specific urgent measures in development to cease the 
disputes as shown in the case studies. At the regional level, the NGOs co-operate with 
like-minded organizations to establish networking, for moral support, meetings, 
conferences and exchange of ideas and experiences. The NGOs make contact at the 
international level for reasons similar to those at the regional level and also for financial 
support.
The principle of co-operation is "autonomy through partnership".30 That is to 
say the co-operation relies upon a basis of equal partnership in development. The 
Phichit case study shows that the NGOs can be agents for bringing government plans to 
the people, identifying people's needs in targeted areas, providing information for the 
design of development plans, and associating with government officials and funding 
agencies in the formalization of policies and implementation and monitoring of 
programmes of rural development and agarian reform. This case study demonstrate that 
the activity of each organization has an "autonomy through partnership" aspect in that 
government officials contribute the infrastructure service, the donors facilitate the 
transfer of resources and the NGOs offer expertise in mobilizing human resource 
development.
28 K. Bysouth, "Inducing Positive Development: Finding New Ways to Turn Constraints into 
Opportunities", Lok Niti: The Journal of the Asian NGO Coalition. Vol., 5, No., 4 (n.d.), pp. 
23-26.
Decha Siriphat interviewed seven peasants of Fang Village (Non Thong Sub-district, Nong 
Ru'a District, Khon Kaen Province), on 10 November 1986. The peasants said that they 
needed NGO workers to help advise and give examples of how to solve problems on their 
behalf. For the peasants themselves, they found it difficult to think in the framework of 
change and could not think on their own -  "khit yak, khit mai-ok, mai mi tuayang khit yon 
khong mai dai" [Decha Siriphat, "Waduai thatsana chaoban to kan damnoen-ngan khong 
ongkan patthana ekachon" [Dealing with the Villagers' Points of View about the NGOs], 
Pacharavasan. pp. 76-79].
30 D.L. Umali, "An Agenda of Future Tasks for NGOs Towards International Development Co­
operation", Lok Niti: The Journal of the Asian NGO Coalition. Vol. 5, No. 4, n.d., p. 7. 
Paper prepared for the Second World NGO Symposium held from 6-8 October 1987 in 
Nagoya, Japan on "Development to the 21st Century - Challenge to NGOs".
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Co-operation allows NGOs to maximize their efficiency as well as to increase 
people's participation. They can avoid duplication of effort and expenditure; they have 
the opportunity to learn, to exchange information and experiences with each other, pool 
resources; and increase specialization through joint programming. The NGOs raise 
local self-confidence and self-consciousness through co-operative activities between 
NGOs and local people. As such NGOs effectively broaden the base of people's 
participation in the development process. Leger supports an effective role for NGOs 
arguing that:
To be effective as agents of change, it is not the size of an organization, nor the budget that 
matters. It is rather the definition of a clear purpose and the planning of long-term strategies 
that take into account the relevant area of action. It also involves foresight, motivating special 
talents, networking with other like-minded institutions, and searching for ways to attract the 
"unconverted" 3 *
Limitation of NGOs reducing their effectiveness
NGOs are not without their limitations and there are traps which can reduce their 
effectiveness: first, while NGOs hope to alleviate the suffering of the poor, they may be 
excessively single-minded, and mistaken in their "altruism".32 Brodhead says that the 
altruism can be both a strength and a weakness of NGOs:
A strength because it draws upon the tremendous energy inherent in the noblest of human 
urges for justice, compassion, and service; a weakness because it seems somehow to place 
such organizations above critical assessment of their own motivation and operations.33
In addition, the NGO objective may be unclear because they derive from ill-defined 
target groups and vice versa. Some NGOs might purposedly shift their objectives from 
supporting the rural poor to promoting their organization's interest.34 This can be a 
fairly common problem for agencies which depend on short term funding from donors 
who have their own objectives which may not always coincide with those of the 
recipient NGO.
Second, the NGO independence is like a two-edged sword. The NGOs which 
place independence above their objectives may reduce their potential for co-operation 
with other NGOs and the government. At the same time a lack of independence may
31 R. Leger, "Agents of Change in International Co-operation: Challenges to New Partnerships 
between Funders and NGOs", Lok Niti: The Journal of the Asian NGO Coalition. Vol. 5, No. 
4, n.d., p. 11. This article contains excerpts from the address of Ronald Leger, Director, 
International NGO Division, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), to the 
World Congress on Philanthropy Metro Toronto Convention Centre, Toronto, Canada, 27 
May 1988.
32 Brodhead, Herbert-Copley and Lambert, op. cit.. pp. 29-46. See also Lissner, op. cit., Ch. 6.
33 Brodhead, Herbert-Copley and Lambert, op.cit.. p. 31.
34 Schneider, op. cit.. pp. 208-209.
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cause problems of co-operation. For example, an NGO might undermine its bargaining 
power as an equal partner in a co-operative arrangement due to a lack of independence 
or having an unclear concept of independence.35
Third, although the NGO flexibility which derives from a loosely and informally 
organized structure helps an organization be responsive to different situations, too much 
flexibility can weaken the organization. For instance, some NGOs lack concrete 
organizational goals and measures for making an assessment of their progress and 
identifying mistakes. They are consequently unable to achieve self-development by 
learning from experiences. Some may find it difficult to establish priorities or to focus 
resources on key areas because they do not adequately identify problems. Some may 
have difficulties in day-to-day administration and expansion due to their lack of rules 
and regulations, which they regard as "bureaucratic" and therefore unacceptable. In 
these circumstances, newcomers perhaps find it hard to fit in to an agency where they 
do not know the appropriate procedure and "can violate core norms and values with the 
best of intentions" and then have "difficulty recovering from the initial mistake."36
Fourth, some constraints come from leadership. For example, a charismatic 
leader whose strength lies in contact with the people might be overwhelmed by the 
demands of administration until he or she cannot fulfil the provision of service to the 
people. At the same time, some NGO workers led by the charismatic leader might get 
used to being so dependent on the leader that they lose creativity and ability to challenge 
their own ideas. This can undermine the development of organization.37 On the other 
hand a power struggle can sometimes emerge between competing factions in an 
organization. This may result in an NGO becoming "organizationally fragmented, 
subject to ideological and territorial dispute".38 Such a struggle bogs down decision 
making and makes the organization ineffective. The struggle might end with the 
departure of officers from the organization.39
Fifth, most NGOs are vulnerable to irregular financial support. NGO financial 
resources often come through informal personal contact. Financial support from 
international funding agencies is short-term support, from one to three years and this 
discourages the NGOs from establishing long-term strategies and administration. As a
35 Brodhead, Herbert-Copley and Lambert, op.cit.. pp. 46-70.
36 Brown, op. cit.. p. 13.
37 Ibid., p. 14.
38 K. Bysouth, "Non-Government Organizations", in P. Eldridge, D. Forbes and D. Porter (eds.), 
Australian Overseas Aid: Future Direction. London: Croom Helm, 1986, p. 224.
39 Ibid., p. 14. In addition, the NGOs cannot afford to have long-term conflict due to financial 
constraints which make donors wary of unstable organizations.
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consequence of being financially vulnerable, some NGOs might unwittingly shift 
organizational objectives from helping the poor to promoting their own organization, as 
mentioned above, and might be easily manipulated by other institutions such as political 
parties and the bureaucracy. Insecure finances can also mean that the NGOs can often 
not afford to pay experienced and skilled professional workers and therefore, while 
NGOs may have strong intentions to do something good for society, many of their staff 
will be young unskilled and inexperienced workers.
However, an NGO which receives large and continuous financial support from 
a single source may face donor expectation which it would not be able to fulfil. Even 
where an NGO receives grants from more than one donor its executives may feel 
uneasy when they face different donor expectations. In these circumstances recipient 
NGOs may sometimes avoid reporting detailed evaluation of projects, providing more 
simple and favourable reports acceptable to the donors in order to reduce the potential 
for conflict occuring with the donors. If the donors are not satisfied, the NGO might 
find that donors demand more control over the funding which may effectively limit the 
NGO's work .40
On occasion governments might intervene in the affairs of recipient NGOs by 
putting pressure on a foreign government not to support certain types of NGOs which 
work in politically sensitive areas. It is often indicated in the official financial contracts 
that local NGOs must not to disturb the relations between states, otherwise the 
government-linked donor funding agencies have the right to withdraw the money from 
the projects supported. Human rights organizations can therefore have a lot of 
difficulties gaining support from such government-linked funding agencies due to the 
fact that they sometimes deal with politically complex issues which might be regarded as 
disturbing the principle of non-intervention between states.
Sixth, while the NGOs are assumed by many to be a bridge for peaceful social 
change through the support of concerned development parties such as local people's 
groups, government and non-government organizations, the process of co-operation 
necessary to achieve change is a very difficult task in many ways.
In co-operation with local people's groups, there may be insistence of villagers 
to various aspects due to the NGO's lack of understanding of the local social 
environment, lack of sensitivity and basic motivation as well as a lack of belief in the 
NGO's work by the local people who are involved in the projects. The NGOs may 
intervene in some projects without consideration for the feeling of people concerned.
40 Brown, op. cit.. p. 14.
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On the other hand, the success of creating self-reliant organizations may create problem 
for NGOs. The authorization of local groups and the building of strong people’s 
organizations may create new challenges towards the NGOs in such a way that the 
NGO values and ideologies would be investigated and their activities would be 
examined by people's organizations.
Working primarily with a local people's organization, even if there is regular 
contact with the government, may create a problem, if for instance, the NGOs might be 
accused by the government of being agitators because the government has to face "new 
demands from previously quiescent local groups".41 Moreover, when the domestic 
political climate is in a crucial condition, the people might be mobilised by the 
authorities to resist NGO activities and the organization may be banned by the 
government as happened in Thailand to the UCL, and other politically oriented 
organizations, after the bloodly coup in October 1976. In co-operation with the 
government, the NGOs might have to be careful in organising their activities.
Considering the problems of co-operation between local people's groups, 
government and non-government organizations, we can see that the interest of people's 
groups and NGOs are less contradictory than those between NGOs and the state (or 
government) as mentioned in Chapter 3. When problems of co-operation between 
people and NGOs occur they may be corrected by adapting values and activities to 
practical requirements. Nonetheless, when conflicts between the government and 
NGOs occur, the former has power to avoid the problems by closing down the 
organization or threatening the NGO workers.
In co-operation with funding agencies, the question of efficiency becomes 
important. NGO efficiency is difficult to evaluate because the NGO projects are to 
some extent subject to uncertainty which may occur on the ground of funding support. 
Canadian researchers indicate that the traditional method of cost-benefit analysis is not 
an appropriate tool for measuring NGO efficiency because it pays "little attention to the 
dynamic long-term effects of a development intervention"; and note that "conventional 
tools of economic analysis are not well adapted to the needs of small projects".42 
However, there are still difficulties in deciding appropriate methods for evaluating NGO 
efficiency.
41
42
Ibid., p. 15.
Brodhead, Herbert-Copley and Lambert, op. cit.. pp. 102-103.
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Assessing NGO Efficiency
Although NGOs are extremely difficult agencies to organise and to lead,43 they 
have a great potential for encouraging constructive social change if they can overcome 
their weaknesses. Canadian researchers propose the use of three factors for assessing 
NGO efficiency, taking into account the roles of NGOs, government sectors and 
funding agencies in contributing to an "indigeneous" development. The three factors 
are 1) the ability of NGOs to mobilise resources; 2) the long-term impact of their 
projects; 3) the extent of NGO co-operation.44
1. The ability of NGOs to mobilise resources
The mobilization of resources is an important part of NGO effort. Some NGOs 
such as NOVIB and ICCO (the Netherlands), CAA, ACR and FFHC (Australia) 
attempt to combine fundraising and development education activities together in their 
approaches to the public.45 At the same time, donor NGOs attempt to encourage 
recipient NGOs to mobilise local contributions in the form of voluntary worker and use 
of locally available materials as well as monetary donation. The level of local 
contribution indicates the ability of NGOs to establish strong links with the community 
and to promote local participation in development activities.46 The human rights 
organization, UCL, for example, adopts the approach that 20 per cent of the total budget 
must come from local contribution (membership fee, legal-assistence fee and public 
donation).
There is now widespread support for NGOs to tap official government and 
international development resources. It is argued that, with independent action, NGOs 
should be able to tap large-scale, capital intensive programmes of government-to- 
govemment assistance and to integrate some NGO activities into national development 
plans.47 This idea is good and worth trying. However, this idea may not be easily 
implemented because many western donor NGOs, such as in the US and even 
Australia, receive grants from their governments under conditions which effectively 
make the aid a tool of their foreign policies and national interests. A Report of the US 
Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), for example, reveals that:
43 Brown, op.cit.. p. 17.
44 Brodhead, Herbert-Copley and Lambert, op. cit.. pp. 99-156; Brown, op. cit.. pp. 15-17; and 
P. Campbell, "Improving Organizational Effectiveness of NGOs", Lok Niti; The Journal of 
the Asian NGO Coalition. Vol. 5, No. 4, n.d., pp. 18-22.
45 Community Aid Abroad (CAA), Australian Catholic Relief (ACR) and From from Hunger 
Campaign (FFHC).
46 Brodhead, Herbert-Copley and Lambert, op. cit.. p. 105.
47 Ibid-, PP- 152-153.
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[A] 11 AID-related development activities occur within the framework of the United States 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,... the central purpose of the Act is... [T]o promote the 
foreign policy, security and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples of the 
world in their efforts toward economic development and internal and external security, and for 
other purpose .48
This instruction applies to funds given to the US voluntary agencies and therefore limits 
the conditions under which they in turn can support NGOs in developing countries. 
The Report further criticises the relationship between aid and US government foreign 
policies in that:
The fundamental barrier to the promotion of true development lies in the purpose of the 
Foreign Assistance Act. Quite simply, the purpose of the Act is to promote U.S. foreign 
policy, U.S. national security, and the welfare of the American people. The development of 
the Third World is only a secondary aspect of the legislation— a means to the ultimate 
objective .49
As an instrument of the US government foreign policies, the Report argues, 
development assistance programmes are hindered by numerous political and economic 
constraints. For example, the Act refers to a list of countries that may not be assisted 
because they are ruled by "communist" governments. In the light of the above, it is 
clearly important for recipient Thai NGOs to discuss further about their sources of 
development assistance from Western NGO donors.
Australian government development assistance is also linked to the so called 
national interest. Quinn (1982), Australian Council for Overseas Aid (1983), 
Community Aid Abroad Press Release (1984), and Eldridge (1986), all note that 
Australian development assistance is closely linked with the country's foreign policy, 
strategic and economic interests.50 In particular in relation to Australian NGOs this can 
be seen in the official funding support for NGO programmes in Vietnam and 
Kampuchea where official bilateral aid has been curtailed by UN resolutions (i.e. non­
recognition of the Phnom Penh government). Eldridge too makes the point in his 
criticism of the Jackson Report of 1984, which he notes takes a similar view to the 
Harries Report of 1979, that "Australian aid policy has sought to serve several
48 E. Schmidt, J. Blewett and P. Henriot, Religious Private Voluntary Organizations and the 
Question of Government Funding. Final Report. New York: Probe Third World Studies, 1981, 
p. 19.
49 Ibid., p. 21.
50 P.T. Quinn, "An Analysis o f Australian Non-Government Aid Agency Programmes: 1979- 
80", Australian Outlook. Vol. 36, No. 3, December 1982, pp. 19-25; Australian Council for 
Overseas Aid (ACFOA), Crisis in Overseas Aid. Canberra: ACFOA, March 1983; 
Community Aid Abroad (CAA), "Jackson Report Fails to Address Basic Faults in Aid 
Programme", Press Release, Canberra, 18 June 1984; and P. Eldridge, "Philosophy and 
Strategy of the Jackson Report: Towards an Alternative Perspective" in P. Eldridge, D. Forbes 
and D. Porter (eds.), Australian Overseas Aid: Future Directions, pp. 3-23.
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objectives, notably strategic, diplomatic, trade, employment of Australian expertise and 
institutional resources as well as humanitarian purposes" without considering the 
priority of development over other goals.51 The official aid policy interprets co­
operation with NGOs in such a way that the role of NGOs is "seen as one of 
complementing official 'development-oriented' programmes and filling in gaps with 
small-scale local programmes for disadvantaged groups plus disaster relief'.52
However, some American and Australian NGOs are aware of the obstacles to 
creating self-reliant development, which can result from these forms of "tied" official 
aid being channelled through them, and encourage their development partners to 
consider an European model of development aid as an alternative. American NGOs 
argue that despite the official sources of funding, German and Dutch development aid 
can truly support self-reliant development in Third World countries because the 
governments disburse funds to church agencies which then make grants to NGOs. 
Taxes collected from Catholic citizens are distributed to the Catholic church agencies 
such as MISEREOR in Germany, CEBEMO in the Netherlands. Those collected from 
Protestant citizens are distributed to the Protestant church agencies such as EZE in 
Germany, ICCO in the Netherlands.53 Thus the government is not involved in project 
selection, or any administration. In this funding model, the church agencies serve as a 
buffer between the state and the non-governmental organizations, neutralizing some of 
the political and strategic implications of government funding. American NGOs argue 
that European NGOs feel much more secure in pursuing indigenous development 
because:
Some PVOs -  rightly or wrongly -  place their faith in these agencies [the churches], assuming 
that they will know when they are being used and when Christain principles are being 
compromised. The PVOs feel that the agencies will know when to reject government funds, 
promoting the PVOs from potentially compromising situations.5^
The source of aid can also predetermined the type of aid. According to several 
American and Australian NGOs, European funding agencies normally support projects 
that focus on structural change such as land redistribution, the elimination of marketing 
intermediaries, political and legal reform. Government aid, on the other hand, goes to 
projects that concentrate on increases in production or the acquisition of skills, but do 
not change fundamental economic and political structures. These NGOs claim that 
"European-funded projects tend to attack a problem at its roots, effecting long-term
51 Eldridge, "Philosophy and Strategy", p. 5. For commentary on the Harries Report see H. 
Bull, "The Harries Report and the Third World", Quadrant. July 1980, pp. 48-53.
52 Eldridge, op. cit.. p. 7.
53 Schmidt, Blewett and Henriot, op. c i t . p. 104.
54 Ibid., p. 104.
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change"; whereas the governments's aid "makes the status quo more bearable, 
ameliorating the present situation without challenging the system that causes poverty 
and hunger in the first place."55 In relations between the source of aid and type of aid, 
indigenous development can be created on the ground of co-operation between 
government and non-government organizations which have common aims in 
development and which are not constrained by political considerations between 
countries. In the case of Germany it is because church and state activities have been 
linked historically that the government has been less sceptical of church involvement in 
development work. In contrast to the US government view and its relationship with aid 
agencies, the German government considers the problems of the poor in developing 
countries to be a normal and appropriate task of the church. As a consequence, many 
NGOs are ensured that their indigenous development projects have been facilitated. 
One American NGO claims also in a similar vein that "[T]he Dutch government and 
(Dutch) non-government organizations are much more liberal thinkers, more radical in 
their analysis" than the US (and I believe Australian, government-controlled funding 
agencies). They are more willing to trust people on the local level, even taking a grater 
risk, to carry out their own self-reliant development projects.56
However, some NGOs who want to see indigenous development occur at the 
grass roots attempt to encourage their national NGOs to reassess their development 
assistant policies. Quinn, an ex-ACFOA research officer, analysed the Australian non­
government aid agency programmes in 1979 and 1980 and found that:
Unfortunately, far greater emphasis is placed on the humanitarian aspect of their work and the 
unarguable contention that therefore such projects are "good", than on any real assessment of 
whether the objectives such as self-help, basic needs and sustained economic benefit are being 
achieved.5^
Quinn also encouraged the Australian NGOs to reassess the practical implementation of 
their development efforts and to conduct appropriate project evaluation which, he 
argued, "needs to be more than a study of cost-effectiveness", in particular, an 
evaluation using participatory approaches with recipient NGOs and people. Eventually, 
he hoped his analysis would "stimulate some interest in NGO aid and prompt serious 
attempts to develop the methodologies necessary to implement such participatory 
evaluations".58
55 Ibid., p. 105.
56 M i . ,  p. 105, 106.
57 Quinn, op. cit.. p. 25.
58 Ibid., p. 25.
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2. The long-term  im pact of NGO projects
The long-term impact of NGO projects is seen in terms of sustainability and 
replication. Sustainability means an NGO ability to support the non-profit, independent 
activities as long as possible. In many instances when funding agencies stop their 
financial support, the recipient NGOs simply assume they have to stop their activities. 
However the Canadian researchers argue that this represents a crucial weakness of a 
static cost-benefit analysis approach. They argue further that since funding support is 
limited, NGOs should only begin projects which they would be able to sustain with
local resources.5^
There were some meetings discussing about the sustainability of self-reliant 
development. For example, on 22-23 June 1983, at the Xavier Hall, Bangkok, CCTD, 
CGRS, TVS and several other NGOs co-operated to hold a seminar on "The 
mobilization of domestic contribution for development". Fifty participants from various 
types of NGOs such as Catholic, Buddhist, urban and rural NGOs were involved. This 
seminar discussed ideas and methods of using traditional ceremonies of both Christians 
and Buddhists as a means of encouraging people to participate in development.60 On 5 
July 1984, in Bangkok, the TDSC and TVS joined hands to arrange a seminar on "The 
Activities for the Economic Self-Reliance of the NGOs". This seminar extended the 
mobilization of resources by talking about the possibility of trading handicraft and 
agricultural products.61 In addition, the NGO workers exchanged experiences in 
mobilising resources with foreign NGO representatives. For example, on 4 September 
1984, in Bangkok, TVS conducted talks with Martin Fiyer and Valerie Keady of the 
Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO). Both gave some basic ideas and methods to 
mobilize resources, i.e. the NGOs need to make a positive effort to explain their work, 
to give reliable facts and information, to ensure people of all walks of life are able to 
support important, useful public activities. The methods include writing letters to 
people, companies, charity organizations; conducting activities (sport, music, charity 
walk) in which local people participate, collecting membership fees and selling goods.62 
On 7-9 November 1986, in Korat, RUDOC conducted a seminar under the theme: 
"Problems of the self-reliance of Thai rural NGOs" involving more than 30
59 Brodhead, Herbert-Copley and Lambert, op. cit.. p. 106.
60 Thai Volunteer Service (TVS) and Thai Development Support Committee (TDSC), "Khosa- 
rup bangton chak kansammana kanradomthun painaiprathet pu’a kanpatthana" [A Basic 
Assumption from the Seminar on the Mobilization of Domestic Contributions for 
Development], Seminar Paper, Xavier Hall, Bangkok, 5 July B.E. 2527 (1984), pp. 1-12.
61 CAA (Australia) is successful in this kind of activities by trading handicrafts and goods from 
various Third World countries.
62 TDSC and TVS, op. cit.. pp. 1-4.
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representatives from funding agencies such as CEBEMO (the Netherlands), MISERIOR 
(Geramany), LDAP (Canada) and various NGOs. The objective was to exchange 
experiences in sustaining the self-reliant development in rural areas. Drawing on 
succesful working experiences with the peasants from Khon Kaen, Surin, Phichit and 
Chainat, the NGOs concluded that the close relationship among villagers, development 
officials and NGO workers both within and outside the country would enhance the self- 
reliant development.63
Furthermore, NGOs have the ability to pioneer innovative activities and 
approaches which can be replicated by government planners and funding supporters. 
The replication of NGO projects is the most important measure of NGO cost- 
effectiveness because it introduces successful new tools, techniques or approaches to a 
wider area and population. In addition, it introduces new forms of working 
relationships, new approaches to project designs, and new forms of co-operation to 
achieve design results.64 The technical feasibility of reproducing past successes relies 
upon the quality and availability of NGO information about successful projects. This 
task of being a development pioneer is given to the NGOs.
However, many NGOs are weak in evaluating and documenting the results of 
successful development projects as well as lacking effective communication with other 
NGOs and sometimes with funding agencies. This may be because, for instance, they 
have bias against the bureaucratic system, their working process is not established and, 
in particular, they need to be guided by a people-concerned development theory which 
they have not yet achieved. As discussed in relation to the potential development 
theories in Chapter 1, we found that the present theories are wanting. As Alliband, an 
Assistant Professor of Community Development at Southern Illinois University, 
discovers, the most difficult task in teaching the community development course is that:
63 Tawikiat Prasoetcharoensuk, "Khokhithen ruang kanphuangtoneng khong ongkon ekachon 
patthana chonnabot" [An Opinion Concerning about the Self-Reliance of Rural Development 
NGOs], Pacharavasan. Vol. 5, November-December B.E. 2529 (1986), pp. 42-50; and Seri 
Phongphit, "The Quest for Self-Reliance of Thai NGOs", RUDOC N ew s, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
October-December 1986, pp. 1-4.
64 Brodhead, Herbert-Copley and Lambert, op. cit.. p. 111. The authors argue that the replication 
does not occur at a project-by-project basis but it somehow influences on local government 
policies.
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"there is no tested corpus of scientific laws or well-grounded theories. Instead, field 
practitioners often operationalize a set of key community development concepts and values 
including self-reliance, locally felt needs, citizen participation, decentralization of key 
resources, and grassroots problem-solving. The shape and substance of any given programme 
built upon these principles may differ markedly from one case to the next. ... the essence of 
community development is the quest for community self-expression. That is, there can be no 
magic formula or standardized model for successful community development work, each case 
will be idiosyncratic, unique, and particularistic [italic as in original]6^
From his direct experience in working with the NGOs in India, Alliband also argues 
that the "community development" approach pioneered and carried out by the NGOs is 
"inherently political in nature" because its objectives and successful outcomes result in 
"the redistribution of power within a community or society" or "an expression of 
'democracy in action'."66
3. The extent of co-operation
The most difficult part of NGO activities, according to the Canadian researchers, 
is to bridge the gap between development partners, because a wide variety of activities, 
views and ideologies may confuse and frustrate co-operative development efforts.67 
The researchers, however, suggest a possible strategy of co-operation with the 
government and funding agencies on an ad hoc basis, using the principle of 
independence through partnership. They argue that NGOs play an important role in 
indigenous development as equals with other parties such as government agencies and 
donors. Regardless of the principle of independence through partnership in co­
operating with government, there is a risk that the NGOs may be become simply "mini­
aid agencies in the mold of official agencies".68 Then, the funding agencies may regard 
the NGOs as channels for achieving their own style of financial development projects.
There is an increasing role for Thai NGOs accepted by the government sectors 
and international agencies. For example, on 14-16 June 1988, in Bangkok, the 
ESCAP-NGO Regional Symposium on Co-operation for Economic and Social 
Devlopment was held. The symposium report promoted the role of NGOs as "a 
catalytic and participatory role" in "promoting development"69 as accepted by the Thai 
government, the UN (in General Assembly resolution 41/171) and the UN family of
6  ^ T. Alliband, Catalysts of Development: Voluntary Agencies in India, West Hartford 
(Connecticut): Kumarian Press, 1983, p. ix.
66 IM -, P- 9.
67 Brodhead, Herbert-Copley and Lambert, op. cit.. p. 115
68 Ibid., p. 150. See also Eldridge, op. cit.. p. 7
69 Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), "Report of the ESCAP- 
NGO Regional Symposium on Co-operation for Economic and Social Development", 
Bangkok, 14-16 June 1988, p. 2
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agencies such as the UNDP, FAO, WHO etc. as well as regional organizations such as 
ESCAP. The Executive Secretary of ESCAP noted some interesting points about the 
characteristics of NGOs:
Usually at the forefront of public debate on crucial development issues, NGOs were no less 
active in upholding the rights of disadvantaged groups, articulating popular interests and 
promoting equitable development strategies, monitoring the actions of governmental and 
private holders of power, and campaigning to help right specific wrongs. Along the way, 
NGOs had built an admirable reputation for cost-effectiveness, innovation, flexibility and the 
ability to get the job done at the grass-roots level.7^
However, the Executive Secretary of ESCAP also pointed out some weaknesses of the 
NGOs:
But for NGOs an adequate means of learning what each other was doing, avoiding duplication 
or mistakes, was sorely lacking... For example, today one could hardly hold a clear or 
conclusive discussion on how many, what type and in what particular fields NGOs were active 
because available data were imprecise.... Thus, there was a clear need for developing, if not a 
co-ordinating mechanism at the current stage, some type of networking arrangement for 
exchanging information and making it available to interested members of the NGO 
community. ... NGOs wouldn't restrict their attention to intra-NGO concerns, and would 
provide suggestions for increased interaction with the wider spectrum of governmental and 
intergovernmental organizations ...7*
To be an effective catalyst in development, the NGOs need to improve their 
work in many ways such as in expanding their ideas of development, increasing their 
involvement in development education and improving their administration. Some 
NGOs, for instance, seem to understand management in terms of hierarchy and 
technocratic efficiency and fail to distinguish between weak and strong but flexible 
management. For the very important task of providing a systematic analysis of 
development, NGOs generally need to be more professional. By professional I mean in 
the way defined by Canadian researchers who have argued that "professionalism" for 
NGOs means the ability to "promote effectiveness and efficiency and at the same time 
enhances participation, the sharing of information, and flexibility".72
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis begins from the premise that the Thai NGOs have been able to 
combine the four significant concepts of "basic minimum needs", "people's 
participation", "basic human rights" and "self-reliant development" for effective 
implementation in the development process. In examining this argument, I adopted a 
definition of development which requires the achievement not only of economic growth 
but also of human values of dignity and freedom for people. In order to achieve the 
human values in development, the state, which plays a crucial role in development, 
must guarantee the standard of living for its citizens through the economic, political and 
legal systems. The definition of development in this context was used to test the 
achievements of development in Thailand by posing the questions of who gained in the 
development process, who lost, and under what conditions. In addition, human values 
were considered to apply generally regardless of the separation between developed and 
developing sectors in societies.
After defining the term development and assessing something of the failures of 
development in the 1960s an 1970s to achieve overall benefits for the people despite the 
improvements in economic growth rate, I provided an overview of the development 
theories used to explain the problems of underdevelopment in the Third World. 
Generally speaking, the theories were characterized into two schools of thought: the 
modernization and neo-Marxist theories. Both theories recognized the existing 
problems of underdevelopment but had different perspectives as to the causes of these 
problems. Modernization theory considered that underdevelopment occurred within a 
country and proposed a succession of approaches to cure the problems, all of which 
proposed internal remedies based on theoretical approaches such as structural- 
functionalism, behaviourism, institutionalization, and, more recently, public policy 
analysis. On the contrary, neo-Marxism analysed the problems of underdevelopment 
through the class-analysis approach which investigated not only conditions within the 
country but also in the broader relations or links with other countries (the international 
system). In terms of the definition of development chosen at the outset, neo-Marxism 
gave more significance than modernization to the conditions of the common people and 
their place in the broader development context, and in this way came closer to our 
definition of development.
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The neo-Marxist analysis of class has not not been satisfactorily resolved. The 
role of the state in development was found to be better developed but still not adequate, 
although it did recognize that the state had an obligation to bring prosperity to its own 
citizens through development. In practice, however, most development programmes in 
Third World countries like Thailand were shown to be influenced by the modernization 
theory which emphasized macro-economic growth and up-to-date sophisticated 
technology at the expense of human development. Under the guideline of this theory, 
the role of the state was reduced to supporting the development of private enterprise in 
national development. The state could not at the same time extend its role to provide 
development opportunities and services to the common people (the landless, small 
peasants and wage workers) in Thailand without the consent of the dominant ruling 
elites, as in most developing countries. More importantly, the state could not provide 
even a place for an nucleus of "indigenous" people organizations to grow because of its 
adherence to growth and security. Even though the state set up a form of people's 
organizations such as farmer's organizations and worker's organizations, they did not 
represent the political and legal interest of common people and were little more than 
extensions of the bureaucracy.
Applying modernization in the Thai development context has shown that Thai 
development followed a similar pattem to the international one. The social discourse 
between the modernizing pattem and socialist-oriented ideas has been apparent since the 
"Great Reform" of the King Rama V (from 1873 to 1910). Pye, an American scholar, 
noted that a modernizing pattern had long been relevant in the Thai society in that 
westernizing reform had been advocated and applied by the Anglo-American school 
through a number of Western consultants. He also accepted that the modernizing 
process could not achieve the establishment of domestic interest and pressure groups 
(from which people's organizations would emerge). At the same time, socialist- 
oriented ideas also appeared to oppose the domination of the westernizing approach, for 
example, Phraya Suriyanuwat's The Science of Property. After the Thai political 
change from the Absolute Monarchy to Constitutional Monarchy in 1932, another 
attempt was made by Luang Pradit Manutham who proposed a similar idea in the form 
of the Draft National Economic Plan to counter the modernizing mainstream by 
extending the role of the state to give service and benefit to the common people. 
Although both attempts failed to be fully implemented as a national economic plan, 
some of their ideas were accepted in the economic policies of later governments.
After the end of World War n, modernization theory came to play a dominant 
role in the world economy. Modernization was seen to be economically successful in 
the form of the Marshall Plan in reconstructing Western Europe and in politically
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constraining Communist expansion. On both fronts modernization was to be important 
internationally. Thailand was regarded as one of the targets of the Communist 
movement in the Southeast Asian region and particular domestic conditions such as the 
political struggle among groups and economic difficulties after the War paved a way for 
the modernization approach to be introduced in the Thai economy, through the influence 
of the World Bank and IMF, and the US economic survey team, to replaced the policy 
of Economic Nationalism. The first Thai national economic plans were formulated 
under the guideline of the modernization theory and with support from the US. One 
consequence of development under the guideline of this theory, however, was the 
upsurge of social and political disorder in various parts of the world among those 
adversely affected; in the face of criticism and reassessment of the modernization theory 
by some academics and human development organizations, the LLO launched the basic 
needs strategy to cure the problems of underdevelopment. However, this strategy 
extended the discussion to people's participation in development process and to the 
recognition of the basic human rights concept in development. The changes in the Thai 
development context from the 1960s to the early 1970s should therefore not be 
considered in isolation from the international theoretical debates.
While the common people were in a weak position economically, socially and 
politically, the NGOs created by active community interest groups in Thailand played a 
catalytic role, not only to encourage the common people to participate in the state's 
affairs, but also to attempt to assume the power to influence the state's affairs. They 
were acting as a counterbalancing power while narrowing the gap between the people's 
participation and the state. They were different from the government-led organizations 
in that they use a people's participation approach to tackle the problems of 
underdevelopment rather than simply attempt to cure the symptoms of poverty by 
providing social welfare handouts.
After establishing a place for the NGOs and presenting a brief history of the 
Thai NGOs, I investigated their catalytic roles in the development process. In the first 
place, the NGOs implemented the people's participation approach very much on a "trial 
and error" basis and, understandably in terms of the many factors involved, they did not 
make any great achievements. In particular, there were new altruistic movements 
emerging at a time of political polarization between the Left and Right in Thailand 
during the mid 1970s. They were effectively suppressed by intolerant "anti­
communist" governments which were especially hard on the NGOs whose activities 
were related to political-oriented issues, but after the moves to depoliticize the debates 
on the future of the Thai society, there was a reconsolidation of the NGOs with the 
financial support of various international NGOs. The Thai NGOs then played a
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catalytic role in voicing the grievances of the common people, encouraging the 
government to reassess the direction of development, to distribute the benefits of 
economic growth to the common people and to depend less on the guideline of 
modernization theory, and to encourage the government to recognize and improve the 
law-based society in Thailand.
In so doing, the NGOs gradually came to apply the four development concepts 
of "basic minimum needs", "people's participation", "self-reliant development" and 
"basic human rights" and drew on "local wisdom" to help strengthen the common 
people's organizations. In order to sustain the standard of living, it was found that the 
common people had to improve their production, to control their production and to 
obtain the bargaining power "to determine what was good for improving their production 
and increasing their income. The maintenance of living standard had to be carried out 
by their own interest groups such as "indigenous" peasant and worker organizations. 
The state and NGOs had an obligation to help support them. While the government 
announced the development plans to implement the people participation and self-reliant 
development approaches and to guarantee the basic minimum needs for the common 
people, I argued that people participation and self-reliant development could not be fully 
implemented unless the basic human rights concept was recognized. The basic human 
rights concept itself guarantees the development of human dignity and freedom, the 
recognition of political decentralization and the recognition of legal development as well 
as the strengthening of the law-based society.
In order to work on behalf of the common people, I argued that the NGOs had 
to play the role of a counterbalancing power with the government and that they should 
be an autonomous partner in the development process. This autonomy was also applied 
to co-operation with the funding agencies, otherwise the NGOs would fall into the 
category of a government organization or be regarded as a branch agency of funding 
organizations.
Three selected case studies proved that the NGOs would be able to play an 
important role economically, politically and, to a certain extent, legally, on behalf of the 
common people. The Phichit experience showed the potential for the people 
participation approach to create self-reliant development and co-operation between the 
NGO workers, government officials, and funding agency teams. The Non Lan 
peasants' land dispute case indicated the problems of peasants in rural areas and the 
protection of their land rights through political and legal means. The case of the women 
workers of Srikao Company illustrated the problems of wage labourers in cities, the 
loopholes in the labour laws and the need to guarantee a standard of living through the
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political and legal schemes. These three case studies demonstrated that economic 
growth was inseparable from political and legal development; or in other words, 
development for the common people is vitally linked with the representative democratic 
system. The case studies also indicated the limitation of both government and non­
government sectors in correcting the common people's problems in isolation from each 
other, and highlighted the benefits which could come from co-operation between the 
two sectors.
Without the guideline of any particular development theory, I argued that the 
NGOs had to carry on their catalytic role in the Thai development process more or less 
on a "trial and error" basis. Their goals could better be achieved through structural 
analysis of people's problems and "alternative development" approaches. This would 
be supported by the positive characteristics of NGOs such as independence, flexibility 
and co-operation with the common people, government officials and funding agencies. 
However, to increase NGO efficiency it would be necessary to reduce negative 
characteristics such as the misconception of altruism, and to ensure that independence 
and flexibility were maintained in the face of dependence on financial support from 
various parties. The "trial and error" of NGOs would be minimized when they would 
be able to discover an appropriate development model which could be replicated in other 
areas.
Finally, I found that the four development concepts were directly concerned
with the political economy approach; and other approaches such as cultural community, 
%
appropriate technology and religious approaches could be considered as part of the 
structural analysis of political economy approach. A further study in the interest of the 
common people, from my point of view, should be carried out using the same 
framework, for example, the creation and strengthening of people's organizations, the 
model of political decentralization, the study of social history,1 and even the creation of 
a theory of civil society.2 The NGOs are an important movement which respects the 
laws and is peaceful in its approach to solving the problems of the common people.
1 C.J. Reynolds, What is Social History?. Thai Khadi Research Institute, Paper No. 8, Bangkok: 
Thammasat University, 1979.
2 By 'civil society* I mean the theory of autonomous governed classes who have an obligation as 
citizens of the state. At the same time, they seek to have an autonomous power to control the 
state's affairs (democratization). Thus, in my opinion, the theory of civil society should be 
defined as the theory of the governed in the representative democratic system, independent from 
the theory of the state. However, both theories are related in terms of the balance of power. 
Otherwise, the term 'civil society' will be subsumed within the framework of the theory of the 
state.
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This is not to say the NGOs do not involve themselves in politics, for such involvement 
is in fact an important technique as seen in the case studies. It does mean that by 
emphasizing the legal basis for the people's right to development they emphasize the 
essentially political responsibility of governments to guarantee development to all 
citizens.
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